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Abstract 
Advances in communication technologies and computational power have determined a technological 
shift in the data paradigm. The resulting architecture requires sensors to send local data to the cloud for 
global processing such as estimation, control, decision and learning, leading to both performance 
improvement and privacy concerns. This thesis explores the emerging field of private control for Internet 
of Things, where it bridges dynamical systems and computations on encrypted data, using applied 
cryptography and information-theoretic tools.Our research contributions are privacy-preserving interactive 
protocols for cloud-outsourced decisions and data processing, as well as for aggregation over networks 
in multi-agent systems, both of which are essential in control theory and machine learning. In these 
settings, we guarantee privacy of the data providers' local inputs over multiple time steps, as well as 
privacy of the cloud service provider's proprietary information. Specifically, we focus on (i) private 
solutions to cloud-based constrained quadratic optimization problems from distributed private data; (ii) 
oblivious distributed weighted sum aggregation; (iii) linear and nonlinear cloud-based control on 
encrypted data; (iv) private evaluation of cloud-outsourced data-driven control policies with sparsity and 
low-complexity requirements. In these scenarios, we require computational privacy and stipulate that 
each participant is allowed to learn nothing more than its own result of the computation. Our protocols 
employ homomorphic encryption schemes and secure multi-party computation tools with the purpose of 
performing computations directly on encrypted data, such that leakage of private information at the 
computing entity is minimized. To this end, we co-design solutions with respect to both control 
performance and privacy specifications, and we streamline their implementation by exploiting the rich 
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ABSTRACT
CRYPTOGRAPHIC FOUNDATIONS FOR CONTROL AND OPTIMIZATION:
MAKING CLOUD-BASED AND NETWORKED DECISIONS ON ENCRYPTED DATA
Andreea B. Alexandru
George J. Pappas
Advances in communication technologies and computational power have determined a tech-
nological shift in the data paradigm. The resulting architecture requires sensors to send local
data to the cloud for global processing such as estimation, control, decision and learning,
leading to both performance improvement and privacy concerns. This thesis explores the
emerging field of private control for Internet of Things, where it bridges dynamical systems
and computations on encrypted data, using applied cryptography and information-theoretic
tools. Our research contributions are privacy-preserving interactive protocols for cloud-
outsourced decisions and data processing, as well as for aggregation over networks in multi-
agent systems, both of which are essential in control theory and machine learning. In these
settings, we guarantee privacy of the data providers’ local inputs over multiple time steps, as
well as privacy of the cloud service provider’s proprietary information. Specifically, we focus
on (i) private solutions to cloud-based constrained quadratic optimization problems from
distributed private data; (ii) oblivious distributed weighted sum aggregation; (iii) linear and
nonlinear cloud-based control on encrypted data; (iv) private evaluation of cloud-outsourced
data-driven control policies with sparsity and low-complexity requirements. In these scenar-
ios, we require computational privacy and stipulate that each participant is allowed to learn
nothing more than its own result of the computation. Our protocols employ homomorphic
encryption schemes and secure multi-party computation tools with the purpose of perform-
ing computations directly on encrypted data, such that leakage of private information at
the computing entity is minimized. To this end, we co-design solutions with respect to both
control performance and privacy specifications, and we streamline their implementation by
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Following the Internet of Things (IoT) revolution, billions of interconnected sensors and
actuators are deployed in every aspect of our daily lives: in intelligent infrastructure and
transportation systems, medical monitoring devices, industrial manufacturing and robotics.
This increase in the number of available sensors and generated data has led to an increase in
the required computational capacity for decision-making and global processing that involves
estimation, control and learning.
One solution is to outsource the computations from low-power platforms to powerful
remote cloud servers that offer on-demand storage, aggregation and processing capabilities.
Apart from storing and processing databases, cloud computing has been employed for ma-
chine learning applications in e.g., healthcare monitoring and social networks, smart grid
control and autonomous vehicle control, and integration with the IoT paradigm [46, 189].
Alternatively, distributed architectures where agents jointly carry out computations over a
communication graph are preferred at the edge level [157].
This emerging paradigm makes privacy a fundamental issue in both cloud-based and
distributed applications, due to the sensitive nature of the collected data, e.g., individual lo-
cation, healthcare information or energy consumption. The privacy concerns of outsourced
computing include tampering with the stored data and interfering with the computation,
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which can be maliciously or unintentionally exploited by the cloud service or other tenants of
the service. Recent examples of data leakage and abuse by cloud servers have drawn atten-
tion to the risks of storing data in the clear and urged more measures against untrustworthy
participants [17, 119, 191]. Moreover, concerns about intellectual property may prevent
competitors from pooling their data or models together, and thus hinder the development of
better solutions for customers. Under these circumstances, securing communication chan-
nels between the participants is necessary but not sufficient to protect the users’ data; we
also need to address corrupt participants and secure the data.
As seen from the surge in smart infrastructure and widespread robotics, these new trends
are also arising in control systems and require transitioning to cloud-based and networked
algorithms. Furthermore, the paradigm of data-driven decision, which lies at the core of
adaptive control solutions, is reimagined and demanded for in the era where the collection,
transmission and processing of data is no longer a technological bottleneck.
Since networked control systems are a fundamental layer in critical infrastructure such
as electric power, transportation, and water distribution networks, cyberattacks have been
common in this context too. Well-known examples are the malwares Stuxnet, Duqu, Indus-
troyer, or Triton [61], as well as inference attacks using smart meters as surveillance devices
[109, 168]. Furthermore, stealth, false-data injection, replay, covert, and distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks were identified [181]. Cyberattacks on control systems can be
highly critical. Unlike attacks on classical IT systems, attacks on control systems may influ-
ence physical processes through digital manipulations [207] and cause substantial damage.
In conclusion, there is a major industrial need for both cloud-based and distributed
algorithms which can perform estimation, control and optimization tasks while maintaining
the privacy of the user data.
1.2 Overview of the thesis
An overarching theme in this thesis is achieving privacy for structured data, i.e., data which
is connected by models or optimality conditions. Control and optimization problems, as
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well as training and inference over neural networks, involve time-series data in instances
of dynamical systems. Knowledge regarding the evolution and control of such systems can
be advantageous in providing security, however, the structure of dynamical systems raises
challenges, such as preserving privacy over multiple time steps and iterations, or efficiently
deploying security measures for constrained devices with fast response times. This is unlike
the data in one-shot computations in static databases, for which many privacy techniques
have been already developed.
General problem statement. Given a dynamical system which generates privacy-
sensitive data, we design algorithms for cloud-based or networked decision-making which ef-
ficiently meet privacy requirements. Specifically, we stipulate that each participating party
is only allowed to learn its own result of the computation and no other partial information.
In this thesis, we design multi-disciplinary solutions which ensure the privacy of struc-
tured data arising from critical infrastructure and user-related sensitive queries, weaving
together knowledge of optimization, systems and control engineering, with modern crypto-
graphic tools such as homomorphic encryption and secret sharing. The goal is to ensure
that everything other than prior knowledge about the structure of the data remains private.
The threat model assumed in this thesis is of passive adversaries that do not tamper with
the data, but try to infer information from it.
Optimization and control foundations. In the following, I will give an overview of
the problems investigated in the thesis, emphasizing the targeted foundational concepts. In
Chapter 2, we provide the reader with a basis on the cryptographic notions we will use in
this thesis. Chapter 3 is devoted to providing protocols that securely evaluate the most com-
mon optimization problems arising in control systems synthesis (and other decision-making
algorithms from machine learning): quadratic optimization problems with or without con-
straints, with or without regularization. These solutions provide foundations for solving more
general optimization problems in a private manner. In Chapter 4, we review and explain
the concept of private sum aggregation, where an actor obliviously aggregates the individ-
ual contributions of other actors, and we expand it to the more complex, but widespread
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scenario of private weighted sum aggregation, with proprietary weights. Securely evaluating
such affine laws is essential in distributed and federated computation, such as consensus,
control, averaging and learning. From Chapter 5 onward, we focus on control-theoretic
fundamental algorithms. We start with linear control policies, which are one of the pillars
of control systems theory. Despite their pervasiveness and elementary formulation, under
privacy requirements on the system’s signals and control parameters, they bring significant
challenges. To illustrate secure solutions, we consider a linear estimation problem, a linear
optimal regulator and structured distributed linear control. The latter is based on the pri-
vate weighted aggregation described in Chapter 4. We further consider a nonlinear control
policy in Chapter 6, in particular, an optimal receding horizon controller. The private so-
lution builds on the quadratic programs from Chapter 3, as well as on the solution from
Chapter 5. In Chapter 7, we explore data-driven control problems, where the decisions
have to be privately computed from input-output data, without prior knowledge of the sys-
tem parameters. This framework comes with extra complexity, compared to a system with
known model. The solutions presented in this chapter build on all the previous chapters, in
terms of private optimization algorithms, insights on streamlining private computations and
reducing complexity from aggregation and linear control, and connections to the nonlinear
control. Finally, in Chapter 8, we complement the research contributions in this thesis with
a discussion on future research directions targeting malicious adversaries that do not follow
the prescribed protocols, secure preprocessing for end-to-end private control procedures, and
more specialized and complex private algorithms.
1.3 Related work
Secure control for networked systems has been intensively studied in the literature during
the last decade. Comprehensive surveys can be found in [53, 67, 137, 181, 207]. Most
existing work focuses on the integrity and availability of networked control schemes using
various defense mechanisms. For example, control-related concepts such as detectability and
identifiability of deception attacks are investigated in [181] and game-theoretic approaches to
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deal with DDoS attacks are considered in [110, 150]. Nevertheless, interdisciplinary solutions
are required to secure control systems.
The emerging field of encrypted control primarily aims for confidentiality of sensitive
system states, control actions, controller parameters, or model data in the entire control
loop. More generally, an encrypted controller can be defined as a networked control scheme
that simultaneously ensures control performance and privacy of the client system(s), as well
as privacy for the service provider’s proprietary information, through specialized crypto-
graphic tools. In the framework of networked control, attacks compromising confidentiality
such as eavesdropping might seem less critical since they do not immediately cause phys-
ical misbehavior. However, “passive” spying often precedes “active” attacks compromising
data integrity and availability [67]. Abstractly speaking, encrypted control is realized by
modifying conventional control schemes such that they are capable of computing encrypted
inputs based on encrypted states (or encrypted controller parameters) without intermedi-
ate decryptions by the controller. Encrypted control goes beyond secure communication
channels by providing security against curious cloud providers or neighboring agents that,
during controller evaluations, would have access to unsecured data. This is the key dif-
ference between encrypted control and existing secure control schemes focusing on confi-
dentiality [145, 210, 211]. Meeting these privacy demands under real-time restrictions is
non-trivial and requires a co-design of controllers and suitable cryptosystems. We further
survey encrypted control in [200].
Among the tools used in the literature to protect the privacy of the data computed
upon, we mention homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation [119], and
differential privacy [84], that we survey below.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) encompasses a range of cryptographic
techniques that facilitate joint computation over secret data distributed between multiple
parties, which can be both clients and servers. The goal of SMPC is that each party is only
allowed to learn its own result of the computation, and no intermediary results such as inputs
or outputs of other parties or other partial information. The concept of SMPC originates
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from [230], where a secure solution to the millionaire’s problem was proposed. Surveys
on SMPC can be found in [74]. SMPC involves communication between parties and can
include individual or hybrid approaches between techniques such as secret sharing [29, 184,
201], oblivious transfer [172, 186], garbled circuits [30, 106, 230], (threshold) homomorphic
encryption [49, 75, 171, 177], etc.
Homomorphic Encryption (HE), introduced in [190] as privacy homomorphism, refers
to a secure computation technique that allows evaluating computations on encrypted data
and produces an encrypted result. HE is best suited when there is a client-server scenario
with an untrusted server: the client simply has to encrypt its data and send it to the
server, which performs the computations on the encrypted data and returns the encrypted
result. The first HE schemes were partial, meaning that they either allowed the evaluation
of additions or multiplications, but not both. Then, somewhat homomorphic schemes were
developed, which allowed a limited number of both operations. One of the bottlenecks
for obtaining an unlimited number of operations was the accumulation of noise introduced
by evaluating operations, which could eventually prevent the correct decryption. The first
fully homomorphic encryption scheme that allowed the evaluation of both additions and
multiplications on encrypted data was developed in [102], where, starting from a somewhat
homomorphic encryption scheme, a bootstrapping operation was introduced. Bootstrapping
allows to obliviously evaluate the scheme’s decryption circuit and reduces the ciphertext
noise. Other fully homomorphic encryption schemes include [50, 51, 62, 91, 103]. For a
thorough history and description of HE, see the survey [159]. For multiple users, the concept
of functional privacy is required, which can be attained by functional encryption [43], which
was developed only for limited functionalities. Privacy solutions based on HE were proposed
for genome matching, national security and critical infrastructure, healthcare databases,
machine learning applications and control systems [19, 22, 188], etc. Of particular interest
to us are the the works in control applications with HE, see [6, 11, 92, 108, 134, 170,
198], to name a few. Furthermore, there has been a soaring interest in homomorphically
encrypted machine learning applications, from statistical analysis and data mining [22] to
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deep learning [188].
The privacy definition for SMPC stipulates that the privacy of the inputs and interme-
diary results is ensured, but the output, which is a function of the inputs of all parties, is
revealed. For applications such as smart meter aggregation [2], social media activity [194],
health records [81], deep learning [1], and where input-output privacy is valued over output
accuracy, the SMPC privacy definition is not enough [238] and needs to be augmented by
guarantees of differential privacy.
Differential Privacy (DP) refers to methods of concealing the information leakage from
the result of the computation, even when having access to auxiliary information [84, 86].
Intuitively, the contribution of the input of each individual to the output should be hidden
from those who access the computation results. To achieve this, carefully chosen noise is
added to each entry such that the statistical properties of the database are preserved [87],
which introduces a trade-off between utility and privacy. When applied in a distributed
system [85, 212], DP provides a problematic solution for smaller number of entries in the
dataset, as all parties would add noise that would completely drown the result of the com-
putation. Several works combine SMPC with DP in order to achieve both computation
privacy and output privacy, for instance [58, 185, 187, 202, 213]. An intuitive compari-
son between privacy-preserving centralized and decentralized computation approaches, with
different privacy goals and utilities is given in Table 1.1.




any desired query everything (except
possibly the result
of the query)





any desired query everything other
than the result of
the query















original users or dele-
gates
Table 1.1: Comparison between centralized and multi-party privacy-preserving approaches [213].
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1.4 Research contributions
Dynamical data challenges. Cryptographic solutions were developed for the most part
for static data, such as databases, or independent data. However, dynamical systems are iter-
ative processes that generate structured and dependent data. Moreover, output data at one
iteration/time step will often be an input to the computation at the next one. Hence, special
attention is needed when using cryptographic techniques in solving optimization problems
and implementing control schemes. For example, values encrypted with homomorphic en-
cryption schemes will require ciphertext refreshing or bootstrapping if the multiplicative
depth of the algorithm exceeds the multiplicative depth of the scheme; when using garbled
circuits, a different circuit has to be generated for different iterations/time steps of the same
algorithm; the controlled noise added for differential privacy at each iteration/time step will
accumulate and drown the result etc. Furthermore, privacy is guaranteed as long as the
keys and randomness are never reused, but freshly generated for each time step; then, the
(possibly offline) phase in which uncorrelated randomness is generated, (independent from
the actual inputs), has to be repeated for a continuously running process. In this thesis, we
design solutions with all these issues in mind.
The research contributions in this thesis concern cloud-based decision and data process-
ing solutions that guarantee privacy of the users’ local data over multiple time steps, as well
as privacy of the service provider’s proprietary data; and private computation and aggre-
gation over networks in multi-agent systems. In all these scenarios, we stipulate that each
participating party is only allowed to learn its own result of the computation and no other
partial information. The idea is to leverage cryptographic tools which allow the evaluation of
computations on encrypted data, ensuring in this way that the privacy of the encrypted data
is never violated. This approach achieves strong privacy guarantees, which are highly desir-
able in a wide range of applications, from critical infrastructure to now ubiquitous Internet
of Things devices. Such a privacy goal can be accomplished using SMPC, which encom-
passes a range of cryptographic techniques that facilitate joint computation over secret data
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distributed between multiple parties. In this thesis we employ, among others, homomorphic
encryption, secret sharing and oblivious transfer.
Private cloud-based optimization and control
A fundamental control scenario for large systems involves a client outsourcing to a cloud
service the computation of the control decisions, using model predictive control with control
input constraints. Without privacy requirements, the cloud controller could solve the prob-
lem locally through an optimization algorithm. With privacy requirements on the states
and control actions, and possibly on the system model, the cloud controller should not in-
fer anything about this private data during and after the computations. This fits in the
paradigm of encrypted computations. A popular solution is to have the cloud perform the
computations on the client’s encrypted data, without the need of decryption. This can
be achieved via additively homomorphic encryption (AHE), which allows the evaluation of
affine transformations on encrypted data. However, there are two subproblems that cannot
be privately solved using solely AHE: constrained optimization and iterated multiplications.
Based on the solutions to these two problems, which are described below, we show how to
achieve cloud-based encrypted model predictive control with private input constraints in
Chapter 6 (following the work presented in [9, 11]).
Privately solving constrained optimization problems. More generally, consider an
optimization problem based on private costs and constraints from data providers, that needs
to be solved at a cloud service and the solution given to a requesting party. Satisfying the
constraints requires iteratively projecting the private optimization variables on the feasible
space. The first challenge is that the cloud is unable to perform this nonlinear projection
operation using only the native affine operations allowed by AHE. Another challenge is to
only provide the solution to the optimization problem, and nothing else, despite publicly
known optimality conditions that connect the private data and can reveal private auxiliary
information. We solve both challenges using blinded communication and oblivious transfer
between the cloud and the requesting party, which allow the evaluation of the projection
operation on the homomorphically encrypted data of the providers in Chapter 3. This
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guarantees no information is leaked, even under collusions with data providers [10, 13].
Estimation and control with encrypted model and encrypted signals. In most
of the literature on encrypted control, the dynamics model is considered public. In Chapter 5
(based on the work in [6]), we propose a protocol for linear state estimation and linear
control of a dynamical system, while enabling privacy for both its model and signals. This
introduces the challenge of computing fast multiplications between encrypted values, with
little communication, and of continuing the encrypted computations over multiple time
steps. We require that the majority of the work for estimation and control be delegated to
the cloud controller, while the system, comprised of individual subsystems, and the actuator
do minimal work. We exploited the dynamics of the data by leveraging labeled homomorphic
encryption, which associates a label to each message, and uses secret shares based on the
labels and AHE to enable multiplication between two encrypted messages. We used the time
steps associated to the measurements as labels so that there is a natural synchronization
between the subsystems and the actuator. We also proposed an extension to obtain the
online encrypted evaluation of higher order polynomials, at the cost of offline communication
and storage. Thus, we were able to privately compute the estimation over measurements
from multiple subsystems, then privately compute the optimal control action, all in real-
time.
Private data-driven Control as a Service. Control as a Service is becoming a
reality, particularly in the case of building automation and smart grid management. Often-
times, it is required to control the client’s system without assuming knowledge of its model.
Consequently, large quantities of input-output data collected from the client are uploaded
to a cloud server. The goal is to privately outsource data-driven decision and control to
cloud services. We optimize the control algorithm used on this privacy-sensitive data for
both efficiency and privacy. The idea is to focus on the encryption-aware co-design of a
data-driven control algorithm, so that the privacy of the client’s uploaded data, desired
reference and control actions are maintained. We achieve privacy by using a leveled fully
homomorphic encryption scheme to enable the cloud to perform complex computations on
10
the client’s encrypted data. We achieve efficiency by manipulating the tasks required by
the control algorithm, including matrix inversion, such that they only involve a cheap low-
depth arithmetic circuit, as well as by exploiting parallelization and ciphertext packing [15].
We thoroughly redesign arithmetic matrix operations and introduce redundancy inside the
ciphertexts (copies of elements) to enable low-depth representation, and, perhaps counter-
intuitively, to require less total memory [14].
In the same context, we also investigate a sparse data predictive control problem, run at
a cloud service to control a system with unknown model, using `1-regularization to limit the
behavior complexity, which can be written as a Lasso problem [16]. The input-output data
collected for the system is privacy-sensitive, hence, we design a privacy-preserving solution
using homomorphically encrypted data. The main challenges are the non-smoothness of the
`1-norm, which is difficult to evaluate on encrypted data, as well as the iterative nature of
the Lasso problem. We use a distributed ADMM formulation that enables us to exchange
substantial local computation for little communication between multiple servers. We first
give an encrypted multi-party protocol for solving the distributed Lasso problem, by ap-
proximating the non-smooth part with a Chebyshev polynomial, evaluating it on encrypted
data, and using a more cost effective distributed bootstrapping operation in Chapter 3. For
the example of data-predictive control, we prefer a non-homogeneous splitting of the data for
better convergence. We give an encrypted multi-party protocol for this non-homogeneous
splitting of the Lasso problem to a non-homogeneous set of servers: one powerful server and
a few less powerful devices, added for security reasons in Chapter 7.
Private distributed control and inference
The recent technological advances in communication speed and deployment of millions of
devices have fostered the adoption of distributed computing frameworks. In turn, such
frameworks require aggregating services in order to utilize the data collected for specific
causes. Even as a step in distributed algorithms, aggregation shifts from a decentralized
nature that inherently guarantees more privacy, to a centralized approach that poses severe
privacy challenges.
11
The applications of this line of work range from smart grid control and autonomous
vehicle coordination to federated learning and graph neural network inference. The challenge
is to enable the agents, which act as aggregators, to obliviously aggregate the weighted
contributions from their neighbors, with privacy constraints on the local data and proprietary
weights/model, while minimizing communication.
Private weighted sum aggregation. Depending on the application, different parties
could know the associated weights: the agents, the aggregator or neither–a system operator
generates offline proprietary weights and wants to keep them hidden from all participants.
We exploit the information structure in the system to propose solutions that achieve privacy
for the three cases in Chapter 4. In the more complex latter case, we propose using two
compatible layers of encryption, one to protect the weights from the agents and the other to
protect the agents’ individual contributions from the aggregator. In [12], we used one layer
of encryption to be an AHE scheme, and the other to be random masks that sum up to zero,
that can be either precomputed and stored locally or computed online in a fully distributed
manner. The appeal of this solution is its simplicity and relatively small sizes of ciphertexts.
For small to medium weight matrices’ dimensions, we can batch multiple values in a single
ciphertext and redesign the computations accordingly, achieving up to 80% improvement in
computation time and communication [8]. Our second solution [7] embeds a ciphertext in
the error term of a learning with errors sample. This enables specific encoding and batching
properties that can reduce the number of operations and of ciphertexts even further. This
solution has fewer rounds of communication and allows a larger range of functionalities to
be performed locally at the agents, but implies larger ciphertext sizes, and is more suitable




This thesis assumes familiarity with control-theoretic and optimization-theoretic notions
and aims to introduce the reader to cryptographic approaches for securing control and
optimization applications in a networked scenario. Therefore, in this chapter, we describe
and provide formal definitions for the cryptographic notions that will be used subsequently
in the thesis, as they will be required in all chapters. On the other hand, we will introduce
as needed the concepts behind the optimization and control algorithms we use in this thesis
in the subsequent chapters.
2.1 Adversarial model
In this thesis we are concerned with adversaries that corrupt parties in order to steal their
private information, but do not intend to disrupt the service offered. Common examples for
this model are database breaches or third-party access, where the adversary plans to sell the
proprietary and/or private data obtained. This model is called semi-honest or honest-but-
curious and is defined in the following.
Definition 2.1.1. (Semi-honest model) A party is semi-honest if it does not deviate from
the steps of the protocol, but may store the transcript of the messages exchanged and process
the data received in order to learn more information than stipulated by the protocol.
This model also holds when considering eavesdroppers on the communication channels.
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The semi-honest model differs from a model that only considers eavesdroppers as adversaries
by the fact that, apart from the untrusted channels, the parties that perform the computa-
tions are also not trusted. Malicious or active adversaries–that diverge from the protocols
or tamper with the messages–are not considered in this thesis but are crucial future research
avenues for the author.
2.2 Security definitions
Definition 2.2.1. A function η : Z≥1 → R is negligible if for every positive c ∈ R>0, there
exists nc ∈ Z≥1 such that for all integers n ≥ nc, we have |η(n)| ≤ n−c.
In what follows, we will use η(·) to represent a negligible function and {0, 1}∗ to define a
sequence of bits of unspecified length. An ensemble X = {Xn}n∈N is a sequence of random
variables ranging over strings of bits of length polynomial in n denoted by poly(n).
Definition 2.2.2. (Statistical indistinguishability [104, Ch. 3]) The ensembles X =
{Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N are statistically indistinguishable, denoted
s≡, if for all





∣∣Pr[Xn = α]− Pr[Yn = α]∣∣ < η(n),
where the quantity on the left is called the statistical distance between the two ensembles.
Computational indistinguishability is weaker than the statistical version, as follows:
Definition 2.2.3. (Computational Indistinguishability [104, Ch. 3]) The ensembles X =
{Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N are computationally indistinguishable, denoted
c≡, if for
every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}, called the distin-
guisher, and all sufficiently large n, the following holds:
∣∣Prx←Xn [D(x) = 1]− Pry←Yn [D(y) = 1]∣∣ < η(n).
The previous definition is relevant when defining the privacy goals to be guaranteed by
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a protocol: two-party privacy of the sensitive data of the parties. The intuition is that a
protocol privately computes a functionality if nothing is learned after its execution, i.e.,
if all information obtained by a computationally-bounded party after the execution of the
protocol (while also keeping a record of the intermediate computations) can be obtained
only from the inputs and outputs available to that party.
In the following definitions, we require the notion of view, which captures the information
held by a party during an execution of the protocol. From this information, the respective
party can try to infer more information than stipulated by the protocol.
Definition 2.2.4. (View of a party [105, Ch. 7]) Let Π be a protocol for computing an
arbitrary functionality f on an input x̄. The view of a party P during an execution of Π on
the input x̄, denoted V Π(x̄), is (x, coins,m1, . . . ,mt), where x is the input of the party P ,
coins represents the outcome of party P ’s internal coin tosses, and mj represents the j-th
message it has received.
In this manuscript, we deal with deterministic functionalities, hence, we will present the
simplified definitions of privacy in the semi-honest model for deterministic functionalities.
For the more general case of probabilistic functionalities, as well as for a description of
privacy definitions in the semi-honest and malicious models, we direct the reader to the
tutorial [152].
Definition 2.2.5. (Two-party privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behavior [105, Ch. 7]) Let f :
{0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ be a functionality, and f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2) denote the
first and second components of f(x1, x2), for any inputs x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}∗. Let Π be a two-
party protocol for computing f . Denote the view of the i-th party (i = 1, 2) as V Πi (x1, x2).
For a deterministic functionality f , we say that Π privately computes f if there exist
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, called simulators, denoted Si, such that:
{Si(xi, fi(x1, x2))}x1,2∈{0,1}∗
c≡ {V Πi (x1, x2)}x1,2∈{0,1}∗ .
This definition assumes the correctness of the protocol, i.e., the probability that the
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output of the parties is not equal to the result of the functionality applied to the inputs is
negligible. For semi-honest adversaries, this requirement is easy to check.
The next definition concerns security in the multi-party computation setup considering
coalitions of a number of parties. Essentially, it extends Definition 2.2.5 and states that
a multi-party protocol privately computes the functionality it runs if everything that a
coalition of parties can obtain from participating in the protocol and keeping records of the
intermediate computations can be obtained only from the inputs and outputs of these parties.
Definition 2.2.6. (Multi-party privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behavior [105, Ch. 7]) Let
f : ({0, 1}∗)n → ({0, 1}∗)n be a n-ary functionality, where fi(x1, . . . , xn) denotes the i-
th element of f(x1, . . . , xn). Denote the inputs by x̄ = (x1, . . . , xn). For I = {i1, . . . , it} ⊂
[n] = {1, . . . , n}, we let fI(x̄) denote the subsequence fi1(x̄), . . . , fit(x̄), which models a
coalition of a number of parties. Let Π be a n-party protocol that computes f . Denote the
view of the i-th party during an execution of Π on the inputs x̄ by V Πi (x̄), and denote the
view of a coalition by V ΠI (x̄) = (I, V
Π
i1
(x̄), . . . , V Πit (x̄)). For a deterministic functionality f ,
we say that Π privately computes f if there exist simulators S, such that, for every
I ⊂ [n], it holds that, for x̄t = (xi1 , . . . , xit):
{S(I, (x̄t), fI(x̄t))}x̄∈({0,1}∗)n
c≡ {V ΠI (x̄)}x̄∈({0,1}∗)n .
Remark 2.2.7. ([105, Ch. 7],[104, Ch. 4]) Auxiliary inputs, which are inputs that cap-
ture additional information available to each of the parties (e.g. local configurations, side-
information), are implicit in Definition 2.2.5 and Definition 2.2.6.
We can also particularize Definition 2.2.5 to capture the setting of a client-server ap-
plication, when we only require privacy of the client’s input and output with respect to a
semi-honest server.
Definition 2.2.8. (Client privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behavior of server) Let xC be the
private input of a client and xS be the input of a server. The client wants the server to
evaluate a functionality f and return the result f(xC , xS). We will denote by fS(xC , xS) the
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corresponding result at the server. Let Π be a two-party protocol for computing f . Denote
by V ΠS (xC , xS) the view of the server during an execution of Π on the inputs (xC , xS). For
a deterministic functionality f , we say that Π privately computes f w.r.t. to the server
if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, called simulator and denoted SS,
such that, for any inputs xC , xS :
{SS(xS , fS(xC , xS))}xC ,xS∈{0,1}∗
c≡ {V ΠS (xC , xS)}xC ,xS∈{0,1}∗ .
It is common for a server to be only employed for computing a result that is then sent
to the client, and the server has no output formally, i.e., fS(xC , xS) = ∅.
Finally, Definition 2.2.8 can be extended to the setup of a client and n servers, where at
most n− 1 servers are allowed to collude (Definition 3.3.1).
For encryption schemes and ciphers, we look at two definitions which tell us how secure
the resulting ciphertext or code word is: perfect secrecy or information-theoretic security
and semantic security.
Definition 2.2.9. (Perfect secrecy [133, Ch. 2]) An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) over
a message space M is perfectly secret if for every probability distribution over M and
every ciphertext c ∈ C for which Pr[C = c] > 0:
Pr[M = m|C = c] = Pr[M = m] or, equivalently, Pr[C = c|M = m] = Pr[C = c].
Definition 2.2.10. (Semantic Security [105, Ch. 5]) An encryption scheme is semantically
secure if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, A, there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A′ such that for every two polynomially bounded functions f, h :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and for any probability ensemble {Xn}n∈N, |Xn| ≤ poly(n), for any positive
polynomial p and sufficiently large n:






where Enc(·) is the encryption primitive.
Semantic security is equivalent to the cryptosystem having indistinguishable encryptions,
which, in essence, means that an adversary that has the plaintext messages a and b cannot
distinguish between the encryptions Enc(a) and Enc(b).
An encryption scheme has a computational security parameter κ if all known attacks
against the scheme, including breaking the encryption or distinguishing between the en-
cryptions of different messages, take 2κ bit operations. In practice, at least 128 bits of
security are preferred [5].
The strength of a cryptosystem relies on the computational intractability of retrieving
the private key from the public information–an adversary holding the public information
cannot find the private key by brute force computations.
2.3 Pseudorandom objects
A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is an efficient deterministic function that expands short
seeds into longer pseudorandom bit sequences, which are computationally indistinguishable
from truly random sequences.
A pseudorandom function (PRF) is a family of efficiently-computable keyed functions
that produce an output which is computationally indistinguishable from the output of a
random function. More details can be found in [104, Ch. 3], [133, Ch. 3].
Pseudorandom functions can be constructed from pseudorandom generators. In practice,
pseudorandom functions are instantiated from block ciphers AES [76], or cryptographic hash
functions like SHA-3 or newer sponge-based functions [37].
2.4 Secret sharing
Secret sharing [184, 201] is a tool that distributes a secret message to a number of parties, by
splitting it into random shares. Specifically, t-out-of-n secret sharing splits a secret message
into n shares and distributes them to different parties; then, the secret message can be
reconstructed by an authorized subset of parties, which have to combine at least t shares.
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The t-out-of-n secret sharing is called polynomial secret sharing, while n-out-of-n secret
sharing is usually called additive secret sharing.
One common scheme is the additive 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme, which splits a secret
message m in a message space M into two shares by: generating uniformly at random an
element s ∈M, adding it to the message and then distributing the shares s and m+s ∈M.
(The message space is a finite abelian group.) Both shares are needed in order to recover
the secret. This can be also thought of as a one-time pad [31, 220] variant onM.
Additive blinding is a weaker scheme than secret sharing, but sufficient for many appli-
cations. For a message m ∈ M of l bits, s will be uniformly sampled from (0, 2l+λ), where
λ is the statistical security parameter. The statistical security parameter can take values of
around 80 bits.
Theorem 2.4.1. (a) Additive secret sharing is perfectly secret when s ∈M [74];
(b) Additive blinding is λ-statistically secure when s ∈ (0, 2l+λ).
Since M is a finite abelian group, addition in M involves wrap-around, which ensures
that the distributions of m and m+ s are identical. This proves (a).
The proof of (b) follows from computing the advantage an adversary has for distinguish-
ing between m + s ∈ (0, 2l+λ + 2l) and a uniformly sampled random value r ∈ (0, 2l+λ),
which is 1/2 + 2−λ (the statistical distance between the two sets is 2−λ).
2.5 Homomorphic encryption schemes
Let Enc(·) denote a generic encryption primitive, with domain the space of private data,
called plaintexts, and codomain the space of encrypted data, called ciphertexts. Enc(·) also
takes as input the public key, and probabilistic encryption primitives also take a random
number. The decryption primitive Dec(·) is defined on the space of ciphertexts and takes
values on the space of plaintexts. Dec(·) also takes as input the private key. Asymmetric or
public key cryptosystems involve a pair of keys: a public key that is disseminated publicly,
and which is used for the encryption of the private messages, and a private key which is
known only to its owner, used for the decryption of the encrypted messages.
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The decryption primitive of a homomorphic encryption scheme is a homomorphism from
the space of ciphertexts to the space of plaintexts. An encryption scheme is called partially
homomorphic if it supports the encrypted evaluation of either a linear polynomial or a
monomial.
Specifically, additively homomorphic schemes satisfy the property that there exists an
operator ⊕ defined on the space of ciphertexts such that:
Enc(a)⊕ Enc(b) ⊂ Enc(a+ b), (2.5.1)
for any plaintexts a, b supported by the scheme. We use set inclusion instead of equality be-
cause the encryption of a message is not unique in probabilistic cryptosystems. Intuitively,
equation (2.5.1) means that by performing this operation on the two encrypted messages,
we obtain a ciphertext that is equivalent to the encryption of the sum of the two plain-
texts. Formally, the decryption primitive Dec(·) is a homomorphism between the group of
ciphertexts with the operator ⊕ and the group of plaintexts with addition +, which justifies
the name of the scheme. It is immediate to see that if a scheme supports addition between
encrypted messages, it will also support subtraction, by adding the additive inverse, and
multiplication between an integer plaintext and an encrypted message, obtained by adding
the encrypted messages for the corresponding number of times.
Multiplicatively homomorphic schemes satisfy the property that there exists an operator
⊗ defined on the space of ciphertexts such that:
Enc(a)⊗ Enc(b) ⊂ Enc(a · b), (2.5.2)
for any plaintexts a, b supported by the scheme.
Furthermore, an encryption scheme is called somewhat or leveled homomorphic if it
supports the encrypted evaluation of a polynomial with a finite degree. In other words, it
satisfies both (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) but only for a limited amount of operations
Finally, an encryption scheme is called fully homomorphic if it supports the encrypted
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evaluation of arbitrary polynomials, i.e., it satisfies both (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) for an unlimited
amount of operations. Leveled homomorphic encryption schemes can be turned into fully
homomorphic encryption schemes if a bootstrapping operation is enabled, which can refresh
the ciphertext after the levels were consumed, such that further operations are allowed while
still guaranteeing correct decryption.
Remark 2.5.1. A homomorphic cryptosystem is malleable, which means that a party that
does not have the private key can alter a ciphertext such that another valid ciphertext is
obtained. Malleability is a desirable property in order to achieve third-party outsourced
computation on encrypted data, but allows ciphertext attacks. In this work, we assume
that the parties have access to authenticated channels, therefore an adversary cannot alter
the messages sent by the honest parties.
In the rest of the thesis, we will slightly abuse the notation Enc(·) to describe encrypting
vectors and matrices (i.e. each element is individually encrypted).
2.5.1 Additively homomorphic encryption
Additively homomorphic encryptions schemes, abbreviated as AHE, can be instantiated by
various schemes such as [80, 107, 130, 177]. Let AHE =(KeyGen,E,D,Add, cMlt) be an
instance of an asymmetric additively homomorphic encryption scheme, withM the message
space and C the ciphertext space. We will use the following abstract notation: ⊕ denotes
the addition on C and ⊗ denotes the multiplication between a plaintext and a ciphertext.
1. KeyGen(1σ): Takes the security parameter σ and outputs a public key pk and a private
key sk.
2. E(pk,m): Takes the public key and a message m ∈M and outputs a ciphertext in C.
3. D(sk, c): Takes the private key and a ciphertext c ∈ C and outputs the message that
was encrypted m′ ∈M.
4. Add(c1, c2): Takes ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ C and outputs ciphertext c = c1 ⊕ c2 ∈ C such
that: D(sk, c) = D(sk, c1) + D(sk, c2).
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5. cMlt(m1, c2): Takes plaintext m1 ∈ M and ciphertext c2 ∈ C and outputs ciphertext
c = m1 ⊗ c2 ∈ C such that: D(sk, c) = m1 ·D(sk, c2).
The Paillier cryptosystem [177] is an asymmetric additively homomorphic encryption
scheme. The private data are elements of the ring of integers modulo N , denoted by ZN ,
where N is a large integer of σ bits, called the Paillier modulus. The ciphertexts take values
in the multiplicative group of integers modulo N2, denoted by Z∗N2 . Paillier is a probabilistic
encryption scheme, which means that the encryption primitive also takes as an argument a
random number which, for simplicity, we omit in this notation. For compactness, we will
denote the Paillier encryption of a message a ∈ ZN by [[a]] as a shorthand notation for
E(pk, a), for an instance of the random number. For readability, we will use throughout the
manuscript the following abstract notation for the operations on the encrypted space:
[[a]]⊕ [[b]] d= [[a+ b]], b⊗ [[a]] d= [[ba]], for plaintexts a, b ∈ ZN , (2.5.3)
where d= means that the equality holds after applying the decryption primitive on both sides.
The pair of keys corresponding to this cryptosystem is (pk, sk), where the public key is
pk = (N, g) and the secret key is sk = (γ, δ). N called the modulus and is the product of
two large prime numbers p, q of the same bit length, and g is an element of order N in Z∗N2 ,
commonly selected to be N + 1, which we also prefer here. Furthermore,
γ = φ(N) = (p− 1)(q − 1), δ = φ(N)−1 mod N,
where φ is Euler’s totient function. For a plaintext a ∈ ZN , the Paillier encryption is:
[[a]] = garN mod N2, (2.5.4)
where r is a random nonzero element in ZN , which makes Paillier a probabilistic encryption
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scheme. The decryption primitive is the following:
a =
[[a]]γ mod N2 − 1
N
δ mod N, (2.5.5)
which uses the fact that (1 +N)a = 1 +Na mod N2.
In the Paillier scheme, in order to obtain addition between plaintexts, the operation
between ciphertexts is modular multiplication, which was denoted by ⊕ in the text:
[[a]] · [[b]] = garN · gbr′N mod N2 = ga+b(rr′)N = [[a+ b]] mod N2. (2.5.6)
The multiplication between a plaintext value c and an encrypted value [[a]], which was
denoted by c⊗ [[a]] in the text, is obtained in the following way:
[[a]]c = gac(rc)N mod N2 = [[ca]]. (2.5.7)
It follows that negation is achieved by modular inverse.
Theorem 2.5.2. The Paillier cryptosystem is semantically secure [177] under the Decisional
Composite Residuosity assumption.
The Decisional Composite Residuosity hardness problem is described in Appendix A.1.
The DGK cryptosystem. In [77, 78], Damgård, Geisler and Krøigaard describe a
protocol for secure comparison. Motivated by that functionality, they propose the DGK
additively homomorphic encryption scheme, in which it is efficient to determine if a given
ciphertext is an encryption of zero. This property is useful for comparisons and when working
with bits.
The plaintext space for DGK is Zu, where u is a small prime divisor of p− 1 and q − 1,
p and q are large, same size prime numbers, and N = pq. The parameters vp and vq are
t-bit prime divisors of p − 1 and q − 1. The numbers g and h are elements of Z∗N of order
uvpvq and vpvq. The DGK encryption scheme has public key pkDGK = (N, g, h, u)DGK
and skDGK = (p, q, vp, vq)DGK. In order to distinguish a DGK ciphertext from a Paillier
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ciphertext we use the notation [·]. For a plaintext x ∈ Zu, a DGK encryption is:
[a] = gahr mod N,
where r is a random 2t-bits integer. We use this encryption scheme with the purpose of
encrypting and decrypting bits that represent comparison results, therefore, for decryption,
we only need to check if the encrypted value is 0. For this, it is enough to verify:
[a]vpvq mod p = 1
to see if a = 0. DGK is additively homomorphic so the following holds:
a+ b = D([a] · [b] mod N), −a = D([a]−1 mod N). (2.5.8)
We will use again ⊕ and ⊗ to abstract the addition between and encrypted values, respec-
tively, the multiplication between a plaintext and an encrypted values.
Theorem 2.5.3. The DGK cryptosystem is semantically secure [77, 78], under the hardness
of factoring assumption.
Remark 2.5.4. We also notice the additive blinding scheme from Preamble 2.4 can be viewed
as a one-time symmetric key-homomorphic and message-homomorphic encryption, as long
as there is no overflow: E′(m) = m−s, D′(E′(m)) = E′(m)+s = m, with s being the secret-
key. This symmetric cryptosystem is compatible with the Paillier and DGK cryptosystems,
in the sense that the two encryptions commute: D(D′(E(E′(m)))) = m by using E(s) instead
of s for decryption D′, where E′(m) is performed on the message space of the cryptosystem,
and similarly D′(D(E(m)⊕ E(s))) = m.
2.5.2 Somewhat homomorphic encryption
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) schemes generally allow many to unlimited
homomorphic addition operations and a limited number of sequential homomorphic multi-
plications. SHE differs from leveled HE in the following sense: from their construction, SHE
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schemes support a fixed number of sequential multiplications (e.g., one or two), whereas lev-
eled HE take as a parameter the number of multiplications when instantiating the scheme
and can be even made to support a different number of multiplications by bootstrapping.
Labeled Homomorphic Encryption (LabHE) is a SHE scheme that allows unlim-
ited additions and one multiplication between ciphertexts. This scheme assumes that the
decryptor knows the program to be executed on the encrypted data. The encryptor assigns
a unique label to each message and sends the encrypted data along with the corresponding
encrypted labels to the server.
Denote by M the message space. An admissible function for LabHE f : Mn → M is
a multivariate polynomial of degree 2 on n variables. A program that has labeled inputs is
called a labeled program [27]:
Definition 2.5.5. A labeled program P is a tuple (f, τ1, . . . , τn), where f :Mn →M is
an admissible function on n variables and τi ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the label of the i-th input of f .
LabHE is constructed from an AHE scheme with the requirement that the message space
must be a public ring in which one can efficiently sample elements uniformly at random.
In what follows, we will use the Paillier cryptosystem as the underlying AHE scheme. The
idea is that an encryptor splits their private message as described in Preamble 2.4 into a
random value (secret) and the difference between the message and the secret. For efficiency,
instead of taking the secret to be a uniformly random value, we take it to be the output of
a pseudorandom function applied to the corresponding label. The label acts like the seed
of the pseudorandom function. The encryptor then forms the LabHE ciphertext from the
encryption of the first share along with the second share, yielding Ê(m) = (m − b, [[b]]),
as described in Step 1 in the following. This enables us to decrypt one multiplication of
two encrypted values, using the observation (2.5.9). The AHE scheme allows computing
(m1 − b1)⊗ [[b2]], (m2 − b2)⊗ [[b1]] and [[(m1 − b1) · (m2 − b2)]], for plaintexts (mi − bi),
i = 1, 2. Hence, we can obtain the AHE encryption of one multiplication [[m1 ·m2−b1 ·b2]]
from Ê(m1) and Ê(m1), described in Step 4 in the following. Decryption, described in
Step 5, requires that the decryptor knows the private key of the AHE scheme, and bi, such
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that it can compute m1 ·m2 = D[[m1 ·m2 − b1 · b2]] + b1 · b2.
m1 ·m2 − b1 · b2 = (m1 − b1) · (m2 − b2) + b1 · (m2 − b2) + b2 · (m1 − b1). (2.5.9)
LetM be the message space of the AHE scheme, L ⊂ {0, 1}∗ denote a finite set of labels
and F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ → M be a pseudorandom function that takes as inputs a key of
size k polynomial in σ the security parameter, and a label from L. LabHE is defined as a
tuple LabHE = ( ˆInit, ˆKeyGen, Ê, ˆEval, D̂):
1. ˆInit(1σ): Takes the security parameter σ and outputs master secret key msk and
master public key mpk for AHE.
2. KeyGen(mpk): Takes the master public key mpk and outputs for each user i a user
secret key uski and a user public key upki.
3. Ê(mpk,upk, τ,m): Takes the master public key, a user public key, a label τ ∈ L and
a message m ∈ M and outputs a ciphertext C = (a, β). It is composed of an online
and offline part:
• Off-Ê(usk, τ): Computes the secret b← F (usk, τ) and outputs Coff = (b, [[b]]).
• On-Ê(Coff ,m): Outputs C = (m− b, [[b]]) =: (a, β) ∈M× C.
4. ˆEval(mpk, f, C1, . . . , Ct): Takes the master public key, an admissible function
f : Mt → M, t ciphertexts and returns a ciphertext C. ˆEval is composed of the
following building blocks:
• M̂lt(C1, C2): Takes Ci = (ai, βi) ∈ M× C for i = 1, 2 and outputs C = [[a1 · a2]] ⊕
(a1 ⊗ β2)⊕ (a2 ⊗ β1) = [[m1 ·m2 − b1 · b2]] =: α ∈ C.
• ˆAdd(C1, C2): If Ci = (ai, βi) ∈ M × C for i = 1, 2, then outputs C = (a1 + a2,
β1 ⊕ β2) =: (a, β) ∈ M × C. If both Ci = αi ∈ C, for i = 1, 2, then outputs
C = α1 ⊕ α2 =: α ∈ C. If C1 = (a1, β1) ∈ M × C and C2 = α2 ∈ C, then outputs
C = (a1, β1 ⊕ α2) =: (a, β) ∈M× C.
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• ˆcMlt(c, C ′): Takes a plaintext c ∈ M and a ciphertext C ′. If C ′ = (a′, β′) ∈ M× C,
outputs C = (c · a′, c⊗ β′) =: (a, β) ∈ M× C. If C ′ = α′ ∈ C, outputs C = c⊗ α′ =:
α ∈ Ĉ.
5. D̂(msk, usk1,...,t,P, C): Takes the master secret key, a vector of t user secret keys, a
labeled program P and a ciphertext C. It has an online and an offline part:
• Off-D̂(msk,P): Parses P as (f, τ1, . . . , τt). For i ∈ [t], it computes the secrets bi =
F (uski, τi), b = f(b1, . . . ,bt) and outputs mskP(msk,b).
• On-D̂(skP , C): If C = (a, β) ∈ M × C: either output (i) m = a + b or (ii) output
m = a+ D(msk, β). If C ∈ C, output m = D(msk, C) + b.
The cost of an online encryption is the cost of an addition in M. The cost of online
decryption is independent of P and only depends on the complexity of D.
Theorem 2.5.6. ([27]) LabHE satisfies correctness (the probability of the scheme not cor-
rectly evaluating the allowed class of functions is negligible), succinctness (the ciphertexts
have polynomial length in the security parameter), semantic security (the ciphertexts are
indistinguishable from one another) and context-hiding (decrypting the ciphertext does not
reveal anything about the inputs of the computed function, only the result of the function on
those inputs).
2.5.3 Leveled fully homomorphic encryption
Recall that leveled homomorphic encryption schemes allow the evaluation of a multivari-
ate polynomial on encrypted data. The common term for such a multivariate polynomial
functionality is arithmetic circuit and the logarithm of the degree of the polynomial is the
multiplicative depth of the circuit.
The newer generations of leveled/fully HE schemes are based on lattices and rely on the
Ring Learning with Errors [4, 156] hardness problem, described in Appendix A.2. Each
operation evaluated on ciphertexts introduces some noise, which, if it overflows, can prevent
correct decryption. Multiplications introduce the most noise, so we focus on the number of
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sequential multiplications allowed in an instance of a leveled homomorphic scheme, which
we call multiplicative budget. Correct decryption is only guaranteed for the evaluation of
circuits of smaller multiplicative depth than the multiplicative budget.
The CKKS scheme (Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song [62]) is a leveled homomorphic encryption
scheme. CKKS can perform operations on encrypted real numbers with a smaller error than
other leveled homomorphic schemes. Each real number is multiplied by a positive integer
scaling factor and truncated, as commonly done, and one can remove the extra scaling factor
occurring in the result after a multiplication, through the rescaling procedure, at very little
error. This manages the magnitude of the underlying plaintexts, which could otherwise
cause overflow in a large depth circuit.
A ciphertext’s size grows with the number of sequential multiplications it supports.
Each ciphertext, respectively plaintext, is characterized by a level, a scaling depth and a
number of moduli. A new ciphertext (freshly encrypted, rather than obtained as the result
of operations on other ciphertexts) is on level L, scaling depth 1 and has as many moduli as
the multiplicative budget minus one. The number L minus the current level corresponds to
the number of rescaling operations previously performed on the ciphertext and scaling depth
corresponds to the number of multiplications without rescaling that have been performed.
After a multiplication followed by a rescaling procedure, the number of levels decreases
by one, the scaling depth remains the same and one modulus is dropped. To avoid some
technicalities and parallel the notion of circuit depth, in the rest of the manuscript, when
we refer to the depth of a ciphertext, we refer to the multiplicative depth of the arithmetic
circuit used in order to obtain that ciphertext. If rescaling is done after every multiplication,
then the depth will be the scaling depth minus one.
In the CKKS scheme, plaintexts and ciphertexts are polynomials in the ring of integers of
a cyclotomic field. Intuitively, this enables us to encode multiple scalar values in a plaintext
or ciphertext. Hence, we obtain ciphertexts that contain the encryption of a vector. This is
a standard practice in lattice-based homomorphic encryption that allows performing single
instruction multiple data (SIMD) operations, and can bring major computation and storage
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improvements when evaluating an arithmetic circuit. We can pack multiple values in one
plaintext/ciphertext–packing can be thought of as the ciphertext having multiple indepen-
dent data slots. Abstracting the details away, the SIMD operations that can be supported
are addition, element-wise multiplication by a plaintext or ciphertext and data slot per-
mutations that can achieve ciphertext rotations (e.g., used for summing up the values in
every slot). However, once the values are packed, extractions of individual values from the
ciphertexts can require multiplicative masking and increase the circuit multiplicative depth.
More specifically, let M be a power of two, and let ΦM (X) denote the M -th cyclotomic
polynomial of degree N := φ(M)/2, i.e., XN + 1. The plaintext space is the ring of poly-
nomials R := Z[X]/〈ΦM (X)〉. N is also called the ring dimension for the plaintext space.
Define the residue ring Rl := R/QlR = ZQl [X]/〈ΦM (X)〉, where Ql is the ciphertext mod-
ulus corresponding to level l. The ciphertext space for level l is the ring Rl×Rl. The CKKS
scheme supports an efficient packing of up to N/2 real values in a single plaintext, respec-
tively a single ciphertext. A real-valued message in CN is encoded in a plaintext in R via
the inverse canonical embedding map and rounding, which corresponds to evaluation of the
inverse Discrete Fourier Transform (with the primitive M -th roots of unity exp(−2πi/M)).
The decoding procedure is given by the forward Discrete Fourier Transform.
We next sketch the algorithms in the basic CKKS scheme. There are several optimiza-
tions available that employ the Residue Number System detailed in [40, 64, 117].
1. Setup(1κ, QL) Given the security parameter κ, for the largest ciphertext modulus QL,
output the ring dimension N . Set the small distributions χkey, χerr, χenc over R for
the secret, error and encryption.
2. KeyGen(R, χkey, χerr, χenc): Sample a secret s ← χkey, a random a ← RL and error
e← χerr. Set the secret key sk← (1, s) and output the public key pk← (b, a) ∈ R2L,
where b← −as+ e(modQL).
3. KSGensk(R, χkey, χerr, χenc): For s′ ∈ R, sample a random a′ ← R2L and error
e′ ← χerr. Output the switching key swk ← (b′, a′) ∈ R22L, where b′ ← −a′s +
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e′ + QLs
′(modQ2L). Output the evaluation key evk ← KeyGensk(s2). Output the
rotation key rk(κ) ← KeyGensk(s(κ)), for rotation index κ.
4. Epk(m): For m ∈ R, sample v ← χenc and e0, e1 ← χerr. Output ct← v · pk + (m+
e0, e1)(modQL).
5. Dsk(ct): For ct← (c0, c1) ∈ R2l , output m̃ = c0 + c1 · s(modQl).
6. CAdd(ct, c): For ct = (c0, c1) ∈ R2l and c ∈ R, output ctCAdd ← (c0 + c, c1)(modQl).
7. Add(ct1, ct2): For ct1, ct2 ∈ R2l , output ctAdd ← ct1 + ct2(modQl).
8. CMult(c, ct): For ct ∈ R2l and c ∈ R, output ctCMult ← c · ct(modQl).
9. Multevk(ct1, ct2): For cti = (bi, ai) ∈ R2l , for i = 1, 2, let (d0, d1, d2) = (b1b2, a1b2 +
a2b1, a1a2)(modQl). Output ctMult ← (d0, d1) + bQ−1L · d2 · evke(modQl).
10. Rotaterk(κ)(ct): For ct = (c0, c1) ∈ R
2







11. ReScale(ct, p): For a ciphertext ct ∈ R2l and an integer p, output ct′ ← b2−p ·
cte(modQl/2p).
Theorem 2.5.7. The CKKS scheme is semantically secure [62] assuming the parameters
are selected so the Decisional Ring Learning with Errors problem is computationally hard.
2.6 Oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer is a technique used when one party wants to obtain a secret from a set of
secrets held by another party [105, Ch. 7]. Party A has k secrets (σ0, . . . , σk−1) and party
B has an index i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. The goal of A is to transmit the i-th secret requested
by the receiver without knowing the value of the index i, while B does not learn anything
other than σi. This is called 1-out-of-k oblivious transfer. There are many constructions
of oblivious transfer that achieve security as in the two-party version of the simulation
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definition (Definition 2.2.6). Many improvements in efficiency, e.g., precomputation, and
security have been proposed, see e.g., [21, 128, 174].
We will use an 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, where the inputs of party A are [[σ0]], [[σ1]]
and party B holds i ∈ {0, 1} and the secret key and has to obtain σi. We will denote this
by σi ← OT([[σ0]], [[σ1]], i, sk). We will also use a variant where party A has to obliviously
obtain the AHE-encrypted [[σi]], and A has [[σ0]], [[σ1]] and party B holds i, for i ∈ {0, 1},
and the secret key. We will denote this variant by [[σi]]← OT′([[σ0]], [[σ1]], i, sk).
The way the variant OT′ works is that A chooses at random r0, r1 from the mes-
sage space M, and sends shares of the messages to B: [[v0]] := Add([[σ0]], [[r0]]), [[v1]] :=
Add([[σ1]], [[r1]]). B selects vi and sends back to A the encryption of the index i: [[i]] and
Add([[vi]], [[0]]), such that A cannot obtain information about i by comparing the value it










Proposition 2.6.1. [[σi]]← OT′([[σ0]], [[σ1]], i, sk) is private w.r.t. Definition 2.2.5.
The proof is given in Appendix A.3.
We will use this oblivious transfer functionality for protocols in Chapters 3 and 6.
2.7 Private two-party comparison
Consider a two-party computation problem under an encryption scheme that does not sup-
port comparison between encrypted data. A large number of secure comparison protocols on
private inputs owned by two parties have been proposed in the literature, see [77, 98, 140,
153], with a survey of the state of the art given in [73]. In [77, 78], Damgård, Geisler and
Krøigaard describe a protocol for secure comparison using the DGK additively homomorphic
encryption scheme described in Preamble 2.5.1, whose ciphertexts are denoted as [·].
Consider two parties A and B, each having a private value α and β. Using the binary
representations of α and β, the two parties exchange l blinded and encrypted values such
that each of the parties will obtain a bit δA ∈ {0, 1} and δB ∈ {0, 1} that satisfy the following
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relation: δA Y δB = (α ≤ β), after executing Protocol 2.7.1, where Y denotes the exclusive
or operation. The protocol is described in [221, Protocol 3], where an improvement of the
DGK scheme is proposed. By applying some extra steps, as in [221, Protocol 2], one can
obtain a protocol for private two-party comparison where party A has two encrypted inputs
with an AHE scheme [[a]], [[b]], with a, b represented on l bits, using the fact that the most
significant bit of (b− a+ 2l) is the bit that indicates if (a ≤ b), shown in Protocol 2.7.2.
Proposition 2.7.1. ( [77, 221]) Protocol 2.7.2 for secure two-party comparison is private
in the semi-honest model w.r.t. Definition 2.2.6.
Protocol 2.7.1: Private two-party comparison with plaintext inputs using DGK
Input: A: α; B: β, skDGK
Output: A: δA; B: δB such that δA Y δB = (α ≤ β)
1: B: send the encrypted bits [βi], 0 ≤ i < l to A.
2: for each 0 ≤ i < l do
3: A: [αi Y βi]← [βi] if αi = 0 and [αi Y βi]← [1]⊕ (−1)⊗ [βi] otherwise.
4: end for
5: A: Choose a uniformly random bit δA ∈ {0, 1}.
6: A: Compute the set L = {i|0 ≤ i < l and αi = δA}.
7: for each i ∈ L do
8: A: compute [ci]← [αi+1 Y βi+1]⊕ . . .⊕ [αl Y βl]) .
9: A: [ci]← [1]⊕ [ci]⊕ (−1)⊗ [βi] if δA = 0 and [ci]← [1]⊕ [ci] otherwise.
10: end for
11: A: generate uniformly random nonzero values ri of 2t bits (see [78]), 0 ≤ i < l.
12: for each 0 ≤ i < l do
13: A: [ci]← ri ⊗ [ci] if i ∈ L and [ci]← [ri] otherwise.
14: end for
15: A: send the values [ci] in random order to B.
16: B: if at least one of the values ci is decrypted to zero, set δB ← 1, otherwise set δB ← 0.
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Protocol 2.7.2: Private two-party comparison with encrypted inputs using DGK
Input: A: [[a]], [[b]]; B: sk, skDGK
Output: B: (δ = 1) ≡ (a ≤ b)
1: A: choose uniformly at random r of l + 1 + λ bits, compute [[z]] ← [[b]] 	 [[a]] ⊕ [[2l + r]] and
send it to B. Then compute α← r mod 2l.
2: B: decrypt [[z]] and compute β ← z mod 2l.
3: A,B: execute Protocol 2.7.1.
4: B: send [[z ÷ 2l]] and [[δB ]] to A.
5: A: [[(β < α)]]← [[δB ]] if δA = 1 and [[(β < α)]]← [[1]]	 [[δB ]] otherwise.
6: A: compute [[δ]]← [[z ÷ 2l]]	 ([[r ÷ 2l]]⊕ [[(β < α)]]) and send it to B.
7: B: decrypts δ.
2.8 Notation
We denote vectors by lower-case bold letters, e.g., x and matrices by upper-case bold letters,
e.g., A. Rm×n represents the set ofm×n matrices with real elements and Sn++ represents the
set of symmetric positive definite n× n matrices. Z denotes the set of integers, ZN denotes
the additive group of integers modulo N and Z∗N denotes the multiplicative group of integers
modulo N . The notation x ← X means that x is uniformly drawn from a distribution X.
Pr denotes the probability taken over a specified distribution. We refer to algorithms that
are run interactively by multiple parties as protocols.
For a vector x ∈ Rn, its `1-norm is ‖x‖1 =
∑n





and its `∞-norm is ‖x‖∞ = max(|x1|, . . . , |xn|). The matrix-induced norm, for a matrix
P ∈ Sn++ is ‖x‖P :=
√
xᵀPx. Element-wise inequalities between vectors are denoted by
,,≺,. For square matrices, A  0 means that A is positive definite and A  0 means
that it is positive semi-definite, with the converse meaning for ≺,.
We use the following notation for the different homomorphic encryption schemes:
• For additively homomorphic encryption schemes, in particular for the Paillier scheme,
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we use E(·),D(·),Add(·), cMlt(·),⊕,	, and [[·]]; see Preamble 2.5.1.
• For the DGK scheme we use [·],⊕,	,; see Preamble 2.5.1.
• For somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes, in particular for the LabHE scheme,
we use Ê(·), D̂(·), ˆEval(·), ˆAdd(·), ˆcMlt(·), M̂lt(·), ⊕̂, 	̂, ̂, ⊗̂; see Preamble 2.5.2.
• For leveled fully homomorphic encryption schemes, in particular for the CKKS scheme,





The development of large-scale distributed systems has led to the outsourcing of costly
computations to cloud-computing platforms, as well as to concerns about privacy of the
collected sensitive data. In control theoretic applications and machine learning, linear and
quadratic optimization problems arise frequently – e.g., state estimation under minimum
square error, model predictive control, support vector machines – which require privacy
guarantees for the data involved in the computation.
The first part of this chapter develops a cloud-based protocol for a quadratic optimiza-
tion problem involving multiple parties, each holding information it seeks to maintain pri-
vate. The protocol is based on the projected gradient ascent on the Lagrange dual problem
and exploits additively homomorphic encryption and secure multi-party computation tech-
niques. Using formal cryptographic definitions of indistinguishability, the protocol is shown
to achieve computational privacy, i.e., there is no computationally efficient algorithm that
any involved party can employ to obtain private information beyond what can be inferred
from the party’s inputs and outputs only. In order to reduce the communication complexity
of the proposed protocol, we introduced a variant that achieves this objective at the expense
of weaker privacy guarantees. We discuss in detail the computational and communication
complexity properties of both algorithms theoretically and also through implementations.
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We conclude the first part with a discussion on computational privacy and other notions
of privacy such as the non-unique retrieval of the private information from the protocol
outputs.
In the second part of this chapter, we investigate how to securely evaluate another perva-
sive optimization problem, with different characteristics than quadratic programs: the least
squares problem with `1-regularized regressors, called Lasso. Sparsity and compressed sens-
ing have been widely used in signal processing, machine learning and control applications,
especially in the big-data regime and noisy environments [52, 123]. In high-dimensional
problems, it is likely that only a subset of features affects the observations. Hence, pur-
suing sparse representations reduces the model complexity, prevents overfitting and helps
with overall interpretation. Since finding the solution with the minimal number of non-zero
coefficients is NP-hard, `1-regularization has been proposed as a convex method that pro-
motes sparsity. Perhaps one of the most used algorithms for sparse recovery has been the
celebrated Lasso algorithm (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator), which accounts
for both sparsity and potentially noisy data, using `1-regularization. For instance, Lasso has
been used in signal reconstruction for medical imaging, wireless communication and track-
ing; seismology applications; portfolio optimization; text analysis [123, 236]. Many of these
applications are large-scale or involve data coming from multiple data sources. With the
recent widespread availability and development of cloud services, it seems an attractive and
cost effective solution to outsource the computations to the cloud, when the data owner or
querier lacks the computational resources and/or expertise to locally perform them. Given
the privacy-sensitive nature of medical data, financial data, location data, energy measure-
ments etc., on which such problems are computed, and how they can be used to profile users
or mount attacks on critical infrastructure, the computations should not be performed in
the clear at the cloud service.
The main challenges are the non-smoothness of the `1-norm, which is difficult to eval-
uate on encrypted data, as well as the iterative nature of the Lasso problem. We use a
distributed ADMM formulation that enables us to exchange substantial local computation
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for little communication between multiple servers. We give an encrypted multi-party proto-
col for solving the distributed Lasso problem, by approximating the non-smooth part with
a Chebyshev polynomial, evaluating it on encrypted data, and using a more cost effective
distributed bootstrapping operation. Finally, we provide numerical results for our proposed
solutions.
Compared to the first part of the chapter (Section 3.2), in the second part (Section 3.3),
we consider the approximation of a non-smooth nonlinear objective function and use multiple
servers to streamline the complex iterative computation, rather than a two-party computa-
tion, and a more powerful homomorphic encryption scheme to partially replace the blinded
communication necessary at every iteration.
This chapter covers the work presented in [10, 13, 16].
Contributions
In the first part of the chapter, we develop a new tractable optimization protocol to pri-
vately solve constrained quadratic problems. Our protocol relies on cryptographic tools
called encryption schemes. To solve the optimization problem on encrypted data, we use
an additively homomorphic encryption scheme, where, in short, addition commutes with the
encryption function. Thus, a party can process encrypted data without having direct access
to the data. The novelty is how to handle in a privacy-preserving manner the constraints of
the problem that introduce nonlinearities which cannot be supported by additively homo-
morphic encryption schemes. We show that a projected gradient method which operates on
the Lagrange dual problem can alleviate this problem and can be efficiently run on encrypted
data by exploiting communication between the participating parties.
The main contributions of our work are the following:
• We design and formally prove computational security guarantees for such protocols.
The proof relies on applying cryptographic tools to the specific optimization algorithm
that runs over multiple iterations.
• We investigate an alternative protocol which sacrifices some privacy but involves less
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communication overhead.
• We implement the protocols and show the computational and communication com-
plexity produce reasonable running times.
Furthermore, we emphasize the difference between the computational security guarantee
with the non-unique retrieval guarantee that is important in such optimization problems.
In the second part of this chapter, we use a more powerful homomorphic encryption
scheme, which enables polynomial (rather than only affine) computations by the cloud over
encrypted data of the client. However, encrypted Lasso brings new challenges: evaluating
non-smooth functions on encrypted data, as well as continuing computations over multiple
iterations and time steps, which generally requires refreshing the ciphertexts.
A conventional observation is that distributing a large optimization problem to multi-
ple servers improves the execution time by parallelizing smaller subproblems. Apart from
this, we note that distributing the computation allows a streamlined execution of encrypted
iterations. In particular, using multiple servers allows us to perform a refresh operation at
a substantially reduced cost compared to performing it only at one server. This cheaper re-
fresh operation enables us to continue the encrypted computations over multiple iterations,
as well as to use a high degree polynomial to approximate the gradient of the `1-norm.
Specifically, we propose:
• an efficient distributed encrypted solution to Lasso problems using ADMM, offering
computational privacy of all the data, including intermediate results;
• an optimized implementation of the above protocol using an efficient Chebyshev series
evaluation for polynomial approximations and reducing the number of ciphertext levels
and operations.
We also note that the quadratic program outlined in the first part of the chapter can be
formulated in a similar fashion, by having the indicator function of the feasible space in the
objective function. Hence, the solution we give here gives a different solution (in a different
setup of the cloud) to the above problem.
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Related work
Unconstrained optimization problems are commonly used in machine learning applications,
e.g., for linear regression, and several works have addressed gradient methods with partially
homomorphic encryption [120, 122]. However, adding constraints substantially complicates
the optimization problem by restricting the feasible domain. In addition, constraints in-
troduce nonlinear operations in the optimization algorithm, which cannot be handled in-
herently by the partially homomorphic cryptosystems. Examples of works that tackle pri-
vate linear programming problems or machine learning applications with optimization sub-
routines using garbled circuits, secret sharing, and hybrid approaches between the above
are [45, 58, 99, 148, 167] and the references within. Out of these, we inspire our solution
from [45], which tackles linear problems in machine learning, assembling blocks for secure
computation of the arg max of multiple values and dot products, using additively and leveled
homomorphic encryption.
The problem of secure constrained quadratic optimization with additively homomorphic
encryption was addressed in [203], but the authors only guaranteed conditional privacy and
non-unique retrieval of the private data. Specifically, in their case, in order to project the
variable on the feasible space, the cloud multiplicatively blinds the encrypted variable and
sends it to the requester, which decrypts the message, compares it to zero, and sends back
the result of the comparison. This reveals more information than strictly necessary, and in
special cases, can be used by the requester to infer information about the data of the agents.
The usage of ADMM for private distributed optimization is not novel, see e.g., [231, 234],
given its convenient formulation and splitting of the objective function and variables. (For
other distributed gradient based methods, see e.g., [155].) However, our usage of distributed
ADMM substantially differs from previous works in the following: i) we start with centralized
rather than already distributed data, so we split the centralized problem in a way that fits
our privacy and low-power requirements; ii) we assume heterogeneous servers and we split
the computations differently depending on who performs them; iii) the data at each server is
not in the clear, which complicates the computations; iv) the servers do not learn any of the
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data, not even intermediate iterates and results; this requires more complex computations to
privately perform nonlinear operations; v) the `1-regularization term is non-smooth and has
nonlinear gradient, leading to updates of the global primal variable that are incompatible
with the mentioned ADMM works.
The authors in [237] propose a distributed ADMM for a Lasso problem, using an thresh-
old additively homomorphic encryption and SPDZ [79] for computing the nonlinear opera-
tions. In contrast to their work, we do not distribute the data in the clear to the computing
servers, meaning we have less flexibility with respect to the local computations. However,
we can choose to split the data in the most convenient way to have a distributed conver-
gence speed similar to the centralized convergence, which [237] does not discuss. Another
difference is that the tools they use require them to communicate for every nonlinear com-
putation, such as multiplications and comparison operations, which require a number of
communication rounds dependent on the number of bits in the messages. In our case, the
servers only send two messages per iteration and the method we employ also allows us to
batch vectors and perform operations in parallel for all elements of a vector.
In [96, 197], the authors propose distributed/federated training and evaluation with
multi-party fully homomorphic encryption for linear, logistic and neural network models,
using stochastic gradient descent. While we inspired our solution from the multi-party fully
homomorphic encryption tool, their setup is different from ours: the data is either distributed
in cleartext locally at the servers or other data providers perform the preprocessing; and the
computations are different, leading to different optimizations: e.g., [96] uses a combination
of distributed and centralized bootstrapping operations, [197] has only one recurring variable
(the model) to bootstrap.
Finally, examples such as [121, 126, 176, 235] make use of differential privacy techniques
in optimization algorithms. Other lines of work solve optimization problems with ad-hoc
methods, such as transformation approaches, e.g. [97, 195, 214, 225]. These methods are
out of the scope of this chapter, but differential privacy is an avenue for future research in
privately determining parameters of the optimization problem.
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3.2 Secure evaluation of quadratic programs
Organization. We formulate the problem in Section 3.2.1. In Section 3.2.3, we de-
scribe the optimization theory behind the proposed protocol and justify the choice of the
gradient method. Furthermore, we present the main protocol and the subroutines that com-
pose it and in Section 3.2.3.6 that use an additively homomorphic scheme and a masking
procedure, and we show that the protocol achieves privacy of the agent’s data and of the
requester’s result. We discuss possible relaxations of the security guarantees and investigate
a more efficient protocol under these weaker conditions in Section 3.2.4.1. In Section 3.2.4,
we provide a privacy analysis of the problem concerning the input-output relation. We
present the complexity analysis of the protocols and show that the experimental results
point out reasonable running times in Section 3.2.5. Finally, the detailed privacy proofs are
given in Appendix B.
3.2.1 Problem setup
3.2.1.1 Motivating Examples
Quadratic optimization is a class of problems frequently employed in control system design
and operation. As a first motivating example, consider the problem of estimating the state
of a dynamical system from privacy-sensitive sensor measurements. For instance, such a
problem arises in smart houses where the temperature or energy readings of the sensors are
aggregated by a cloud controller and can reveal whether the owners are in the building. In
particular, let the system dynamics and sensor measurements be described by:
xt+1 = Axt + wt, yt = Cxt + vt, (3.2.1)
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, where wt,vt are process and measurement noise respectively. The
system and sensor parameters A ∈ Rn×n,C ∈ Rp×n can be thought as publicly available
information while the sensor measurements y0, . . . ,yT−1 are privacy-sensitive data. The
untrusted cloud has to collect the measurements and output an initial state estimate x0 of
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the system to a target agent, while maintaining the privacy of the sensor data and final

























O ∈ RTp×n is the system observability matrix. More general state estimation problems may
also include constraints, e.g., the initial state may lie in a polyhedral set Dx0  b where
the shape of the polyhedron captured by the matrix D is publicly known but its position
and size captured by the vector b is private information.
As a second example, consider a control problem with privacy-sensitive objectives. Sup-
pose we are interested in steering a dynamical system (to track a private reference) starting
from a private initial position while guaranteeing safety state and/or input constraints for
a time horizon. The need for privacy in such problems arises when exploring vehicles are
deployed in uncertain or hazardous environments or when different users compete against
each other and want to hide their tactics. The appropriate controller for this problem is
a model predictive controller, a type of receding horizon control that minimizes a cost on
the deviation of states, measurements and control inputs from the desired references, under
safety or saturation constraints. We thoroughly investigate the secure evaluation of model
predictive controllers for linear systems in Chapter 6, using the solution from this chapter.
3.2.1.2 Problem statement
The above examples can be modeled as constrained quadratic optimization problems with
distributed private data. We consider three types of parties involved in the problem: a
number of agents Ai, i = 1, . . . , p, a cloud server C and a requester R. The purpose of this
setup is to solve an optimization problem with the data provided by the agents and the
computation performed on the cloud and send the result to the requester. The architecture
is presented in Figure 3.1.
Let us consider a strictly-convex quadratic optimization problem, which we assume to
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be feasible (there is at least one point where all constraints are satisfied):




xᵀ QC x + c
ᵀ
Ax
s.t. AC x  bA,
(3.2.3)
where the variables and the parties to which they belong to are described as follows:
Agents A = (A1, . . . ,Ap): The agents are parties with low computational capabilities that
possess the private information bA and cA. The private information is decomposed across
the agents as: bA = (b1, . . . ,bp) and cA = (c1, . . . , cp), with bi ∈ Rmi and ci ∈ Rni being
the private data of agent i such that
∑p
i=1mi = m and
∑p
i=1 ni = n.
Cloud C: The cloud is a party with high computational capabilities that has access to
the matrices QC ∈ Sn++ and AC ∈ Rm×n. When the computation is sophisticated and/or
involves proprietary algorithms, QC and AC are private data of the cloud; otherwise, QC or
AC are public.
Requester R: The requester is a party with more computational capabilities than the
agents that is interested in the optimal solution x∗ of the problem. The requester can be
either one of the data providers or a separate cloud server.
Figure 3.1: Architecture of the problem: Agents are low-resource parties that have private data
that they outsource to a powerful server, called the cloud. The cloud has to solve an optimization
problem on the private data of the agents and send the result to a party called the requester, which
will help with the computations.
Note that in the first motivating example (3.2.2), the matrix QC in (3.2.3) corresponds to
the publicly known matrix OᵀO and the vector cA corresponds to the private vector −Oᵀ y.
For the objective to be strongly convex, we require that rank(O) = n, which also implies
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standard system observability. In the second example, the matrix QC is composed from the
regulating cost matrices, the cost vector cA is formed from the private initial conditions
and steady-state solution for the reference tracking, mixed by the system’s dynamics, and
the constraints vector bA depends on the private state bounds and initial condition (see
Chapter 6, equation (6.2.3)).
In most cloud applications, the service provider has to deliver the contracted service or
otherwise the clients would switch to another service provider. This means that the cloud
cannot alter the data it receives. Moreover, the clients’ interest is to obtain the correct result
from the service they pay for, hence, the agents and target node will also not alter the data.
However, the parties can locally process the data they receive in any fashion they want. This
means that the adversarial model we consider is semi-honest, defined in Definition 2.1.1.
The purpose of this section is to solve Problem (3.2.3) using a secure multiparty com-
putation protocol for semi-honest parties. This protocol takes as inputs the private data of
the agents, as well as the cloud’s data, and involves the parties in exchanging messages and
participating in some specified computations, and eventually outputs to the requester the
solution of the optimization problem. This protocol should guarantee computational secu-
rity, cf. Definition 2.2.6. More specifically, the cloud cannot obtain any information about
the private inputs of the agents and the output of the requester and similarly, the requester
cannot obtain any information about the private inputs of the agents and the cloud, other
than what they can compute using their inputs and outputs and public information, by
running a computationally efficient algorithm after the execution of the protocol.
In this section, we use the popular Paillier encryption, described in Preamble 2.5.1, but
any other additively homomorphic encryption scheme can be employed. In our protocol, the
requester R is the owner of a pair of Paillier keys. For everything that follows, [[·]] denotes
the encryption with the requester’s public key pkR. In addition, we also use an additive
blinding scheme, as described in Preamble 2.4, for reasons that will become apparent in
the protocol, related to hiding the data from the requester. In Remark 2.5.4, we showed
how this additive blinding is compatible with the AHE scheme, and combined, they offer a
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double encryption of the agents’ data.
3.2.2 A simpler problem: secure unconstrained quadratic optimization









where the variables have the same meaning as in Problem (3.2.3) described in Section 3.2.1.






2 + λ‖x‖22, for some appropriately sized quantities Q, c and penalty λ
can be cast in the same form as (3.2.4).
Problem (3.2.4) can be solved by setting the optimal solution equal to value that zeroes
the gradient of the objective function:
∇f(x∗) = 0→ x∗ = Q−1C cA. (3.2.5)
Alternatively, when QC is very large or its inverse is numerically unstable, we prefer to
use an iterative algorithm to reach to the optimal solution, namely, the gradient descent
algorithm. An iteration of the gradient method has the form:
xk+1 = xk − η∇f(xk) = (I− ηQC)xk − ηcA, (3.2.6)
where η > 0 is the step-size chosen by the cloud and k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 for a number of
iterations K. While usually we would check convergence by checking the difference between
the objective function evaluated at consecutive iterations and would stop if this difference is
smaller than some tolerance, this can leak information about the private data (it is problem
dependent whether this leakage is significant or not). Therefore, for privacy reasons, K
needs to be chosen large enough such that convergence is guaranteed with high probability
and the algorithm should be run for this fixed number of iterations.
It is important to notice that for a quadratic objective function, only linear operations
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in the private data cA and {xk}k=0,...,K−1 are required in order to compute the solution,
both in its closed-form (3.2.5) and in its iterative form (3.2.6). Hence, by having the agents
encrypt their data with an additively homomorphic encryption scheme (e.g., the Paillier
scheme described in Preamble 2.5.1) and taking advantage of the additively homomorphic
property (2.5.3), the cloud can locally compute the optimal solution in its closed-form in
the encrypted domain:
[[x∗]] = Q−1C ⊗ [[cA]], (3.2.7)
or by the gradient descent algorithm in the encrypted domain, for all k = 0, . . . ,K − 1:
[[xk+1]] = (I− ηQC)⊗ [[xk]]⊕ (−η)⊗ [[cA]], (3.2.8)
and send the final point [[x∗]] = [[xK ]] to the requester to decrypt and obtain the desired
result. Such a protocol satisfies the desired security according to Definition 2.2.6 provided in
Preamble 2.2 by the fact that the cloud only has access to data encrypted by a semantically
secure encryption scheme.
We mention also that quadratic problems with linear equality constraints can be solved









s.t. ACx = bA.
(3.2.9)














invertible. As before, one can write an iterative algorithm to obtain the optimal solution x∗
without explicitly inverting the matrices.
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One needs to be careful with what kind of privacy is expected from the above kind of
problem. In a trivial example, if AC = I, then upon receiving the solution x∗, the requester
immediately learns the private data bA. The kind of input-output cryptographic privacy
covers this trivial example as well, stating that nothing apart from the knowledge inferred
from the input and output is leaked by a secure protocol.
Encryption schemes are usually defined on finite fields or finite groups, while in practice,
data involved in optimization problems have real values. To this end, we need to employ a
lossy mapping to map real values to a finite set. One common approach is to use fixed-point
representation to map from reals to a finite group of integers: truncate the real values to a
fixed number of integer bits and fractional bits and then multiply by a scaling factor, a large
enough integer value such that the result is an integer in the appropriate range. A subtlety
that arises when evaluating iterative algorithms on encrypted data, when the underlying
data uses fixed-point representation and is not originally an integer, is overflow. Trunca-
tion is not possible over (additively homomorphic) ciphertexts and dealing with consecutive
multiplications implies the accumulation of the scaling factor which leads to overflow: the
underlying plaintext in the resulting ciphertext will be be outside of the finite group and
decryption will become incorrect. The same problems can happen with sequential addi-
tions, but the problem is clearly not as stringent as with sequential multiplications. In the
literature, this is addressed by using, where possible, similarity transformations to integer
matrices [65] or reset the iterate accordingly [170]. In this chapter, we avoid the overflow
problem by exploiting the communication between parties (necessary in order to achieve
more complex operations on encrypted data) in order to privately perform truncation.
3.2.3 Secure constrained quadratic optimization
In this section we introduce our main algorithmic results for securely solving a quadratic op-
timization problem with linear inequality constraints, which introduce nonlinear operations
in the optimization algorithm and cannot be handled inherently by an AHE scheme. Let us
first describe the optimization algorithm used for solving the minimization problem (3.2.3)
on unencrypted data.
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For strongly convex problems, one can resort to duality theory [47, Ch. 5] to compute the
projection on the feasible set, and be able to retrieve the optimal value of the primal problem
from the optimal value of the dual problem. For the quadratic optimization problem (3.2.3),
its dual is also a quadratic optimization problem:







Cµ + cA)− µ
ᵀbA
s.t. µ  0. (3.2.11)
The dual objective function is denoted by g(µ) and its gradient is equal to:
∇g(µ) = −ACQ−1C (A
ᵀ
Cµ + cA)− bA. (3.2.12)
Under standard constraint qualifications, e.g., Slater’s condition [47, Ch. 5], strong du-
ality between the primal and dual holds, which means the optimal objective in the primal
problem (3.2.3) is equal to the objective in the dual problem (3.2.11). Moreover, the opti-
mality conditions (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker) hold and are the following:
QCx
∗ + AᵀCµ
∗ + cA = 0 (3.2.13)
ACx




∗ − bi) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m. (3.2.15)
For strictly convex problems, i.e., QC ∈ Sn++, the optimal solution of the primal problem
can be obtained from (3.2.13) as
x∗ = −Q−1C (A
ᵀ
Cµ
∗ + cA). (3.2.16)
An algorithm for computing the optimum in problem (3.2.11), which we will show is also
compatible with the AHE scheme, is the projected gradient ascent method. The projected
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gradient ascent is composed by iterations of the following type:
µk+1 = max{0,µk + η∇g(µk)}, (3.2.17)
where η > 0 is the step size and µk+1 is the projected value of µk + η∇g(µk) over the
non-negative orthant. For full rank of ACQ−1C A
ᵀ
C , the dual problem is strictly convex and





C). For non-strictly convex dual function, the gradient ascent algorithm
converges in sublinear time [173].
3.2.3.1 Projected gradient ascent on encrypted data
As stated in Section 3.2.1, we aim to solve an optimization problem outsourced to the
cloud on private distributed data from the agents and send the result to the requester. To
protect the agents’ data, we use an encryption scheme that allows the cloud to perform
linear manipulations on encrypted data, as described in Preamble 2.5.1. To this end, the
requester generates a pair of keys (pkR, skR) and distributes the public key to the agents
and the cloud, enabling them to encrypt their data, which only the requester will be able to
decrypt, using the private key. We consider that all the data is represented on integers of l
bits and comment on this further in Section 3.2.3.5.
The main difficulty in performing the projected gradient ascent on encrypted data is
performing iteration (3.2.17). We have already seen in the example in Section 3.2.2 that the
update of the iterate in the direction of the gradient ascent can be computed locally by the
cloud directly on the encrypted data (3.2.8). However a first challenge lies in performing the
comparison with zero. Due to the probabilistic nature and modular arithmetic of the Paillier
encryption scheme, comparing ciphertexts does not give any information about the order
between the underlying messages and comparison on encrypted data cannot be performed
locally by the cloud. Notwithstanding, we employ an interactive protocol between the cloud,
which holds the encrypted data, and the requester, which is the owner of the private key
for the Paillier cryptosystem, that achieves the comparison securely. Moreover, after the
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comparison is performed, the update of the encrypted iterate (3.2.17) has to be done in
a private way, so that the result of the maximum operation is not revealed to any of the
parties involved (the cloud and the requester). These two steps are the main computational
bottleneck in the protocol we propose, as both require secure communication between the
cloud and the requester.
We can privately achieve the two steps mentioned above in three stages. First, the
cloud has to randomize the order of the two encrypted variables it wants to compare (Pro-
tocol 3.2.1). Second, the cloud and requester engage in an interactive comparison protocol
that takes as inputs the two randomized variables and outputs the result of the comparison
to the requester (Protocol 2.7.2 in Preamble 2.7). Third, the update of the dual iterate is
achieved through an interactive protocol between the cloud and requester, which takes as
inputs the two randomized variables and the result of the comparison and outputs to the
cloud the updated iterate (Protocol 3.2.2 and Preamble 2.6). Throughout this section, by
comparison we mean element-wise comparison, since the variable µ is a vector.
3.2.3.2 Secure comparison protocol
In order to privately compute (3.2.17), i.e., hide the result from all the parties involved, we
want to keep the result of the comparison of the updated iterate µk + ∇g(µk) with zero
unknown to both the cloud and the requester. The comparison protocol will reveal the result
of the comparison between the two inputs to the requester R. However, if we introduce an
additional step where C randomizes the order of the two values that it wants to compare,
then R does not learn any information by knowing the result of the comparison.
Protocol 3.2.1: Randomization step
Input: C: [[µ̄]], [[0]], where µ̄ := µ + η∇g(µ)
Output: C: [[a]], [[b]]
1: C: choose a random permutation π on two elements
2: C: output [[a]], [[b]]← π([[0]], [[µ̄]]), where the permutation is applied component-wise
50
The comparison protocol that will be used in our optimization protocol is as follows. Let
C have two encrypted values under the Paillier scheme [[a]] and [[b]] that it obtained after
running Protocol 3.2.1, and let R have the decryption key. Furthermore, let R also have the
decryption key of the DGK homomorphic encryption scheme. At the end of the protocol
(outlined in Protocol 2.7.2 in Preamble 2.7), R will have the result of the comparison in
the form of one bit δ such that (δ = 1) ⇔ (a ≤ b). Let l denote the number of bits of the
unencrypted inputs a, b.
We will use blinding by random numbers to secure the communication from the cloud
to the requester. To guarantee the security of the DGK scheme, we choose a key-size that
makes factoring hard and set the randomization in the encryption primitive to be of length
greater than 2t bits, for t = 160. See more details in [77, 78].
3.2.3.3 Secure update protocol
Moreover, we need to ensure that when the cloud C updates the value of the dual iterate at
iteration k+ 1 in equation (3.2.17), it does not know the new value. The solution is to make
the cloud blind the values of [[a]] and [[b]] and send them to the requester in this order,
where the latter selects the value accordingly to the comparison result and then sends it
back to the cloud. However, there are two important issues that have to be addressed in
order for the update step to not leak information about the sign of the iterate: the blinding
should be additive and effectuated with different random values, and the ciphertexts should
be refreshed. The reasons are the following: if the blinding is multiplicative, by decrypting
the product, the requester knows which one of the values is zero. Moreover, if the two values
are additively blinded with the same random value, the requester can subtract them and
reveal at least if the value is zero. Re-randomization of the encryptions is necessary so that
the cloud cannot simply compare [[a]] and [[b]] with the received value. This can be done
by adding an encryption of zero or by decryption followed by encryption. Protocol 3.2.2 is
the solution to the update problem. In particular, it is the oblivious transfer procedure OT ′
in Preamble 2.6 applied element-wise for vectors [[a]], [[b]] and selection bits δ.
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Protocol 3.2.2: Secure update of the dual variable
Input: C: [[a]], [[b]]; R: δ such that (δi = 1)⇔ (ai ≤ bi)
Output: C: [[µ]]
1: for each i = 1, . . . ,m in parallel do
2: C: choose two random numbers r, s
3: C: [[ā]]← [[ai]]⊕ [[r]], [[b̄]]← [[bi]]⊕ [[s]]
4: C: send [[ā]] and [[b̄]] to R
5: if δi = 0 then R: [[v]]← [̃[ā]] = [[ā]] + [[0]]
6: else R: [[v]]← [̃[b̄]] = [[b̄]] + [[0]] . Refresh the ciphertext
7: end if
8: R: send [[v]] and [[δi]] to C
9: C: [[µi]]← [[v]]⊕ r ⊗ [[δi]]⊕ [[−r]]⊕ (−s)⊗ [[t]] . µi ← v + r(δi − 1)− sδi
10: end for
3.2.3.4 Protocol for solving strictly-convex quadratic problems
Having defined these protocols, we can now build a protocol that represents one iteration
(3.2.17) of the dual projected gradient ascent method.
Protocol 3.2.3: Secure iteration of the dual projected gradient ascent method
Input: C: AC ∈ Rm×n,QC ∈ Sn++, [[bA]], [[cA]], η > 0, [[µk]]; R: skR
Output: C: [[µk+1]]




C )⊗ [[cA]]⊕ (−1)⊗ [[bA]] . Compute the
encrypted gradient as in (3.2.12)
2: C: [[µ̄k]]← [[µk]]⊕ η ⊗ [[∇g(µk)]] . Update the value in the ascent direction
3: C,R truncate [[µ̄k]] to l bits
4: C execute Protocol 3.2.1: C gets [[ak]], [[bk]] . Randomly assign [[µ̄k]], [[0]] to [[ak]], [[bk]]
5: C,R execute Protocol 2.7.2 element-wise on inputs [[ak]], [[bk]]: R gets δk . Secure comparison
6: C,R execute Protocol 3.2.2: C obtains [[µk+1]] . Secure update ensuring µk+1 = max{µ̄k,0}
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Line 3 ensures that the updated iterate has the required number of bits for the comparison
protocol. This step is achieved by an exchange between the cloud and requester: the cloud
additively blinds the iterate by a random number, sends it to the requester, which decrypts
and truncates the sum and sends it back, where the cloud then subtracts the truncated
random number.
The random numbers used for blinding the sensitive values (in Protocols 2.7.2 and 3.2.2)
are sampled uniformly from the integers in ZN of l+λ bits, where λ is the statistical security
parameter, chosen such that brute-forcing the solution is intractable. In order to guarantee
correctness of the comparison protocol, no overflow must take place, so we must impose
log2N > l + λ+ 1.
The proof of security in the semi-honest model follows similar steps as in the argmax
protocol in [45] and we will address it in Appendix B.1.
Proposition 3.2.1. Protocol 3.2.3 is secure in the semi-honest model, cf. Definition 2.2.5.
Using the building blocks described above, we can finally assemble the protocol that
privately solves the constrained quadratic optimization problem (3.2.3) with private data
and sends the optimal solution to the requester. The public key pkR and bit-length l are
known by all the parties, hence we omit them from the inputs.
Protocol 3.2.4: Privacy preserving algorithm for solving strictly-convex quadratic
optimization problems
Input: Ai=1,...,p: bA = {bj}j=1,...,m, cA = {cj}j=1,...,n; C: AC ∈ Rm×n,QC ∈ Sn++,K; R: skR,K
Output: R: x∗
1: for i=1,. . . ,p do
2: Ai : encrypt the private information msgi ← ([[bi]], [[ci]])
3: Ai : send the encrypted messages to C
4: end for
5: C: Construct the vectors [[bA]] and [[cA]] from the messages
6: C: η ← 1/λmax(ACQ−1C A
ᵀ
C)
7: C: Choose a random positive initial value µ0 for the dual variable and encrypt it: [[µ0]]
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8: for each k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 do
9: C,R execute Protocol 3.2.3: C gets [[µk+1]] . C,R securely effectuate an iteration of the
dual projected gradient ascent
10: end for
11: C: [[x∗]]← (−Q−1C A
ᵀ
C)⊗ [[µK ]]⊕ (−Q
−1
C )⊗ [[cA]] and send it to R . Compute the primal
optimum from the optimal dual solution as in (3.2.13)
12: R: Decrypt [[x∗]] and output x∗
3.2.3.5 Fixed-point arithmetic
The optimization problem (3.2.3) is defined on real variables, whereas the Paillier encryption
scheme is defined on integers. To address this issue, we adopt a fixed-point arithmetic setting,
where we allow for a number to have a fixed number of fractional bits. First, we consider
numbers that have the magnitude between −2li−1 < x < 2li−1. Second, we consider a
value having li bits for the integer part and lf bits for the fractional part. Therefore, by
multiplying the real values by 2lf and truncating the result, we obtain integers. We choose
l = li + lf large enough such that the loss in accuracy is negligible and assume that there is
no overflow. For ease of exposition, we consider this data processing done implicitly in the
protocols described.
The errors in the solution caused by the fixed-point arithmetic operations necessary for
the encryption can be analyzed with the same tools as in [11, 129, 193]. The round-off
errors can be regarded as states in a stable dynamical system with bounded disturbances,
and hence, have a bounded norm that offers a guide on how to choose the number of
fractional bits lf for the fixed-point representation. On the other hand, the overflow and
quantization errors depend on the magnitude of the dual iterates. We considered feasible
and bounded problems–the dual problem (3.2.11) has a finite solution–therefore, one can
select the number of integer bits li in the representation such that no overflow occurs.
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3.2.3.6 Privacy of quadratic optimization protocol
We first provide the statements of the results and the main ideas of the proofs here, and
follow-up with the detailed arguments in Appendix B.
Theorem 3.2.2. Protocol 3.2.4 is secure cf. Definition 2.2.5 for non-colluding parties.
The intuition for the proof is as follows. Consider an iteration of the gradient ascent
in Protocol 3.2.4. Firstly, in the Paillier cryptosystem, two ciphertexts are computationally
indistinguishable to a party that does not have access to the decryption key. Secondly, the
exchanges between the cloud and the requester are additively blinded using a different ran-
dom number uniformly sampled from a large enough range (at least λ bits more over the
values that are desired to be blinded, where the size of λ is chosen appropriately, as discussed
in Preamble 2.4. This means that the blinded message is statistically indistinguishable from
a random number sampled from the same distribution. Thirdly, the ciphertexts are refreshed
(a different encryption of the same value), after each exchange, so a party that does not have
access to the decryption key cannot infer information about the encrypted values by simply
comparing the ciphertexts. Then, none of the parties can infer the magnitude or the sign
of the private variables. However, we need to show that privacy is not broken by running
an iteration multiple times. We prove that storing the exchanged messages does not give
any new information on the private data, using similar arguments. Formally, using Defini-
tion 2.2.5, we construct a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator that randomly generates
messages from the inputs and outputs such that its view and the view of the adversary, on
the same inputs, are computationally indistinguishable. The correctness of Protocol 3.2.4 is
immediate and follows from the correctness of the dual gradient ascent algorithm and the
correctness of the comparison protocol. The proof is given in Appendix B.1.
Let us now consider collusions between the parties in the setup and prove privacy of Pro-
tocol 3.2.4 under coalitions. Definition 2.2.6 states that even under collusions, the protocol
securely computes a functionality, which in this case, is solving a quadratic optimization
problem. No further information is revealed than what can inferred from the coalition’s
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inputs and outputs. However, if all agents and the cloud collude then they have access to
all the information to solve the problem, in which case the above result is rather vacuous.
Similarly, if the cloud colludes with the requester, then it can gain access to all the private
data of the agents. Hence, we consider coalitions that involve either all the agents or the
cloud and the requester to be prohibited (and unrealistic) and only consider coalitions be-
tween a strict subset of the agents and the cloud or between a strict subset of the agents
and the requester. We give a complementary analysis on the information gained from the
inputs and outputs of coalitions in Section 3.2.4.
Theorem 3.2.3. Protocol 3.2.4 is secure cf. Definition 2.2.6 against coalitions.
The proof of Theorem 3.2.3 can be derived from the proof of Theorem 3.2.2 because
the agents only contribute with their inputs to the view of the coalition, and not with new
messages. The proof is given in Appendix B.2.
Remark 3.2.4. When the matrices QC and AC are private, hence, sent to the cloud encrypted,
an additively homomorphic encryption scheme does not suffice anymore. To account for
this and give a private solution to problem (3.2.3), we can update Protocol (3.2.4) to use
a level-1 somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, like LabHE or leveled fully HE (see
Preamble 2.5.2 and Preamble 2.5.3).
3.2.4 Privacy discussion
3.2.4.1 Alternative quadratic optimization protocol
As explained in Section 3.2.3.2, the major computational and communication overhead of the
above protocol is the secure comparison protocol, required to project dual variables to non-
negative numbers. In this section, we describe a computationally less involved alternative
approach, which bypasses the need for the secure comparison protocol, at the expense of
revealing more information. This approach is developed in more detail in [13, 203].
Specifically, consider a step of the dual gradient algorithm where the cloud maintains
an unprojected gradient ascent step µ̄k = µk − η[ACQ−1C (A
ᵀ
Cµk + cA) + bA] encrypted
using the public key of the requester. Suppose the cloud multiplies the elements in this
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vector with random scalar values rk uniformly distributed over the positive integers and
sends the products to the requester. The latter can decrypt the message using its private
key and gain access not to the actual unprojected iterate but to the randomly scaled version
of it, which reveals the sign. It can then project it to the non-negative orthant in an
unencrypted fashion: max{0, (rk)i(µ̄k)i} for i = 1, . . . ,m, and finally encrypt the result
using its public key and return it to the cloud. The cloud can divide the result with the
previously selected values rk to compute in an encrypted fashion the elements [[(µk+1)i]] =
(1/(rk)i)⊗ [[max{0, (rk)i(µ̄k)i}]] which is equivalent to the encrypted actual projected step
[[max{0, (µ̄k)i}]] for i = 1, . . . ,m, because division with a positive number commutes with
the max operator.
This alternative solution bypasses the complexity of the secure comparison part. On
the other hand, it reveals more information to the requester than the secure comparison
approach. In particular it reveals a scaled version of the unprojected dual variable which
in turn does not reveal the magnitude of this value but reveals whether this is positive,
negative, or zero.
Implementation-wise, we want the values of rk to be large enough to blind the magnitude
of the elements of µ̄k, so we will randomly sample rk from the values of γ + l bits, where
γ is the security size for the multiplicative blinding. Furthermore, we need to be able to
represent 1/(rk)i on the message space and to have enough precision as to obtain the correct
value of (µk+1)i. Hence, we will perform implicit multiplications and divisions by 2
l′f , for
l′f > l+ γ. This change shows that, although significantly less communication is required to
perform the projection operation, all the other operations are more expensive, because we
work with larger numbers.
3.2.4.2 Privacy analysis of input-output relation
In this section we discuss privacy aspects that differ from the computational notions of
Definitions 2.2.5 and 2.2.6. Even if a protocol does not leak any information, the known
information in a coalition (e.g., the output and some of the inputs) can be used by the
coalition to infer the rest of the private inputs. More specifically, in our optimization prob-
57
lem, the private variables and the optimal solution are coupled via the optimality conditions
(3.2.13)-(3.2.15), which are public knowledge, irrespective of the protocol, and may be used
for the purpose described above.
Consider the following definition that concerns the retrieval of private data from adver-
sarial/known data.
Definition 3.2.5. (Non-unique retrieval) Let p be the private inputs of a problem and let
an algorithm A(p) solve that problem. Let K be the adversarial knowledge of the problem,
which can contain public information, some private information (including some parts of the
input) and the output of algorithm A for the adversary, denoted by AK(p). We say p cannot
be uniquely retrieved by the adversary if there exists a set U , such that p ∈ U , |U| ≥ 2 and:
∀p′ ∈ U : AK(p) = AK(p′).
Definition 3.2.5 can be modified to be stronger by requiring the set U to have an infinite
number of elements.
Meeting the requirements of Definition 2.2.5 and Definition 2.2.6 is equivalent to not
revealing any other information than what is already known to any of the parties, i.e.
inputs, prescribed outputs, if any, and previously known side information. This is a stronger
requirement than guaranteeing that an adversary cannot uniquely retrieve the data of the
honest parties, i.e. Definition 3.2.5. Revealing sensitive information does not always lead
to a unique retrieval of the private data. Nevertheless, any piece of information revealed by
the execution of the protocol, that cannot be obtained only from its inputs and outputs,
leads to the violation of Definitions 2.2.5, 2.2.6, even if the private data cannot be singled
out with this information.
In what follows, beyond the computational security analysis of the previous sections,
we carry out an algebraic analysis on a black-box protocol that given the agent’s private
data bA, cA and the cloud’s matrices QC ,AC , outputs the solution x∗ of Problem (3.2.3)
to the requester. We provide conditions such that a coalition cannot uniquely determine
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unknown private inputs from the output and a set of inputs, in the sense of Definition 3.2.5.
In particular, this analysis applies to Protocol 3.2.4 which, assuming it runs for sufficient
iterations, outputs the desired result x∗ to the requester. We perform this algebraic analysis
in the space of real numbers, which can be further expanded to fixed-point arithmetics for
large enough precision.
Suppose without loss of generality that a coalition between p̄ agents (1 ≤ p̄ < p) has
access to the elements b1, . . . , bm̄ with 0 ≤ m̄ ≤ m, and c1, . . . , cn̄ with 0 ≤ n̄ ≤ n. Then let





where the matrices A1 ∈ Rm̄×n, A21 ∈ R(m−m̄)×n̄, A22 ∈ R(m−m̄)×(n−n̄).
Proposition 3.2.6. Consider a protocol solving Problem (3.2.3) and a coalition between the
requester and agents with access to m̄ of the values of bA and n̄ of the values of cA. Suppose
the cost and constraint matrices AC, QC are public. Then:
(1) if m̄ < m and there exists a vector γ ∈ Rm−m̄ such that γ 6= 0,γ  0 and Aᵀ21γ = 0,
then the coalition cannot uniquely retrieve the value of bA;
(2) if additionally n̄ < n and Aᵀ22γ 6= 0 then the coalition cannot uniquely retrieve the
value of cA.
The proof is based on the fact that the variables bA, cA, x∗, µ∗ satisfy the optimality
conditions (3.2.13)-(3.2.15). Specifically, these are conditions that the unknown variables
bm̄+1, . . . , bm and cn̄+1, . . . , cn, as well as the optimal dual variables µ∗, must satisfy given
all the rest of the known variables. Hence, if there are multiple such solutions to the KKT
conditions the coalition cannot uniquely determine the private variables. The proof is given
in Section B.3.
Proposition 3.2.7. Consider a protocol solving Problem (3.2.3) and a coalition between the
cloud and agents with access to m̄ of the values of bA and n̄ of the values of cA. Then,
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a coalition that satisfies m̄ < m and n̄ < n cannot uniquely retrieve the values of bA, cA
and x∗.
The proof follows from the fact that QC is a positive definite matrix, hence, the solution
x∗ is finite, and AC does not have any columns or rows of zeros. A coalition between the
cloud and the p̄ < p agents cannot solve (3.2.3) since it lacks all the data to define it (m̄ < m
and n̄ < n), so it cannot uniquely retrieve x∗ and the rest of the agents’ private data.
Propositions 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 give general sufficient conditions for the desired non-unique
retrieval property to hold and are independent of the exact problem instance values. If the
conditions stated are not satisfied, then the previous result in Theorem 3.2.3 still holds.
However, the additional non-unique retrieval property may fail because the inputs and out-
puts of the coalition are sufficient to leak information about the rest of the private inputs.
The above analysis can also be extended to the case where some of the matrices QC ,AC are
private information.
Let us now use Definition 3.2.5 to analyze the alternative protocol in Section 3.2.4.1 and
the effect the release of more information to the requester has on the privacy of the inputs of
the honest agents. We perform the analysis at a setup where the protocol runs for a sufficient
number of iterations and hence the dual variable µk has converged to the true optimal value
µ∗ and the algorithm has also converged to the true optimal primal value x∗. Suppose the
requester has access to the sign of the unprojected optimal dual variable µ∗ + ∇g(µ∗) –
note that this is the case when we employ the alternative solution. In combination with
the solution x∗, this information can be further employed by the requester to infer private
information of the agents.
Proposition 3.2.8. Consider a protocol solving Problem (3.2.3) where the requester has
access to the solution x∗ and also the sign of the unprojected optimal dual variables δ :=
sign(µ∗ + ∇g(µ∗)) ∈ {+1,−1, 0}m. Suppose further the matrix AC is publicly available.
Then the private values bA cannot be uniquely retrieved by the requester if and only if δi < 0
for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Here δi < 0 implies that the corresponding optimal dual value is zero, µ∗i = 0. This means
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that the corresponding constraint in problem (3.2.3) is inactive at the optimal solution x∗ [47,
Ch. 5] and the requester cannot uniquely determine the ith element of the corresponding
bound bA. In the opposite case, if all constraints (3.2.14) are either active or redundant at
the optimal solution (µ∗  0), this is revealed to the requester because in that case δi ≥ 0,
and the private value bA is uniquely determined by bA = ACx∗.
Proposition 3.2.9. Consider the setup of Proposition 3.2.8 and the matrix QC is publicly
available. The private values cA cannot be uniquely retrieved from the outputs x∗ and δ of
the requester if and only if δi > 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The case δi > 0 corresponds now to the case where the corresponding constraint is active
at the optimal solution x∗. When this fails, all constraints are inactive at x∗ and they do
not play a role. Hence, we have an unconstrained quadratic problem in (3.2.3), i.e., the
optimal solution satisfies the first order condition QCx∗ + cA = 0, which reveals the value
of cA to the requester. To guarantee privacy with respect to both private values bA, cA we
need both an inactive constraint (δi < 0) as well as an active constraint (δj > 0) for some
i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, leaving some uncertainty in the estimations performed by the requester.
Similar analysis may be performed for collusions, e.g., of the requester and some agents.
3.2.5 Implementation
The efficiency of a secure multi-party protocol is measured in the complexity of the com-
putations performed by each party, along with the rounds of communications between the
parties. While the former is relevant from the perspective of the level of computational
power required, the latter are relevant when communication is slow.
In the setup we considered, the agents are low-power platforms, hence, they are only
required to effectuate one encryption and one communication round, but the cloud and the
requester are platforms with high computational capabilities, e.g., servers.
Let σ be the bit-length of the modulus N . Then, the size of a Paillier ciphertext is 2σ,
regardless of the size of the plaintext in ZN . A Paillier encryption takes one online expo-
nentiation and one multiplication modulo N2, and a decryption takes one exponentiation
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modulo N2 and one multiplication modulo N . The addition of two ciphertexts takes one
modular multiplication modulo N2. A multiplication of a ciphertext with a plaintext of l
bits is achieved as a modular exponentiation modulo N2. A multiplication of two elements
in Z∗N2 can be achieved in O((2σ)
1.7). A modular exponentiation in N2 with an l-bit expo-
nent can be computed in O(l(2σ)2) and can be sped up via the Chinese Remainder Theorem
when the factorization of N is known. A DGK encryption takes one modular exponentiation
and one modular multiplication in Z∗NDGK , and a DGK decryption–checking if the encrypted
message is 0 or not–takes an exponentiation modulo pDGK.
We implemented the protocol proposed in Section 3.2.3.4 in Python 3 and ran it on a
2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor. For random instances of the data in Problem (3.2.3), with
σ = 1024 and l = 32 bits, and 0 ms delay for communication, we obtain the average running
times depicted with the dashed gray lines in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.2 depicts the online execution time of Protocol 3.2.4 with the iterations as
in Protocol 3.2.3. As expected, because we work in the dual space, the time required for
running the iterations varies very little with the number of variables, but increases with the
number of constraints. However, in the case of Figure 3.3, which depicts the online execution
time of Protocol 3.2.4 with the alternative iterations as in Section 3.2.4.1, the time varies
more with the number of variables n and not as much with m as Protocol 3.2.3 does. The
reason is that we work with substantially larger numbers than in the previous case, due to
the large factor with which we have to multiply in order to be able to de-mask the dual
iterate, which amplifies the time difference between problems of different dimensions.
The trade-off between the privacy and communication can be seen when we artificially
add a communication delay of 20 ms between the cloud and the requester, to simulate the
delays that can occur on a communication network. It can be observed in Figures 3.2 and 3.3
that the communication delay has a smaller effect on the less private protocol than on the
fully private Protocol 3.2.3.
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Figure 3.2: Average running time of Protocol 3.2.4 for problem instances with the number of variables
on the abscissa and the number of constraints in the legend, with a 20 ms communication delay
(colored solid) and undelayed (gray dashed). The simulation is run for 30 iterations, a 1024 bit key
and 32 bit messages (16 bit precision). The statistical parameter for additive blinding is 100 bits.
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Figure 3.3: Average running time of Protocol 3.2.4 with the alternative iterations as in Section 3.2.4.1
for problem instances with the number of variables on the abscissa and the number of constraints
in the legend, with a 20 ms communication delay (colored solid) and undelayed (gray dashed). The
simulation is run for 30 iterations, a 1024 bit key and 32 bit messages (16 bit precision). The
statistical parameter for multiplicative blinding is 40 bits.
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3.3 Secure evaluation of Lasso
Organization. We outline the Lasso problem and the unsecure solution using ADMM in Sec-
tion 3.3.1 and we present the privacy requirements for the secure solution. In Section 3.3.2,
we describe the multi-party homomorphic encryption scheme used and justify the choice of
distributed servers and distributed bootstrapping, as well as the method chosen for poly-
nomial approximation. We then detail the challenges for achieving secure Lasso and their
corresponding solutions, and assemble the encrypted protocol. Finally, Section 3.3.4 shows
our implementation results and observations for Lasso problems of varying dimensions. The
proof of privacy for the encrypted protocol is given in Appendix B.5.
3.3.1 Problem formulation
For a covariate matrix A ∈ Rm×n, a vector of outcomes b ∈ Rm, the variable x ∈ Rn and a





‖Ax− b‖22 + λ‖x‖1. (3.3.1)
For dependent covariates, there is no closed-form solution to (3.3.1) and many iterative
optimization algorithms have been proposed in the literature [123, Ch. 5]. For example,
Lasso problems can be solved using proximal methods or augmented Lagrangian methods,
such as the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) [48], [123, Ch. 5]. Splitting





‖Ax− b‖22 + λ‖z‖1
s.t. x− z = 0.
(3.3.2)
Let Sα(x) = (x−α1)+−(−x−α1)+ denote the soft thresholding operator. The ADMM
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algorithm for (3.3.2) is:








‖x− zk + wk‖22
)
= (AᵀA + ρI)−1
(
Aᵀb + ρ(zk −wk)
)










wk+1 = wk + xk+1 − zk+1.
(3.3.3)
While for general optimization problems, the ADMM might converge slowly, for the
Lasso problem it is known to have a fast convergence of a few (tens of) iterations for a
large range of parameter ρ > 0 [48]. ADMM is a fast choice in the cases where a very high
precision of the optimal result is not required, which is the case in noisy control problems,
like the one we investigate in Chapter 7.3.
Goals and privacy requirements. A client outsources problem (3.3.1) to a cloud
service that has to compute the optimal solution based on the data from the client.
We consider the cloud service to be semi-honest, meaning it does not deviate from the
client’s specifications, but can process the data it receives to extract private information for
its own profit. The cloud service can be a conglomerate ofK servers (see Figure 3.4), possibly
belonging to different organizations, offering the guarantee that not all K servers collude.
Under this adversarial model, we require client data confidentiality, i.e., an adversary
corrupting at most K − 1 of the servers should not be able to infer anything about the
client’s inputs and outputs, which consist of the values of the matrix A and the vector b,
any intermediate values, and solution x∗. The penalty λ and parameter ρ can be chosen by
Figure 3.4: Schematic diagram of the problem, with a client outsourcing its encrypted data to a
cloud service, that is authorized to compute on the data, but not to decrypt it.
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the cloud service or chosen by the client, but are public. The formal privacy definition can be
particularized from the multi-party privacy Definition 2.2.6 and is given by Definition 3.3.1.
Definition 3.3.1. (Client privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behavior of servers) Let xC be the
private input of a client and xS,i be the input of server i, for i = 1, . . . , n. The client wants
the servers to evaluate a functionality f and return the result f(xC , xS,1, . . . , xS,n). Denote
the inputs by x̄ = (xC , xS,1, . . . , xS,n). Let fS,i(x̄) denote the corresponding result at server i.
For I = {i1, . . . , it} ⊂ [n] := {1, . . . , n}, with |I| < n, we let fS,I(x̄) denote the subsequence
fS,i1(x̄), . . . , fS,it(x̄), which models a coalition of a number of servers. Let Π be a n-party
protocol for computing f . Denote the view of server i on input (x̄) by V ΠS,i(x̄) and denote the
view of a coalition between servers by V ΠI (x̄) = (I, V
Π
S,i1
(x̄), . . . , V ΠS,it(x̄)). For a deterministic
functionality f , we say that Π privately computes f if there exist simulators S, such
that, for every I ⊂ [n], it holds that, for any inputs x̄t = (xS,i1 , . . . , xS,it):
{S(I, (x̄t), fI(x̄t))}x̄∈({0,1}∗)n
c≡ {V ΠI (x̄)}x̄∈({0,1}∗)n .
3.3.2 Background
3.3.2.1 Distributed Bootstrapping for Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
If done locally at a server with no access to the private key, bootstrapping is a very expensive
operation, consuming around 10 levels and introducing more noise (from encrypted approxi-
mation of nonpolynomial functions); see [60, 63] for details. Apart from the computationally
intensive bootstrapping procedure, all the prior and posterior operations are impacted, since
ciphertexts are required to have an extra 10 levels, leading to very large scheme parameters
and ciphertexts size, making centralized bootstrapping undesirable.
Instead of performing bootstrapping locally, a server can ask the client to refresh a
ciphertext on level 0. However, this implies more computation, communication and avail-
ability from the client, which is often prohibitive. A preferable solution is to use two or
more servers for the computation and the refreshing. However, corrupting only two servers
can be attainable by an adversary. Increasing the number of servers decreases the probability
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of an adversary corrupting them all. Distributed bootstrapping trades substantial computa-
tion power to one round of communication and does not introduce as much noise as the
centralized bootstrapping, as described below.
In multi-party HE schemes, the private key is additively secret shared between a num-
ber of servers, meaning that no proper subset of the servers can decrypt. An important
assumption is that an adversary cannot corrupt all servers at once, hence the private key
is never recovered. In [169], a multi-party HE scheme is described, where servers can carry
out the homomorphic computations locally and only need to interact for decryption and
bootstrapping. In our scenario, the decryption will be performed at the client so we are only
interested in distributed bootstrapping. Intuitively, distributed bootstrapping requires each
server to use its local secret share of the private key to perform a partial decryption, mask
this result and send it to the other servers. Summing up all the partial decryptions results
in a refreshed ciphertext with the desired number of levels that can be correctly decrypted
to the original message. The masking needs to provide statistical privacy of the message, so
we require the mask to be > 80 bits larger than the size of messages and that no overflow
occurs (the statistical security parameter is generally smaller than the computational secu-
rity parameter). This means that distributed bootstrapping consumes around 3 levels; see
more details in [96, 169].
In the rest of this chapter, we work with the multi-party version [96] of the leveled HE
scheme CKKS [62]. Specifically, we use the version of the CKKS scheme [62], optimized
to run on machine word size of 64-bit integer arithmetic [64, 117] instead of multiprecision
integer arithmetic. We will denote by Ev0(x) the encryption of the vector x followed by trail-
ing zeros and by Ev∗(x) the encryption of the vector x followed by junk elements (elements
whose value we do not care about).
3.3.2.2 Polynomial approximation and Chebyshev series
As described above, homomorphic encryption can evaluate polynomials on encrypted values.
However, other operations such as trigonometric functions, divisions or comparisons are not
supported. Therefore, we prefer to evaluate a polynomial approximation of the nonpolyno-
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mial functions. We choose to work with the Chebyshev polynomial series rather than the
more common Taylor power series due to better precision and smaller approximation error.
Specifically, the Chebyshev series polynomial interpolation is a near-minimax approximation
of a continuous function on the interval [−1, 1] [160].
However, polynomial approximation is not a panacea: for non-smooth functions, it gives
a reasonable error only on relatively small intervals or using high degree polynomials. We
choose to use this method, rather than other encrypted computation tools that can exactly
evaluate non-smooth functions at the cost of more communication, knowing that we are
dealing with noisy systems, where the small approximation errors are absorbed by noise.
3.3.3 Encrypted distributed Lasso
The setting we consider is the following: the client encrypts its data A,b and secret shares
its private key to a number of servers. The servers are responsible to compute and return
the solution of problem (3.3.2) to the the client.
3.3.3.1 Challenge: Evaluating nonpolynomial functions
In the steps (3.3.3) of the ADMM algorithm for problem (3.3.2), the soft thresholding
function is nonpolynomial, yet we need to evaluate it on encrypted data when computing
zk+1. We deal with this challenge by approximating the soft thresholding function using
a polynomial on a fixed interval via the Chebyshev series (we hardcode the coefficients for
this function). If the interval is not [−1, 1], we first apply a linear transformation to bring
the inputs to this interval.
In the context of encrypted evaluation, a high polynomial degree increases the number of
levels necessary for the computations, as well as the number of homomorphic multiplications
between ciphertexts, which are expensive operations (compared to plaintext-ciphertext mul-
tiplications or additions). While we cannot consume fewer than dlog ne levels to evaluate a
polynomial of degree n, we can reduce the O(n) homomorphic multiplications from the naive
evaluation. Specifically, we implement the Paterson-Stockmayer algorithm [182], which re-




+ O(1) by recursively
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evaluating polynomials of smaller degree. We modify the Paterson-Stockmayer algorithm
that works with power series to work with Chebyshev series. The benefit of this algorithm
compared to the naive evaluation is visible after degree 5 and grows with the degree. As
an example, to evaluate a non-monic polynomial of degree 25, we require 5 levels and 11
homomorphic multiplications between ciphertexts.
Remark 3.3.2. The “stability” of the ADMM iterations for the Lasso problem allows the
value xk+1 + wk to stay within a fixed interval, given in Lemma 3.3.3. In practice, we
choose this interval from prior simulation.
Lemma 3.3.3. Define M := AᵀA + ρI, n := M−1Aᵀb and c :=
√
nλ/ρ‖2ρM−1 − I‖2 +
‖n‖2. Since σ := ‖ρM−1‖2 is in (0, 1], we have the following bounds for the quantity
‖xk+1 + wk‖∞ in (3.3.3), for all k = 1, . . . ,Kiter:
‖xk+1 + wk‖∞ ≤ σk‖n‖2 +
1− σk
1− σ
c, if σ < 1
‖xk+1 + wk‖∞ ≤ ‖n‖2 + kc, if σ = 1.
(3.3.4)
The proof is given in Section B.4.
3.3.3.2 Challenge: Evaluating iterations
Depending on the precision we choose, the polynomial approximation can have a high de-
gree, implying the need of bootstrapping in order to continue operations in the subsequent
iterations. We resolve this challenge by making use of multiple servers in order to realize
a cheaper bootstrapping compared to a centralized bootstrapping and a less burdensome
solution than requesting action from the client.
To this end, we turn to the distributed version of ADMM [48], such that we use the
servers both to ease the computation of the optimal solution and to ensure privacy through
encrypted computations. We split the matrix A and vector b into K parts, each to be held
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‖Aixi − bi‖22 + λ‖z‖1
s.t. xi − z = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
(3.3.5)




























Each server is given ciphertexts corresponding to Ai,bi. We assume that there is a pre-
processing step where servers can precompute convenient ciphertexts that will be used often
in the online iterations, such as 1/ρAᵀibi and ρ (A
ᵀ
iAi + ρI)
−1. As in the unencrypted case,
the servers can use the matrix inversion lemma to compute an inversion of a smaller matrix,
which saves in offline computation. Online, each server locally computes the encryptions
of xi and wi, then communicates to the other servers the local sum xk+1i + w
k
i , such that
all servers are then able to compute zk+1. So far, the only communication necessary is the
same as in the unencrypted ADMM.
3.3.3.3 Challenge: Realizing the fewest bootstrapping operations
Distributed bootstrapping requires all parties to start by holding the same ciphertext and
all parties to obtain that refreshed ciphertext. Bootstrapping the ciphertext encrypting
zk+1 seems attractive, because it is global and its evaluation involves the most sequential
multiplications. However, this is not enough: wk+1i loses levels through x
k+1
i , which is the
result of a multiplication; so we would need to bootstrap also before computing zk+1, not
just after.
Instead, we do the following trick. Each server already has to compute and send a
ciphertext encrypting xk+1i + w
k
i to the other servers in order to compute the global iterate
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and distributedly bootstrap it. Afterwards,
each server can extract the refreshed ciphertext containing its local value xk+1i +w
k
i , as well






i by repeatedly rotating and summing
the refreshed ciphertext ck+1 (this takes O(K) operations). From this value, each server can
locally compute its encrypted iterates wk+1i and x
k+1
i , while doing only one bootstrapping
operation per iteration rather than two.
Apart from xk+1i +w
k
i , the servers send one more message to complete the bootstrapping
operation, so there are two rounds of communication per iteration, one at the smallest
admissible level (dictated by bootstrapping) and the other at the full number of levels
required, computed below.
Assume that offline quantities are refreshed. Define lB to be the number of levels for a
statistically secure distributed bootstrapping and lP to be the number of levels necessary for
the evaluation of Sλ/ρ(·) at a desired precision: this is the degree of the approximation poly-
nomial plus one, coming from the linear transformation to the interval [−1, 1] (we merge the
multiplication by 1/K in the Chebyshev coefficients). Hence, the fresh ciphertexts need to
have L = lB + lP + 1 levels, if we bootstrap once per iteration. Because lP is usually higher
than 5, bootstrapping once every few iterations leads to larger parameters and ciphertexts.
3.3.3.4 Encrypted protocol
Protocol 3.3.1 describes the steps for privately solving the distributed Lasso problem.
We use an optimized diagonal method [115] for encrypted matrix-vector multiplication.
Consider a matrix S ∈ Rn×n and a vector p ∈ Rn. Denote the diagonals of S by di, for
i = 0, . . . , n− 1. Let n1 := d
√
















With (3.3.8), we need n1 + n2 = O(
√
n) homomorphic rotations, given ρ(dj·n1+k,−j · n1),
instead of n if we use (3.3.7). In both cases we require n homomorphic multiplications.
For a rectangular matrix, we need extended diagonals but the method is the same. The
header of the function that achieves this is MultDiag(S,p), and we pass the matrix S as
separate ciphertexts encoding diagonals rotated accordingly and the vector p encoded in a
ciphertext with trailing zeros. (In line 9 in Protocol 3.3.1, a masking is performed in order
to satisfy the latter requirement.) We implement MultDiag such that it returns a ciphertext
that encodes the result q with trailing zeros. This method can be parallelized. MultDiag is
performed locally at the servers (lines 3 and 11).
The header ApproxSoftT(p) represents the implementation of the Chebyshev interpo-
lation element-wise for p, for a given set of coefficients that specify the degree of the ap-
proximation and an interval for which the coefficients are valid. Internally, the input is
normalized to the interval [−1, 1] (this also masks the junk elements), such that the output
is a ciphertext encoding the result with trailing zeros. ApproxSoftT is performed locally
(line 8 in Protocol 3.3.1).
DBoot(p) is a distributed protocol, where all servers start with the ciphertext of the
vector p and all servers obtain a ciphertext that contains the refreshed vector p having a
predetermined number of levels (line 6 in Protocol 3.3.1). It implies one round of commu-
nication between all servers, as described in Section 3.3.2.1.
There is also an offline protocol that computes the input as listed in Protocol 3.3.1. We
mention that the client distributes the rows of A and b to the servers and the shares of
the private key. The servers compute mi by multiplication and Mi by the matrix inversion
lemma and a high degree polynomial approximation for the inversion function, and use
rotation and masking in order to obtain the diagonal representation needed. The servers
collaborate to bootstrap the ciphertexts, in order to start Protocol 1 on the desired level.
Theorem 3.3.4. Protocol 3.3.1 achieves client data confidentiality with respect to semi-
honest servers, assuming at least one of the servers is honest.
The proof is given in Section B.5.
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Protocol 3.3.1: Distributed encrypted protocol for (3.3.5) with equal servers and equal
data split
Input: Public parameters: public key pk, number of servers K, number of maximum iterations






i bi), share of the secret key ski, the Chebyshev coefficients for evaluating Sλ/ρ(·) on
a given interval.
Output: C: x∗.
1: Si=1,...,K : set initial values Ev0(x0i ), Ev0(w0i ), Ev0(z0) (the value of zk is previously agreed upon);
2: for k = 0, . . . ,Kiter − 1 do
3: Si=1,...,K : Ev0(xki ) = MultDiag(Mi,mi + zk −wki );
4: Si=1,...,K : compute and send to other servers the rotation of the sum Ev0(vi) := ρ(xk+1i +
wki ,−(i− 1)n);
5: Si=1,...,K : assemble Ev∗(v) := Ev∗([v1 v2 . . .vK ]) by summing own ciphertext and all re-
ceived shifted ciphertexts;
6: Si=1,...,K : perform part in the distributed bootstrapping to get Ev∗(vb) := DBoot(Ev∗(v));
7: Si=1,...,K : extract its refreshed sum of local iterates Ev∗(vbi ) = ρ(Ev∗(vb), (i− 1)n);














9: Si=1,...,K : Ev0(wk+1i ) = [1
ᵀ
S 0
ᵀ]ᵀ  Ev∗(vbi )− Ev0(zk);
10: end for
11: S1: compute Ev0(xKiter1 ) = MultDiag(M1,m1 + z
Kiter−1−wKiter−11 ) and send it to the client C;
12: C: decrypt and extract x∗.
Remark 3.3.5. This distributed setup can be used for the quadratic problem described in
Section 3.2, by using polynomial approximation for the maximum function in the dual
problem (3.2.11). However, unless special conditions on the matrices are given, the projected
gradient iterates do not have the same “stability” property as in Remark 3.3.2. This might
require larger intervals and worse approximation error or very high approximation degree.
Hence, we preferred to exploit the architecture and the capabilities of the requester in
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Section 3.2, and to obtain more precise solutions.
3.3.4 Numerical results
We evaluate Protocol 3.3.1 on Ubuntu 18.04 on a commodity laptop with 8 GB of RAM
and Intel Core i7, implemented using the PALISADE library [178], for three servers using
8 threads. We set the parameters such that we get a security level of 128 bits, i.e., we use
a ciphertext modulus of 436 bits and a ring dimension of 214. We obtain 6 decimal places
















Figure 3.5: Timing for steps in one online iteration for one server for solving Lasso problems of various
dimensions via encrypted distributed ADMM with three servers (Protocol 3.3.1). The legend shows
the operation that takes the most time in the step.
In Figure 3.5, we show how the time for one ADMM iteration varies with the dimension
of the problem, i.e., number of columns of matrix A in (3.3.2). The blue bar shows the
time for lines 3 and 4 in Protocol 3.3.1, effectively consisting of the matrix-vector multi-
plication. The yellow bar shows the time for lines 5 and 6, representing the preparation
for bootstrapping and the bootstrapping itself. Finally, the red bar represents lines 7–9 of
Protocol 3.3.1, consisting mostly of the polynomial evaluation. We want to stress that the
bootstrapping and polynomial evaluation are made independent from the dimension of the
problem through packing, which represents a great advantage when increasing the dimen-
sion. On the other hand, for large dimensions, the encrypted matrix multiplication takes
most of the computational and memory effort, and other methods that decrease storage and





As large amounts of data are circulated both from users to a cloud server and between users,
there is a critical need for privately aggregating the shared data. Of particular interest is
the general problem of weighted sum aggregation, that we explore in this chapter, in which
an aggregating party needs to collect and sum contributions from a number of agents–
the contributions consist of some local data weighted by some other relevant quantities.
There is a wealth of examples spanning various research areas that require the computation
of weighted aggregates: (a) Decentralized and cooperative linear control for multi-agent
systems [69, 151, 223]; (b)Graph neural networks [136] and collaborative inference [111, 206];
(c) Average consensus [90, 229]; (d) Federated learning [165, 228], aggregation of linear
inference results; (e) Energy price aggregation and management [68, 222], vehicle tolls
collection [26, 146].
Each of the above examples can pose different privacy requirements on the local data of
the agents, as well as on the corresponding weights. For example, in the context of federated
learning, the model is locally trained by the agents and the aggregating server needs to
compute the mean model without obtaining the local models. In some price collection
instances, the prices can depend on private information known at the aggregator and can
vary dynamically, so the aggregator knows the price weights, while the agents do not. Finally,
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there are cases where a system operator has invested resources into computing the control
gains for a distributed system and wants to keep them private from both the agents and
the aggregator, who needs to compute a linear control without knowing neither the local
agent’s states nor the gains. Similar privacy requirements are in place for secure inference,
where a service provider has trained a proprietary model on its own data and wants to keep
it private while allowing it to be deployed.
Related work
In the context of (a), linear distributed control with homomorphically encrypted gains was
addressed by [7, 12, 199], with [7] touching also on (b). We will elaborate and improve on
these works in Section 4.3.2. Concerning (c), there is a body of research that targets the
privacy of the local data of the agents achieving consensus, using partially homomorphic
encryption or differential privacy: see [112, 113, 175, 192] and the references within. For
(d) and (e), works such as [2, 41, 89, 142, 147] provide private solutions for private sum
aggregation, touching on a large base of cryptographic tools, such as secret sharing, threshold
homomorphic encryption, differential privacy.
Contributions
This chapter considers the problem of private weighted sum aggregation with secret weights,
where an aggregator wants to compute the weighted sum of the local data of some agents.
Given the wide spread of private weighted sum aggregation problems with different privacy
constraints, our first contribution is to review their solutions and give a unified formulation.
We intend for this chapter to serve as a guide for choosing an efficient particular solution
based on knowledge distribution and privacy demands. Our second contribution is to offer
a private solution for the general case of weighted aggregation, where weights are hidden
from all parties. Our third contribution is to extend these solutions to multi-dimensional
data rather than scalar data and give valuable optimizations. Our fourth contribution is to
implement and extensively demonstrate the runtime and communication improvements of
up to 80% for the problem with hidden weights.
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Organization. In Section 4.2, we outline the three types of problems and the de-
sired security requirements. We first review existing solutions for private sum aggregation
(weights are known by the agents, but not by the aggregator) in Section 4.3.1.1. Most of the
previously mentioned literature falls into this category. Second, we describe private weighted
sum aggregation with centralized weights (weights are known at the aggregator, but not at
the agents), which can be solved from the lens of functional encryption for inner products in
Section 4.3.1.2. Third, we give a solution for the more general case of private weighted sum
aggregation with hidden weights (neither agents nor aggregator know the weights; they are
generated by a system operator, who wants to keep them private) and improve it compared
to previous work in terms of security: larger collusion threshold, communication: fewer
messages exchanged, and runtime: fewer operations, in the multi-dimensional case in Sec-
tion 4.3.2. Finally, we propose a private weighted sum aggregation scheme that uses the
same secret keys for all the time steps of the computation, thus minimizing the number of
communication rounds, and keeps the threshold of colluding agents at the cardinality of all
but one participating agents in Section 4.5. The capabilities of this final scheme could also
allow aggregation of nonlinear functions of private weights.
Our solutions achieve aggregator obliviousness, even under collusion between the par-
ticipants. In order to make the schemes communication efficient, we use packing, which
compresses a vector of messages in one plaintext, respectively one ciphertext. We show
how to astutely perform the operations on the packed ciphertexts to reduce the computa-
tional and communication cost. Different solutions are presented for the different schemes,
exploiting the characteristics of the underlying schemes, and are given in Section 4.4 and
Section 4.6.
This chapter covers work presented in [7, 8, 12].
Special notation for this chapter
For a positive integer n, let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. A quantity (·)i refers to agent i and a
quantity (·)a refers to the aggregator. By x[j], we refer to the j-th element of vector x and
by W[jl], to the element of matrix W on the j-th row and l-th column. κ is the security
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parameter. We denote the Paillier encryption primitive by E(·) and the decryption primitive
by D(·). We denote negligible functions, defined in Definition 2.2.1 by η(·). φ(N) denotes
Euler’s totient function; for N = pq, with p, q primes, φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). A value
x ∈ Qli,lf represents a rational value x = xi.xf with li bits for the integer part and lf bits
for the fractional part.
4.2 Problem statement
We investigate an aggregation problem of weighted contributions, depicted schematically in
Figure 7.1. We consider a system with M agents and one aggregator. Each agent i ∈ [M ]
has some data xi(t) ∈ Rni at time t and the aggregator wants to compute an aggregate of
the data in the system xa(t) ∈ Rna , where Wi ∈ Rna×ni are constant weights designated





At every time step, each agent i ∈ [M ] has access to its local data xi(t), either by
direct measurement (e.g., location, energy consumption) or by computation (e.g., gradient
of the model, local prediction). We consider three types of privacy requirements for private
weighted sum aggregation.
Private Weighted Sum Aggregation with hidden weights
This case requires the strongest privacy guarantees:
Figure 4.1: Diagram of the private weighted sum aggregation. Some of the participants can be
corrupted and disclose their private data.
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(a) Agent i should not infer anything about the other agents’ local data xj(t), j ∈ [M ]\{i}
or about the aggregator’s result xa(t) or about the weights Wi, i ∈ [M ], including
partial information such as Wixi(t).
(b) The aggregator should only be able to compute xa(t) and should not infer anything
else about the agents’ local data xi(t) or the weights Wi, i ∈ [M ], including partial
information such as Wixi(t).
Private Sum Aggregation
In this case, we replace (a) by:
(a) Agent i knows its corresponding weight Wi and should not infer anything about
the other agents’ local data and weights xj(t),Wj , j ∈ [M ] \ {i}, including partial
information such as Wjxj(t), or about the aggregator’s result xa(t).
Private Weighted Sum Aggregation with centralized weights
In this case, we replace (b) by:
(b) The aggregator knows the weights Wi and should only be able to compute xa(t) and
should not infer anything else about the agents’ local data xi(t), i ∈ [M ], including
partial information such as Wixi(t).
These privacy requirements should hold even under collusion between the aggregator
and at most M − 2 agents, or between M − 1 agents, i.e., a coalition should not be able to
infer the private data of the remaining honest participants.
We consider computationally bounded adversaries that are semi-honest, defined in Def-
inition 2.1.1. Such a model is chosen because the aggregator is interested in obtaining the
correct result of the computation, and for instance, in applications involving pricing, the
agents would be fined in they cheat.
The goal here is to protect the privacy of the inputs and intermediary computations,
but reveal the output to the aggregator. As a side note, all the presented algorithms can
support differential privacy, in case the output should also be protected.
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In describing the rest of this section and the schemes in Sections 4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.2, 4.3.2
and 4.5, we focus on scalar data wi, xi, xa ∈ Z≥0, for i ∈ [M ]. After illustrating the function-
alities, we provide methods for dealing with multi-dimensional rational data in Sections 4.4.1,
4.4 and 4.6.
Aggregator obliviousness for pWSAh
We give a formal description of the privacy requirements from Section 4.2 as a cryptographic
game between an adversary and a challenger, where the adversary A can corrupt agents and
the aggregator. The weights wi∈[M ] are constant over the time steps, so the adversary
is forced to specify constant weights; in particular, the adversary will specify two sets of
weights: wA,0i∈[M ] and w
A,1
i∈[M ]. The security game pWSAO (private Weighted Sum Aggregator
Obliviousness) is as follows:
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public parameters prm to
the adversary.
Queries. The adversary can submit compromise queries and encryption queries that are
answered by the challenger. In the case of compromise queries, the adversary submits
an index i ∈ [M ] to the challenger and receives ski, which means the adversary corrupts
agent i. The set of the corrupted agents is denoted by C. In the case of encryption queries,
the adversary is allowed one query per time step t and per agent i ∈ [M ]. The adversary






i }, and the challenger first runs sw
A,0
i =
InitW(prm, i, wA,0i ), sw
A,1
i = InitW(prm, i, w
A,1
i ) and returns Enc(prm, sw
A,0
i , ski, t, xi(t))
and Enc(prm, swA,1i , ski, t, xi(t)). The set of participants for which an encryption query was
made by the adversary at time t is denoted by E(t).
Challenge. The adversary chooses a specific time step t∗. Let U∗ denote the set of
participants that were not compromised at the end of the game and for which no en-
cryption query was made at time t∗, i.e., U∗ = ([M ] ∪ {a}) \ (C ∪ E(t∗)). The adver-
sary specifies a subset of participants S∗ ⊆ U∗. At this time t∗, for each agent i ∈
S∗ \ {a}, the adversary chooses two plaintext series x0i (t∗) and x1i (t∗), along with w
A,0
i
and wA,1i , and sends them to the challenger. If S∗ = U∗ and a /∈ S∗, i.e., the aggrega-
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∗). The challenger flips a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
computes Enc(prm, InitW(prm, i, wA,bi ), ski, t, x
b
i(t
∗)), ∀i ∈ S∗. The challenger then returns
the ciphertexts to the adversary.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} on whether b is 0 or 1. The advantage of
the adversary is defined as:
AdvpWSAO(A) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The adversary wins the game if it correctly guesses b.
Definition 4.2.1. A scheme pWSAh = (Setup,Enc, InitW, AggrDec) achieves weighted
sum aggregator obliviousness if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary has more than
negligible advantage in winning this security game:
AdvpWSAO(A) ≤ η(κ).
4.3 Private weighted sum aggregation
4.3.1 Review of private sum aggregation
4.3.1.1 Private sum aggregation
Private sum aggregation (pSA), introduced in [187, 202], enables an untrusted aggregator
to compute the sum of the private data contributed by agents, without learning their indi-
vidual contributions. Additionally, it allows noise mechanisms to ensure that the aggregate
is differentially private. Improvements in terms of efficiency and functionality of pSA have
been proposed in [28, 33, 41, 57, 131, 208] and the references within. The formal definition
of aggregator obliviousness that pSA schemes have to satisfy (informally described in Sec-
tion 4.2) was introduced in [202] and is given as a cryptographic game between an adversary
and a challenger, similar to the game we describe in Section 4.2.
When the weights wi are known to the agents, equation (4.2.1) can be computed privately
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with a pSA scheme. Specifically, in every time step, denoted by t ∈ Z≥0, each agent i ∈ [M ]
holds a private value xi(t) and wi. Define vi(t) := wixi(t). The aggregator wants to compute
the aggregate statistics over the private values: xa(t) =
∑
i∈[M ] vi(t).
Let l denote the maximum number of bits of xi(t), wi, ∀i ∈ [M ]. An assumption that
we make for the rest of the chapter is:
Assumption 4.3.1. For each time step t, after discretization, xi(t), wi, wixi(t), xa(t) < N ,
∀i ∈ [M ], i.e., there is no overflow for N specified in each scheme.
The most intuitive pSA scheme involves secret sharing. Each participant will be given
by a trusted dealer at the onset of scheme a secret share of zero for each time step. Each
agent will use this share to mask its local data, like a one-time pad–see Preamble 2.4. The
aggregator will then sum all the contributions it receives and obtain the desired sum, as the
shares of zero will cancel out. The idea of using shares of zero to additively mask private
values in aggregation problems was explored, e.g., in [41, 54, 149, 208].
A private sum aggregation scheme should consist of the following algorithms, pSA1 =
(Setup,Enc,AggrDec):
• Setup(1κ,M,wi∈[M ], T ): take as input the security parameter κ, the number of agents
M and time period T , and output public parameters prm, secret information for
each agent ski, i ∈ [M ] and for the aggregator ska. This happens as follows: let
N = max(κ, 2l +M), then, for each time step t ∈ [T ], generate M + 1 shares of zero:
∑
i∈[M ]∪{a}
si(t) = 0, si(t) ∈ ZN .
Set prm = (κ,M), ski = (si(t), wi), ska = (sa(t)).
• Enc(prm, ski, t, xi(t)): take as input the public parameters, agent i’s secret informa-
tion, the time step and the local private value. Set vi(t) = wixi(t) and compute:
ci(t) = vi(t) + si(t) ∈ ZN .
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• AggrDec(prm, ska, t, {ci(t)}i∈[M ]): take as input the public parameters, the aggrega-
tor’s secret information, the time step and the ciphertexts of the agents for that time
step. The aggregator obtains xa(t) =
∑
i∈[M ] vi(t), as follows:




The correctness of pSA1 is based on the correct generation of the random shares of zero
in Setup, that cancel out after aggregation. Aggregator obliviousness is based on the perfect
security of masking the private data in Enc by a one-time pad.
The scheme pSA1 requires a different set of shares of zero for every time step (otherwise,
partial information such as differences between private contributions at different time steps
is leaked), which can involve elaborate communication, as we will see in Section 4.3.3. On
the other hand, the pSA2 = (Setup,Enc,AggrDec) scheme from [131], that we describe
next, only requires an initial set of shares of zero. This scheme is based on the Paillier
cryptosystem [177], see Preamble 2.5.1.
• Setup(1κ,M, {wi}i∈[M ], T ): generate p, q to be two equal-size primes and set N = pq
with gcd(φ(N), N) = 1, blog2Nc = κ. Define a hash function that acts as a random




si, si ∈ Z∗N2 .
Set prm = (κ,N,H), ski = (si, wi), ska = (sa).
• Enc(prm, ski, t, xi(t)): set vi(t) = wixi(t) and output:
ci(t) = (1 +N)
vi(t)H(t)si mod N2.
• AggrDec(prm, ska, t, {ci(t)}i∈[M ]): take as input the public parameters, the aggrega-
tor’s secret information, the time step and the ciphertexts of the agents for that time
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step. The aggregator obtains xa(t) =
∑
i∈[M ] vi(t), as follows:




2, xa(t) = (V (t)− 1)/N.
The correctness of this scheme follows from the generation of the secret shares and
from (A.1.1) in Appendix A.1. The aggregator obliviousness property is proved in [131].
Furthermore, [131] shows that the security of the scheme is not impacted when the hash
function H takes values in ZN2 , not in Z∗N2 .
In the pSA2 scheme, the aggregator can decrypt the sum without having access to φ(N),
as opposed to what would be needed for Paillier decryption, see Preamble 2.5.1. This is
crucial for the proof of aggregator obliviousness of pSA2 and explains why we cannot use
the same scheme to obtain the private weighted sum aggregation scheme with hidden weights
when the weights are encrypted with the Paillier cryptosystem.
4.3.1.2 Private weighted sum aggregation with centralized weights
When the aggregator knows the weight wi corresponding to each of the agents (and they are
not identical), but the agents do not know them, we cannot reuse the above private sum
aggregation schemes. We operate under the assumption that the constant weights are not
chosen in an adversarial way and there is an auditor that checks them beforehand. This
way, we ensure that, the weights are not chosen to single out only one piece of local data.
There are two lines of work that investigate this problem. First, in [39], the authors
propose a distributed scenario for aggregation in a graph of agents using a threshold cryp-
tosystem. This implies that after receiving contributions from the agents, the aggregator
would ask for help in decrypting the aggregate value. The second line of work removes
the extra communication required for decryption. Functional encryption [43] is a general-
ization of homomorphic encryption and allows a party to compute a functionality over the
encrypted data of another party and obtain the desired solution without decryption. One
of the few current practical implementations is the functionality of inner products, where
one party holds one input and the other party holds the other [3]. Here, we formulate our
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problem of private weighted sum aggregation with weights known by the aggregator in terms
of functional encryption for inner product: xa(t) = 〈[w1, . . . , wM ], [x1(t), . . . , xM (t)]〉.
The proposed scheme assumes constant weights, as in Section 4.2. The definition of
aggregator obliviousness for this case can be written as a cryptographic game formalizing the
requirements in Section 4.2. Stronger privacy definitions, from the perspective of functional
encryption, can be found in [3].
We modify pSA2 to get a private weighted sum with centralized weights scheme
pWSAc = (Setup,Enc,AggrDec):
• Setup(1κ, {wi}i∈[M ], T ): given the security parameter κ, generate two equal-size prime
numbers p, q and set N = pq such that blog2Nc = κ and gcd(φ(N), N) = 1. The





Choose a hash function that acts as a random oracle H : Z → Z∗N2 (see [3]). Finally,
set prm = (κ,N,H), ski = (si) and ska = ({wi}i∈[M ], sa).
• Enc(prm, ski, t, xi(t)): For xi(t) ∈ ZN , compute:
ci(t) = (1 +N)
xi(t) ·H(t)si mod N2.
• AggrDec(prm, ska, t, {ci(t)}i∈[M ], {wi}i∈[M ]): compute




wi mod N2, xa(t) = (V (t)− 1)/N.
Correctness follows after expanding V (t): Using the binomial theorem modulo N2, we
can write ci(t) = (1 +N)xi(t)H(t)si mod N2. Then:
V (t) = H(t)sa · (1 +N)
∑




Using sa = −
∑
i∈[M ]wisi, we obtain that (V (t)−1)/N =
∑
i∈[M ]wixi(t) = xa(t), as needed.
Aggregator obliviousness follows from the proof in [131], where the secret of the aggregator
is now sa = −
∑
i∈[M ]wisi instead of −
∑
i∈[M ] si, and the aggregator raises the ciphertexts
of the participants to the respective power wi. A different proof can be found in [3].
Notice that the keys are independent of the time period T . The Setup step can be
performed as follows by a third-party dealer that does not need to know the weights of the
aggregator. The dealer generates M random secrets si and sends one to each agent. The
aggregator generates the public and secret key of an additively homomorphic encryption
scheme, e.g., Paillier [177], encrypts the weights wi, for i ∈ [M ] and sends them to the






and sends it to the aggregator, which then simply decrypts sa. If using the Paillier scheme,
the modulus corresponding to the aggregator’s scheme has to satisfy Na > N2.
4.3.2 Private weighted sum aggregation with hidden weights
A private weighted sum aggregation scheme for weights unknown to all participants is com-
posed of algorithms pWSAh = (Setup, InitW,Enc,AggrDec). The formal security definition
of aggregator obliviousness is given in Definition 4.2.1 in Section 4.2 as a cryptographic game.
This game mimics the real execution of the scheme, but with a more powerful adversary
that can choose both the local data of the corrupted participants and the local data of un-
corrupted participants. If even in this case, the adversary is not able to break the privacy
of the scheme, then the scheme is private also when multiple participants collude and share
their private information, but cannot set the private data of the honest participants.
In pWSAh, the weight wi should be private from all participants, so one solution is to
encrypt it. Then, agent i has to be able to send an encryption of the masked product wixi(t)
to the aggregator, and the latter has to be able to compute and decrypt the result. This
suggests the outline in Figure 4.2:
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• wi should be encrypted with an additively homomorphic encryption that the aggrega-
tor knows how to decrypt;
• the layer of encryption introduced in Enc should be compatible with the inner addi-
tively homomorphic layer;
• the aggregator should not be able to decrypt the individual contributions it receives
from the agents, despite having the secret key of the homomorphic encryption scheme.
Figure 4.2: Diagram of the pWSAh functionality and privacy requirements.
To achieve the solution, we use a combination of the two schemes described in Sec-
tion 4.3.1.1. For the outer layer of encryption, we use one-time pads as in pSA1, which are
compatible with the additively homomorphic property. For the inner layer of encryption,
we use an asymmetric additive homomorphic encryption scheme. We instantiate it with the
Paillier cryptosystem [177], due to its simplicity and popularity. More details about this
cryptosystem can be found in Preamble 2.5.1.
Hence, the steps of the algorithms in pWSAh are:
• Setup(1κ,M, T ): given the security parameter κ, get a pair of Paillier keys (pk, sk):
generate two equal-size prime numbers p, q and set N = pq such that blog2Nc = κ and
gcd(φ(N), N) = 1. Set: pk = (N), sk =
(
φ(N), φ(N)−1 mod N
)
. For every t ∈ [T ],




si(t), si(t) ∈ Z∗N .
Finally, set prm = (κ,pk), ski = (si(t ∈ [T ])) and ska = (sk, sa(t ∈ [T ])).
• InitW(prm,M, {wi}i∈[M ]): given the public key of the Paillier scheme pk, encrypt wi
87
for i ∈ [M ] and return swi = E(wi) = (1 +N)wirN mod N2, for r randomly sampled
from ZN and such that gcd(r,N) = 1.
• Enc(prm, swi, ski, t, xi(t)): for xi(t) ∈ ZN , compute:
ci(t) = E(wi)
xi(t) · E(si(t)) = E(wixi(t) + si(t)).
• AggrDec(prm, ska, t, {ci(t)}i∈[M ]): compute V (t) =
∏
i∈[M ] ci(t) mod N
2 and then set:
xa(t) =
(
D(V (t)) + sa(t)
)
mod N.
Correctness: D(V (t)) =
∑
i∈[M ]wixi(t) + si(t) follows from the correct execution of
Paillier operations in Enc. Then, D(V (t))+sa(t) =
∑
i∈[M ]wixi(t) mod N = xa(t) from the
generation of shares of zero.
Theorem 4.3.2. The pWSAh scheme achieves weighted sum aggregator obliviousness w.r.t.
Definition 4.2.1.
The proof is given in Section C.1.
Remark 4.3.3. Unlike in pSA2, in pWSAh the aggregator has to know the secret key of the
cryptosystem that encrypts the weights. If we would use pSA2, which has a single share
of zero per agent for all time steps, an adversary that corrupts the aggregator and selects
equal contributions at different time steps for an agent in the pWSAO game (described in
Section 4.2) could learn that agent’s secret share.
The above scheme is appealing due to its simplicity, but involves demanding communi-
cation, because secret shares of zero are required at every time step t for every participant,
as motivated by Remark 4.3.3. The Setup is executed by an incorruptible trusted third-
party, called dealer. This dealer cannot be online at every time step to distribute the shares
because, otherwise, this party could act as a trusted aggregator. A more reasonable assump-
tion is that, prior to the online computations, the dealer computes the shares for T time
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steps and sends them to the agents, who have to store them. Alternatively, we also offer
a solution to generate the secret shares of zero in a distributed way, without the need of a
trusted third-party.
4.3.3 Decentralized generation of zero shares
4.3.3.1 One communication round, lower collusion threshold
We first describe a solution with one round of communication but lower collusion thresh-
old. This solution is appealing in the case where the agents are connected by a dense
graph. Specifically, at each time step, each agent would generate and send shares to the
agents in its neighborhood (including the aggregator), then sum up the shares it received
from its neighbors. This guarantees that all participants will hold a share of zero. However,
if the communication graph between the agents is sparse, the collusion threshold drops from
M − 1 participants to the minimum number of neighbors that an agents has.
The scheme for distributedly generating shares of zero for the update computed at agent i
for time t has the following steps:
1. At time t − 1, each agent j ∈ Ni ∪ i sends shares of zero σijl(t) ∈ Z∗N to itself and to
the agents in the intersection of its neighbors and the neighbors of agent i:
∑
l∈(Nj∪j)∩(Ni∪i)
σijl(t) = 0 mod N. (4.3.2)
2. At time t, each agent j ∈ Ni ∪ i sums its own share and the shares it received meant











jl(t) = 0 mod N. Then, we confirm
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that we obtained shares of zero for agent i and j ∈ Ni:
∑
j∈Ni∪i
sij(t) = 0 mod N.
The idea is inspired from the dining cryptographers problem [59].
Furthermore, the bandwidth overhead can be reduced if, instead of sending the full secret
σ ∈ Z∗N , the agents send only a smaller seed τ ∈ Zw, w << N for a pseudorandom generator
function (e.g. a hash function) H : Zw → Z∗N , that is publicly known. The above scheme
can be modified as follows:
1. At time t − 1, each agent j ∈ Ni ∪ i generates random seeds for each agent l ∈









2. At time t, each agent j ∈ Ni ∪ i sums the outputs of the hash function on the seeds it









For the centralized solution of creating shares of zero considered in Section 4.3.2, the
privacy of one agent j ∈ Ni ∪ i is guaranteed as long as the number of colluding agents is
strictly less than |Ni∪i|−1 (otherwise the share of agent j can be computed from the shares
of the colluding agents). For the decentralized solution, the privacy of one agent j ∈ Ni∪ i is
guaranteed as long as the number of colluding agents is strictly less than (Nj ∪ j)∩ (Ni ∪ i).
Hence, this scheme is more robust the more neighbors an agent has.
In summary, the above solution has the advantage that the agents communicate their
shares in a decentralized fashion, but the disadvantage that the number threshold of collud-
ing parties that can guess a secret share is reduced from the cardinality of the neighbors of
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the aggregating agent to the cardinality of the smallest intersection of the neighborhood of
the aggregator’s neighbors and the aggregator’s neighborhood.
4.3.3.2 Two communication rounds, same collusion threshold
When agents are not sufficiently connected, there are ways of remediating the problem, each
with different trade-offs. If we are able to enforce new communication links between the
agents, we can create dummy connections such that each agent reaches a desired vertex
degree. This keeps the same number of communication rounds as before, but it is debatable
whether the cost of adding new communication links is reasonable. For instance, if the
connections are based on proximity, such a solution is expensive. On the other hand, if we
relax the number of communication rounds such that each agent obtains a valid share of zero
in two rounds, we can retrieve the initial collusion threshold ofM−1 participants. Instead of
sending the shares to each other, the agents will use the aggregator as an intermediate relay
to get to the agents that they are not directly connected to. Specifically, each agent i ∈ [M ]
will generate M + 1 shares and encrypt them with a key known the agent l ∈ ([M ] \ i) ∪ a
(with, e.g., a symmetric encryption like AES). The aggregator will forward the corresponding
shares to its neighbors l 6= i.
1. At time t − 2, each agent and the aggregator i ∈ [M ] ∪ a creates shares of zero
σil(t) ∈ Z∗N for itself and for the rest of the agents:
∑
l∈[M ]∪a
σil(t) = 0 mod N. (4.3.4)
It encrypts them with a key known to agent l ∈ [M ]∪a\ i and sends AES(keyl, σil(t))
to the aggregator.
2. At time t− 1, the aggregator batches the M shares for agent i ∈ [M ] and sends them.
3. At time t, each agent l ∈ [M ] ∪ a sums its own share and the shares it received and
91




σil(t) mod N. (4.3.5)
In order to reduce the load on the aggregator, an agent i can communicate directly to
agents l ∈ Ni∩ [M ], where Ni is the set of neighbors of agent i and only sends the encrypted
shares to the aggregator for the agents l /∈ Ni ∩ [M ].
A technical discussion on sampling the shares of zero is given in Appendix C.2.
4.4 Schemes for multi-dimensional data
4.4.1 Packed Paillier scheme
Assume we have a vector y = [y[1],y[2], . . . ,y[m]], with y[i] ∈ [0, 2l) ∩ Z≥0. We can take
advantage of the fact that N >> 2l, where N is the Paillier modulus by packing m items of




y[i]2l(i−1) = [y[1]|y[2]| . . . |y[m]].
Here, we depict the least significant bits on the left, to show the elements in the order that
they appear in the vector. If we need to perform additional operations on py after packing,
we have to make sure we retrieve the correct elements. Hence, we need to take into account
possible overflows from one “slot” of the ciphertext the another. We do this by padding with


















Note that we can perform (4.4.1) as long as mδ < N .
In (4.4.1), we require positive integers. For a value y ∈ Qli,lf , we first construct an
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integer y, and then obtain a positive integer ỹ, for γ > l := li + lf that we will specify later:
y := y2lf ⇒ ȳ ∈ [−2l−1, 2l−1) ∩ Z (4.4.2)
ỹ := y + 2γ ⇒ ỹ ∈ [0, 2γ+1) ∩ Z≥0. (4.4.3)
In Sections 4.4.2.2 and 4.4.2.4, where we do not use packing, instead of (4.4.3) we use
(assuming 2l−1 < N/2):
ỹ :=

ȳ if ȳ ≥ 0
ȳ +N if ȳ < 0
⇒ y ∈ ZN . (4.4.4)
Batching multiple entries into one Paillier ciphertext was first proposed in [100]. No-
tice that after packing multiple plaintexts into one Paillier ciphertext as in (4.4.1), we can
still perform the homomorphisms corresponding to element-wise addition and scalar mul-
tiplication. In the following, we investigate a more efficient way to compute an encrypted
matrix-plaintext vector multiplication, by using only packing, element-wise addition and
scalar multiplication. For a matrix W ∈ Rm×n, denote the jth column by wj , for j ∈ [n].
Then, in order to obtain the product v := Wx, we multiply each column wj by the corre-





Figure 4.3 depicts this method.
4.4.2 Multi-dimensional private weighted sum aggregation
4.4.2.1 Multi-dimensional pSA
In the case of pSA1, the messages have small sizes and communication is less of a problem
even for multi-dimensional data. However, in the case of pSA2, messages (ciphertexts) are
larger and we propose a better method than sending a different message for each element of
93
Figure 4.3: Diagram of column-packed matrix-vector multiplication. The entries with the same
outer coloring are packed in the same ciphertext.
the resulting vector, by batching the elements in a single ciphertext. The aggregator wants
to obtain xa(t) =
∑
i∈[M ] Wixi(t) =:
∑
i∈[M ] vi(t). In pSA2, the dealer generates the secret
shares the same way as previously, but each agent i ∈ [M ] computes v[j]i (t) and uses (4.4.2)







δ(j−1), ci(t) = (1 +N)
pi(t)H(t)si mod N2.
The aggregator computes V (t) as before, and retrieves:
x̃[k]a = V (t)//2
(na−k)δ mod 2(k−1)δ, k ∈ {2, . . . , na − 1}
and x̃[1]a = V (t) mod 2δ, x̃
[na]
a = V (t)//2(na−1)δ, where by // we mean the quotient opera-
tion. From the elements of x̃a(t), the aggregator needs to subtract 2γM and divide by 22lf
each element, in order to obtain xa(t).
Choosing γ = 2l+ 1 and δ = 2l+ 2 + dlog2Me ensures the correctness of the decryption,
as no overflow occurs.
4.4.2.2 Multi-dimensional pWSAc
Here, we cannot use packing to reduce the number of ciphertexts because we would require
rotations and element-wise multiplications, which cannot be performed on packed Paillier
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ciphertexts. Compared to the pWSAh scheme, pWSAc has the advantage that only one set
of secret shares are needed for all time steps, hence, communication due to secret generation
and sharing only happens once.
In the multi-dimensional case, the algorithms change from the ones in Section 4.3.1.1
as described next. The participants prepare their data using (4.4.2) and (4.4.4). In Setup,
naM secrets si ∈ (Z∗N )










i , k ∈ [na].
In Enc, each agent i ∈ [M ] constructs na ciphertexts:
c
[j]





i mod N2, j ∈ [ni].


















The aggregator retrieves the elements of xa(t) from x̃a(t) by subtracting N from the
elements greater than N/2 and dividing all of them by 22lf .
4.4.2.3 Multi-dimensional pWSAh
We consider values on l bits, with log2N >> l, for N ensuring semantic security of the Pail-
lier scheme. Sampling a random value from a large ZN is expensive, but also redundant, since
it masks a much smaller message. To this end, we prefer to sample si(t) ∈ (0, 2λ+2l), ∀i ∈
[M ], for λ the statistical security parameter and to set sa(t) := −
∑
i∈[M ] si(t) in pWSAh.
Masking by si(t) will guarantee λ-statistical security rather than perfect security, see Pream-
ble 2.4. From here on, we use this more efficient approach.
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4.4.2.4 Naive multi-dimensional scheme
This solution was proposed in [12]. The algorithms change compared to Section 4.3.2 as
follows. In Setup, for every t ∈ [T ], M · na shares of zero s[k]i (t) ∈ (0, 2λ+2l) are generated
for i ∈ [M ], k ∈ [na]:








In InitW, the weights Wi, i ∈ [M ] are processed as in (4.4.2) and (4.4.4) and encrypted
element-wise: E(W[kj]i ) = (1 + N)
W̃
[kj]
i rN modN2, for r randomly sampled from ZN and


















i (t) + s
[k]
i (t)
 ,∀k ∈ [na].






i (t) mod N
2, x̃[k]a (t) = D(V
[k](t)) + s[k]a (t).
4.4.2.5 Packed multi-dimensional scheme
We reduce the number of ciphertexts and the corresponding number of operations by using
packing and the more efficient encrypted matrix-plaintext vector multiplication described in
Section 4.4.1.
Assume at the moment that we can pack at least na values in one ciphertext. The
steps we take are: 1) Pre-process the values to be positive and integer; 2) Pack and en-
crypt the columns of the matrix Wi and obtain ni ciphertexts; 3) Perform a scalar multi-
plication of one encrypted column c with the scalar x[c]i (t); 4) Sum the ni ciphertexts to get
the encryption of Wixi(t); 5) Add the share of zero and mask the intermediate results; 6)
Sum the M ciphertexts to obtain the encryption of
∑
i∈[M ] Wixi(t); 7) Decrypt, unmask
and unpack the result.
Figure 4.4 indicates possible values for the number of rows, columns and agents depend-
96
ing on the plaintext size and statistical security. Denote the maximum number of values we
can pack by m < N/δ. If na > m, we split the columns into dna/me Paillier ciphertexts and
follow the same operations as before, and concatenate the resulting vectors after decryption.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14


























Estimate of number of rows packed in 2048 bits 










Figure 4.4: The number of rows m that can be packed in a plaintext of N = 2048 bits, as a function
of the number of columns n, number of agents M , message size l and statistical security λ = 80 bits.
Let pWSAh∗ = (Setup, InitW,Enc,AggrDec) be a packed multi-dimensional scheme for
private weighted sum aggregation with hidden weights, where steps 1) and 2) are performed
by the dealer as part of InitW and the shares of zero for step 5) are generated as part of
Setup, steps 1), 3)–5) are performed by each agent i ∈ [M ] in Enc and steps 6) and 7) are
performed by the aggregator in AggrDec.
The steps and how to choose bit sizes in order to guarantee both correctness and privacy,
as well as the proof of the following theorem, are detailed in Appendix C.3.
Theorem 4.4.1. The packed multi-dimensional scheme pWSAh∗ is correct and achieves
aggregator obliviousness.
4.4.3 Comparison between naive and packed method
In the naive version of the multi-dimensional pWSAh, each agent receives nani ciphertexts
for Wi at the initialization of the protocol, then computes nani ciphertext–scalar multipli-
cations (modular exponentiation), na(ni−1) ciphertext additions (modular multiplications)
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and sends to the aggregator na ciphertexts. In the decentralized way of generating shares,
each agent will have to send out (2l + λ)na bits of randomness to each of the M neighbors
per time step.
Denote by m the number of elements we can pack in a Paillier ciphertext. In the packed
version pWSAh∗, each agent receives dna/meni ciphertexts for Wi at the initialization of
the protocol, then computes dna/meni ciphertext–scalar multiplications, dna/me(ni − 1)
ciphertext additions and sends to the aggregator dna/me ciphertexts. In the decentralized
way of generating shares, each agent will have to send out (2l+ 1 + dne+ dMe)dna/me bits
of randomness to each of the M neighbors per time step.
4.5 LWE-based private weighted aggregation with hidden
weights
To avoid the trust and communication issues introduced by successive symmetric keys, as
described in the previous section, we use a public-key additively homomorphic cryptosystem
(as the inner encryption scheme) to encapsulate the message in a Learning with Errors
ciphertext (the outer encryption scheme). A pSA scheme based on this idea was proposed
in [28] using the Augmented Learning with Errors concept introduced in [88]. We show
how to modify the scheme in [28] such that we obtain a private weighted sum aggregation
scheme and exploit the structure of the problem in order to reduce the number of ciphertexts
communicated and number of operations performed.
The LWE problem essentially amounts to distinguishing random linear equations per-
turbed by small amounts of noise from uniform linear equations. Let κ denote the security
parameter, q = q(κ) a positive prime, l = dlog qe and λ a positive integer, such that λ/l ∈ Z.
The Augmented Learning with Errors (A-LWE) problem [88] encodes a message in the error
from an LWE term. An A-LWE term consists of (A,bᵀ), with bᵀ = sᵀA + eᵀ ∈ Zλq , for a
public matrix A ∈ Zκ×λq , a secret key s ∈ Zκq and error term e ∈ Zλq , which is sampled from
a distribution related to the message we want to encode.
Specifically, let µ be a message and f(·) a function with the property that its output is
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indistinguishable from random (e.g., an encryption mechanism from a semantically secure
scheme). For y = f(µ) ∈ Zλ/lq and for a public matrix G ∈ Zλ/l×λq , the error term e is
sampled from a special error distribution, defined by DΛ⊥y (G),σ, and satisfies Ge ≡ y mod q.
The special error distribution DΛ⊥y (G),σ is a discrete Gaussian distribution with standard
deviation σ over a lattice determined by the matrix G and vector y, see Definition 4.5.1.
Informally, given an A-LWE term (A,bᵀ), one cannot retrieve the secret key s and the
message µ encoded in the error term e, but, given s, one can efficiently recover µ from e,
see Definition 4.5.2.
For the inner layer of encryption, we require a semantically secure public-key additively
homomorphic encryption that allows plaintext-ciphertext multiplication and the operator on
the ciphertext space corresponding to addition is also addition. We will call such a scheme
Packed Additively Homomorphic Encryption (PAHE) for reasons described in Section 4.6.
For the moment, we give a bare-bones description, just to specify the compatibility with
the A-LWE outer ciphertext: Setup() → prm; KeyGen(prm) → (pk, sk); Epk(µ) → c;
Dsk(c)→ µ; and Eval, composed of: Add(c1, c2)← c ≡ c1+c2; CMult(p1, c2)← c ≡ p1 ·c2.
There is an encoding step in the encryption primitive that transforms the given message
into an appropriate plaintext and a decoding step in the decryption primitive that transforms
the obtained plaintext into a message from the desired domain. There exist transformations
between the ciphertext space, which is a ring of polynomials, and Zλ/lq . So, for simplicity,
we say c ∈ Zλ/lq .
Definition 4.5.1. [A-LWE distribution] Let κ, q, p, λ be integers and l := dlog qe. Let
µ ∈ Zp be a plaintext and f : Zp → Zλ/lq be a function with output indistinguishable from
random. Define gᵀ :=
[
1 2 . . . 2l−1
]




$← Zκq and A
$← Zκ×λq . A sample from the Augmented Learning with Errors distribution
LA-LWEκ,λ,q (µ) over Zκ×λq × Zλq is obtained as follows: Compute y := f(µ) ∈ Z
λ/l
q ; Sample
e← DΛ⊥y (G),σ ∈ Z
λ
q ; Return (A,bᵀ), with bᵀ := sᵀA + eᵀ.
Let ρ : R → (0, 1] with ρσ(x) = exp(−x2/σ2). The discrete Gaussian distribution over
the integers DZ,σ samples x ∈ Z with probability ρσ(x)/(
∑
y∈Z ρσ(y)). An efficient sampling
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algorithm of the error term e from the discrete Gaussian distribution DΛ⊥y (G),σ for a general
q, is given by [101]. We remark that we can also use another basis instead of 2 for g.
Definition 4.5.2. [Decisional A-LWE problem] Let κ, q, p, λ be integers and let f be a
function with output indistinguishable from random. The decisional A-LWE problem asks to
distinguish in polynomial time poly(κ) between samples (A,bᵀ)← LA-LWEκ,λ,q (µ) and uniform
random samples (Ā, b̄ᵀ) $← Zκ×λq × Zλq .
If the distribution of y is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution
on the same domain, i.e., PAHE is semantically secure, then the decisional A-LWE problem
is hard [28, 88].
Solution of pWSAh problem
The idea of the scheme is as follows. The aggregator generates a pair of PAHE keys. A third
party (responsible also for choosing the weights) encrypts the weights with the public key and
generates a set ofM+1 random keys that sum to zero, then distributes them accordingly to
the agents and aggregator. Each agent computes the product of the encrypted weight with its
local data, which is possible due to the homomorphic properties of the PAHE cryptosystem.
Then, it samples the error term according to its local PAHE ciphertext, creates an A-LWE
ciphertext with its local key and sends it to the aggregator. The aggregator sums all the
A-LWE ciphertexts and obtains the sum of the error terms, which is an encoding of the sum
of the PAHE ciphertexts. Using its PAHE secret key, the aggregator proceeds to decrypt
and obtain the desired weighted sum of the data of the agents in the network.
• Setup(1κ,M, λ, q, σ, w1,...,M , T ): Generate the public parameters At
$← Zκ×λq , for
time steps t = 1, . . . , T . Generate (pk, sk) ← KeyGen. For all agents i ∈ [M ],
draw si
$← Zκq and let sa = −
∑
i∈[M ] si. Broadcast public parameters prm =(
A1,...,T , q, κ, σ, λ,M,pk
)
. To each agent i ∈ [M ], send their secret key si. Send(
sa, sk
)
to the aggregator. Each agent and the aggregator computes the vector
gᵀ =
[
1 2 . . . 2l−1
]




• InitW(prm, {wi}i∈[M ]): given the public key of the PAHE scheme pk, encrypt wi for
i ∈ [M ] and return swi = Epk(wi).
• Enc(At,gᵀ,pk, σ, si, xi(t), swi): Each agent i computes the chiphertext yi(t) =
CMult(swi, xi(t)) ∈ Zλ/lq and samples the noise term ei(t) ← DΛ⊥
yi(t)
(G),σ ∈ Zλq .
Finally, it computes ci(t) = s
ᵀ
iAt + ei(t)
ᵀ ∈ Zλq and sends the ciphertext to the
aggregator.
• AggrDec(At,G, sa, sk, c1,...,M (t)): The aggregator sums the ciphertexts from all the
agents c(t) =
∑
i∈[M ] ci(t). It then computes the aggregated error term e(t) =
c(t) + sᵀaAt. Finally, the aggregated sum of the agents’ data is computed as xa(t) =
Dsk(Ge(t) mod q).
Theorem 4.5.3. The pWSA scheme achieves weighted sum aggregator obliviousness w.r.t.
Definition 4.2.1.
The proof for Theorem 4.5.3 and the correctness of the scheme are given in Section C.4.
Compared to the solution in Section 4.3.2, only one set of secret shares of zero sa =
−
∑
i∈[M ] si have to be generated for all the time steps. In this case, it is reasonable to expect
a trusted third party to generate and distribute them offline or even for the agents and
aggregator to embark in an offline secure multi-party computation algorithm to obtain them.
For the security of the scheme over multiple time steps, we need to use different matrices
A for each time step t, otherwise the aggregator can obtain differences of messages at two
time steps. These matrices At are public and can be broadcasted or posted on a board of
messages, where each participant has access to. For better efficiency, only smaller random
seeds can be sent and stored, e.g., agree on a function that outputs a pseudorandom matrix
and feed in the time steps and a smaller seed. Only one seed s0 should be sent at time zero,
then the agents can construct the seed for time t in a counter block cipher mode st = s0 + t.
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4.6 Packed weighted aggregation with A-LWE
In this section, we show how to extend in an efficient way the scalar weighted sum aggregation
scheme to multi-dimensional data. Compared to the solution in 4.4.2.3, this scheme uses
ciphertexts that allow packing a significantly larger number of values.
We require the packed additively homomorphic encryption scheme (PAHE) scheme to be
semantically secure and to satisfy the requirement from Section 4.5 of ciphertext summation.
This scheme should also allow packing and single instruction multiple data (SIMD) oper-
ations. We draw inspiration from the packed additively homomorphic encryption scheme
used in [132]. PAHE can be instantiated by schemes in e.g., [51, 62]; see Preamble 2.5.3. The
underlying hardness problem is Ring Learning with Errors (R-LWE in Appendix A.2). The
PAHE construction is parameterized by the following constants: the ring dimension 2N , the
plaintext modulus p, the ciphertext modulus q and the standard deviation σ of a discrete
Gaussian distribution. We can pack up to N values in one ciphertext using the Chinese
Remainder Theorem. Packing can be thought of as the ciphertext having N independent
data slots. Using the notation in Section 4.5, N = λ/(2l).
Recall the abstraction of the PAHE primitives: Setup, KeyGen, E, D, Eval. The
operations that can be evaluated during Eval are single instruction multiple data, which
means that they can operate on the whole encoded vector. Specifically, these operations are
SIMDAdd, SIMDCMult and Rotate, i.e. element-wise addition, element-wise multiplication
by a plaintext vector and slots permutations that can achieve rotations:
• SIMDAdd(c1, c2)→ c, such that, if ci = Epk(µi), i = 1, 2, then Dsk(c) = µ1 + µ2.
• SIMDCMult(c,ν) → c′, such that, if c = Epk(µ), then Dsk(c′) = µ ◦ ν, where ◦
denotes element-wise multiplication.
• Rotaterk(π)(c, π) → c
′, such that, for a permutation π and c = Epk(µ), we have
Dsk(c
′) = [µπ(1), . . . ,µπ(n)], where rk is the associated rotation key.
The encryption E endows the ciphertexts with a fresh small noise η0. The operations in
Eval also introduce an amount of noise in the ciphertext, which can overflow and prevent the
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correct decryption. Denote by η the noise level in a ciphertext c. A ciphertext resulted from
SIMDAdd has noise η1 + η2. A ciphertext resulted from SIMDCMult has noise bounded
by ηη×, where η× ≤ p
√
N . A ciphertext resulted from Rotate has noise η + ηπ, where ηπ
is the noise of the permutation operation. The multiplication introduces the largest noise.
In terms of computation cost, the addition is the cheapest, while the rotation is the most
expensive. The parameters of the scheme need to be chosen such that the noise does not
overflow.
4.6.1 Efficient homomorphic matrix-vector multiplication
In this section, we investigate efficient methods for performing the multiplication of an
encrypted matrix W ∈ Rm×n and plaintext x ∈ Rn, i.e., computing the corresponding
ciphertext version of y = Wx. For our target applications of weighted aggregation, the
goals of the computation are, in order of importance:
• minimize the size of the encrypted output that contains y, since this ciphertext has
to be encoded in the noise term and then sent over to the aggregator;
• minimize the noise growth, in order to reduce the parameter size, which in turn also
minimizes both the computational cost and size of the communicated message;
• minimize the computational cost;
• minimize the input ciphertext that packs W.
Sequential SIMDCMult operations should be avoided because of the exponential growth
in the noise. For the input vector packing, we assume that m,n < N . For the input matrix
packing, we assume that nm < N or n2 < N . We pad the rest of the slots up to N with
zeros. If mn > N (or n2 > N), then the number of input ciphertexts will be dmn/Ne
(respectively dn2/Ne). We show in Figure 4.5 the schematic representations of the five
methods considered for computing a matrix-vector multiplication.
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4.6.1.1 Naive method with each row packed in one ciphertext.
The output of a matrix-vector multiplication is given by:
yj = Wjx =
n∑
k=1
Wjk ◦ xk, j = 1, . . . ,m. (4.6.1)
If each row of the matrix W is packed and encrypted in a ciphertext, and x is packed in
a plaintext, then the naive version involves m SIMDCMult operations. For each resulting
vector, we then need n−1 Rotate and n−1 SIMDAdd operations, which creates a ciphertext
j whose first slot contains yj . Using a tree structure to perform these operations, we can
reduce their number to dlog ne Rotate and dlog ne SIMDAdd operations. This creates m
output ciphertexts. In order to obtain only one output ciphertext, we needm SIMDCMult to
mask the ciphertexts by [1|0|0| . . .], thenm−1 Rotate andm−1 SIMDAdd operations. This
sequence of operations introduces a lot of noise, because of the two sequential SIMDCMult
operations.
4.6.1.2 Method with each column packed in one ciphertext.





If each Cj is packed and encrypted in a ciphertext, and we pack m copies of xj in a
plaintext, the product can be achieved by n SIMDCMult, n− 1 SIMDAdd operations, and
no permutation, while outputting a single ciphertext.
4.6.1.3 Method with each diagonal packed in one ciphertext.
In the applications mentioned in the Introduction, the matrix W usually satisfies m ≤ n.
We pad the matrix with zeros such that it becomes square W̄ ∈ Rn×n. We can pack and
encrypt every diagonal of the matrix, denoted by dj , j = 1, . . . , n as a separate ciphertext.
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dj ◦ ρ(x, j − 1). (4.6.3)
If we rotate and pack the plaintext vector x, the product can be achieved by n SIMDCMult,
n− 1 SIMDAdd operations, and no permutation, while outputting a single ciphertext, the
same as in the column method.
Figure 4.5: Diagrams of the various matrix-vector multiplication schemes considered. The entries
with the same outer coloring are packed in the same ciphertext. The inner color is selected to aid
with visualizing the rotations and the corresponding element-wise slot multiplications.
4.6.1.4 Method with hybrid diagonal packing in a ciphertext.
We can combine the naive and the diagonal method by packing into a ciphertext an “extended
diagonal” of the rectangular matrix W, which we denote d̄j for j = 1, . . . ,m. Then, the
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d̄j ◦ ρ(x, j − 1),m(i− 1)
)
. (4.6.4)
This requiresm SIMDCMult operations, dlog n/me Rotate and dlog n/me+m−1 SIMDAdd.
4.6.1.5 Naive method with all matrix packed in one ciphertext.
Consider that W is packed and encrypted in one ciphertext, row by row. Then we pack m
copies of x in a plaintext and perform one SIMDCMult operation to get:
[W1 ◦ x|W2 ◦ x| . . . |Wm ◦ x| . . .].
We only need to perform dlog ne Rotate and dlog ne SIMDAdd operations to obtain: [y1| ∗
| . . . | ∗ |y2| ∗ | . . . | ∗ |ym| ∗ | . . .]. Notice that this yields only one output ciphertext, and no
further masking is required as long as the aggregator knows which slots to retrieve when
decrypting.
4.6.1.6 Method with all diagonals packed in one ciphertext.
Consider that the n diagonals of W̄ ∈ Rn×n are packed and encrypted in one ciphertext.
Then we can also pack the n rotated versions of x in a plaintext, and then perform one
SIMDCMult operation to get:
[d1 ◦ x|d2 ◦ ρ(x, 1)| . . . |dn ◦ ρ(x, n− 1)| . . .].
As before, we only need to perform dlog ne Rotate and dlog ne SIMDAdd operations to
obtain: [y1|y2|ym| ∗ | ∗ | . . .].
Regardless of how we pack the matrix into one ciphertext (column and hybrid packing
too), the computational cost and noise are the same. The advantage of using the diagonal/
column input matrix packing is that the elements of the output vector will be in the first m
slots of the output ciphertext, rather than spread one every n slots.
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Table 4.1 summarizes the number of operations, noise gain and number of input and
output ciphertexts of the methods we analyzed. Note that η0 grows with the number of
inputs packed inside a ciphertext. These methods point out a trade-off between memory
and computation. The agents have to perform as many multiplications as input ciphertexts
(with the exception of the naive method). At the same time, the maximum number of input
ciphertexts (n) required in the diagonal/column methods does not require any permutation
and has the least amount of noise.
Method Rotate SIMD
CMult











Column 0 n n− 1 nη0η× n 1






packed dlog ne 1 dlog ne nη0η× + (n− 1)ηπ 1 1
Table 4.1: Table with costs of different methods for computing a ciphertext matrix-plaintext vector
multiplication. η0 represents the noise of the corresponding fresh ciphertext. In the method column,
the naive, diagonal/column and hybrid are input vector packed.
Making a decision between the available methods should take into account the agents’
capabilities and the sizes of n and m. Note that the weights are constant and transmitted
only once at the protocol’s initialization, hence the communication overhead for the input
transmission is not decisive. For a square matrix W, the diagonal method is the same as
the hybrid one and is the default option, as is the column method. For very large n and
n >> m, the hybrid method is preferable. For large n,m with mn comparable to N , the
input matrix packing is preferable.
Remark 4.6.1. When the number of items packed in a ciphertext is less than N and rotations
are performed, some slots in the output ciphertext will reveal partial sums to the decryptor.
An inexpensive solution (one SIMDAdd) to this issue is to add noise to the slots that are
not of interest, in order to prevent information leakage at the decryption. The diagonal and
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column methods with input vector packing do not require the noise treatment.
4.6.2 Multi-dimensional A-LWE based solution
Fot the pWSAh scheme, the Setup phase unfolds as in Section 4.5: the parameters and
keys are generated with respect to the PAHE crypto-system and the weight matrices Wi
are packed and encrypted corresponding to the chosen method from Table 4.1.
In the Enc phase, each agent packs its local vector xi(t) in plaintext corresponding to
the chosen method from Table 4.1 and performs that instead of CMult. Before sampling
ei(t) from yi(t), the agents add noise as indicated in Remark 4.6.1.
In the AggrDec phase, the aggregator takes the same steps as in Section 4.5. Unlike the
packed matrix-vector multiplication at the agent’s side, the multiplication Ge(t) is done as
is. Although the size of the matrix can be large, it is very sparse: G = Iλ/l ⊗ gᵀ, where
gᵀ = [1, 2, . . . , 2l−1], so we only need to multiply chunks of size l. These multiplications can
be efficiently obtained by bit shifting.
Correctness: The correctness of this modified scheme is immediate, given correctly se-
lected parameters such that the noise does not overflow.
Theorem 4.6.2. The pWSA scheme for multi-dimensional problems achieves weighted sum
aggregator obliviousness w.r.t. Definition 4.2.1.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Theorem 4.5.3 and also incorporates
the noise added at the agents’ side such that there is no information leakage from the partial




In this chapter, we explore the secure evaluation of linear controllers, one of the most
widely used type of controllers. Nevertheless, even securely evaluating the most elementary
control policies brings three challenges. First, we want to preserve the privacy of both
signals, such as states, measurements, control inputs, references, estimates, and system
parameters, such as dynamical model parameters, control gains, associated costs. Second,
we are looking at dynamical processes, that operate over multiple time steps; this requires
the secure evaluation protocol to be designed such that privacy and correctness are preserved
at every time step (there are no overflows, decryptions are correct). Third, linear controllers
are often preferred due to their simplicity for fast systems with small sampling times and
low-power platforms. Hence, the secure evaluation protocol has to operate in real-time and
return the desired computation before the sampling period ends, and its computational
overhead has to be compatible with the available system hardware.
In this chapter, we showcase two different linear controllers in two different settings:
a controller composed by a Kalman filter for estimation and a quadratic optimal control
for tracking performance, computed between a cloud controller and an actuator, based on
multiple sensors’ data; and a decentralized generic linear controller, computed between a set
of agents that are interconnected through communication links.
Specifically, in the first part of the chapter, we consider the problem of implementing a
109
Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) controller on a system, while maintaining the privacy of
the measurements, state estimates, control inputs and system model. The component sub-
systems and actuator outsource the LQG computation to a cloud controller and encrypt their
signals and parameters. The encryption scheme used is Labeled Homomorphic Encryption,
which supports the evaluation of degree-2 polynomials on encrypted data, by attaching a
unique label to each piece of data and using the fact that the outsourced computation is
known by the actuator. We write the state estimate update and control computation as
multivariate polynomials in the encrypted data and propose an extension to the Labeled
Homomorphic Encryption scheme that achieves the evaluation of low-degree (larger than
two) polynomials on encrypted data. We showcase the numerical results of the proposed
protocol for a temperature control application that indicates competitive online times.
In the second part of the chapter, we propose a secure multi-party computation scheme
that ensures the private computation of the linear control updates of each agent in a dis-
tributed system, without leaking any other information about the states and controls of
their neighbors or themselves. To this end, we make use of additively homomorphic encryp-
tion and private sum aggregation schemes. We analyze the conditions such that a dishonest
agent cannot observe the rest of the network. Finally, we present implementations of the
proposed schemes and showcase their efficiency.
This chapter covers the work presented in [6, 7, 12].
5.1 Secure evaluation of LQG control
5.1.1 Introduction
In the setting of distributed systems with large number of sensors that collect data over large
periods of times, e.g., FitBit data, medical monitoring data or parameters in a plant, the
data from the sensors is aggregated, stored and processed at a powerful server, generically
called cloud. Requesting parties submit the processing algorithms they want to perform on
the data stored at the cloud. Although cloud computing solves the storage and computation
problems, it also raises issues about trust and privacy of the data and results [46]. Users
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agree to participate in the computation if their data is guaranteed to remain concealed
from both the cloud and requester. Similarly, a requesting party desires to keep private the
parameters of its processing algorithms, as well as the result of the computation.
Usually, in cloud-outsourced control and estimation applications, the controller or plan-
ner knows the algorithms that are outsourced to the cloud, for instance, Kalman Filter,
Linear Quadratic (Gaussian) Regulator or Model Predictive Controller. An encrypted Lin-
ear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) controller can be useful for any application that requires
distributed noisy private data from sensors to be aggregated and steered by a potentially
untrustworthy cloud. Examples of such applications include: power generation regulation,
robots tracking targets in a dangerous environment, temperature regulation in smart build-
ings, packet routing in a private computer network. Since these applications involve multiple
entities, the matrices in the model will depend on local private data. This requires both
sensor data and system parameters to be private. In the rest of the section, we will focus
on the problem of secure implementation of an LQG controller on private data.
General frameworks under the umbrella of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) [74]
have been proposed to solve the problem of private computations with data collected from
multiple parties. While their generality is desirable in some cases, it is also advantageous
to exploit the particularities of the specific architecture and the computation that is per-
formed. Specifically, one of the solutions in the literature called Labeled Homomorphic
Encryption [27], which we will explore in this section, achieves accelerated complex opera-
tions on encrypted data by making use of the knowledge of the algorithm the cloud computes
by the requester party.
5.1.1.1 Related work
There are several recent approaches that explore privacy-preserving filters and controllers,
with the goal of concealing the private information from untrusted parties. Linear encrypted
controllers and filters are presented in [92, 199] using additively homomorphic encryption–
the signals are encrypted but the gains are public; using multiplicatively homomorphic
encryption in [139]–both the gains and signals are encrypted, however the decryptor is able
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to find out not just the final result, but also products of scalars before summation, which can
leak at least which signals or gain entries are zero; and using fully homomorphic encryption
in [134]–both the gains and signals are encrypted and only the final result is revealed, but
the scheme is computationally prohibitive, requiring multiple controllers.
SMPC approaches, based on secret sharing schemes that can be combined with homomor-
phic encryption and/or garbled circuits, are considered in the following works: an encrypted
Extended Kalman Filter was explored in [108], where the encrypted gains are computed by
repeated exchanges between a client and a server that achieve encrypted complex operations;
an encrypted linear Finite Impulse Response filter with plaintext coefficients is computed
in [209]; and in [20], an encrypted multi-sensor information filtering is proposed, where a
grid operator aggregates the encrypted estimates from sensors and sends it to the mobile
agent requesting its location.
A different privacy goal is Differential Privacy (DP), which adds randomness to the
inputs and/or computation, so that the inputs cannot be reconstructed from the resulting
output. Techniques from works such as Kalman Filter with DP [144] and LQG with DP [114]
can be used to augment the output privacy of a secure filter and controller. However, such
techniques reduce the accuracy of the result and stability is difficult to guarantee.
5.1.1.2 Contributions
We develop a protocol that privately performs the estimation and control as described by an
LQG controller, without revealing anything about the private states, gain matrices, control
inputs and intermediary steps, while achieving fast running times. Our contributions are
the following. First, we describe the cryptographic tool Labeled Homomorphic Encryption
and show how the labels can be naturally exploited in estimation and control applications.
Since LQG requires evaluating a polynomial on encrypted data, we propose an extension to
the Labeled Homomorphic Encryption scheme that can evaluate an encrypted polynomial
of degree d ≥ 2 by using offline communication and computation. Second, we propose a
protocol that achieves the fully encrypted execution of an LQG controller on encrypted
model and encrypted data and allows different parties to have different keys. We provide
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two solutions, depending on how much precomputed information is available and on the
architecture of the problem. Finally, we illustrate the performance of the encrypted LQG
on data from a temperature control application.
5.1.2 Problem setup
We consider agents or subsystems in the architecture in Figure 5.1, with local sensors, and
an actuator that needs to apply the control inputs based on the measurements and references
from the agents. The agents and the actuator employ a cloud server to privately compute
an LQG controller, that does not have access to the model of the system, control gains, the
measurements or the desired references. The system has the following model:
xk+1 = Axk + Buk + wk
zk = Cxk + vk, k = 0, . . . , N − 1,
(5.1.1)
where xk,wk ∈ Rn,uk ∈ Rm, zk,vk ∈ Rp. Each subsystem i ∈ [N ] has a partition of
the states xik ∈ Rni , a partition of the control inputs uik ∈ Rmi and a partition of the
measurements zik ∈ Rpi , such that their union forms system (5.1.1). The distributed system
has one proxy entity that facilitates the cloud-computation: a setup entity, which holds the
model of the system, that is not fully known by each individual subsystem. The subsystems
want to conceal their data from the other participants in the computation, hence having
partitions of the data is justified in this context.
We assume that the process and measurement noise vectors are uncorrelated i.i.d. ran-
dom variables with zero mean and known positive semi-definite and respectively, positive
definite covariance matrices: E[wkw
ᵀ
k] = W and E[vkv
ᵀ
k] = V. The initial state is a random
Gaussian variable with a finite mean and covariance matrix. Furthermore, we assume that
{x0,w1, . . . ,wk,v1, . . . ,vk} are mutually independent.
Our first control objective is to achieve stability for the system (5.1.1). The separation
principle [38] allows the optimal control problem to be divided into two successive steps: the
design of an optimal estimator for the system’s state, which is the Kalman Filter under the
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Figure 5.1: Architecture of the cloud-outsourced LQG problem: the subsystems send their mea-
surements and desired references to the cloud. The cloud has to run the LQG algorithm on the
measurements and the system’s matrices and send the result to the actuator. The variables in the
figure are described in equations (5.1.1)–(5.1.4).
assumption that the process and measurement noise vectors have a Gaussian distribution;
and the design of an optimal controller for the system with the perfect information given by
the estimator, which we achieve by minimizing a quadratic cost.
Our second control objective is to steer the system to a reference r for the measurements,
xr for the states and ur for the control inputs, composed by the desired references of each
subsystem. We want to determine the control input uk such that the output deviation
∆zk := zk−r, the state deviation ∆xk := xk−xr and the control deviation ∆uk := uk−ur
are small for all values of k. We can write the system:
∆xk+1 = A∆xk + B∆uk + wk
∆zk = C∆xk + vk, k = 0, . . . , N − 1,
(5.1.2)
For simplicity, we consider the stationary LQG problem in this section, which is often
used in real-time implementations due to the low memory requirements [38]. Assuming that
the process and measurement noise processes are white, Gaussian and stationary, the control-
lability (stabilizability) of the pairs (A,B) and (A,W
1
2 ) and the observability (detectability)
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of the pairs (A,C) and (A,Q
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allows an infinite horizon solution [24, 38]:
uk = −K(x̂k − xr) + ur,
x̂k+1 = Ax̂k + Buk + L (zk+1 −C(Ax̂k + Buk)) ,
(5.1.4)
where x̂ is the estimated state. The steady-state Kalman and control gains are obtained
by solving the following discrete algebraic Riccati equations, which converge under the as-
sumptions described above:
L = PCᵀ (CPCᵀ + V)−1 , K = (BᵀSB + R)−1 BᵀSA,
P = AᵀPA−AᵀPCᵀ (CPCᵀ + V)−1 CPA + W, (5.1.5)
S = AᵀSA−AᵀSB (BᵀSB + R)−1 BᵀSA + Q.
The matrices A−BK and A− LCA determine the stability of the closed-loop system
and the quality of the estimation. Notice that an iteration of the LQG (5.1.4) can be written
as a multivariate polynomial in x̂k, uk, xr, ur and A,B,C,K,L.
The LQG control presented can be abstracted in a more general framework. Consider
a cloud server that collects encrypted data from several clients, which in Figure 5.1 were
the subsystems. The data represents time series and is labeled with the corresponding time.
A requester, which in Figure 5.1 was the actuator, makes queries, e.g., an LQG iteration,
that can be written as multivariate polynomials over the data stored at the cloud server and
solicits the result. We allow semi-honest parties, which are parties that follow the preset
protocols, but can locally process the data in order to try to infer private information.
This is a reasonable assumption, as cloud services are reputation based and cannot afford
to tamper with the clients’ data. Furthermore, we consider the classical computational
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privacy definition of an interactive protocol, given in Definition 2.2.6. We assume that only
computations that have been previously agreed upon can be requested, such that the privacy
of the data stored at the cloud server is not broken (e.g. the requester cannot simply ask
for the data).
Our privacy goal is to develop a solution that allows the cloud to efficiently perform the
LQG computation and send the results to the requester, without finding out anything about
the private data and results, as well as preserving the privacy of the input data with respect
to the requester.
5.1.3 Labeled homomorphic encryption and extension
Labeled Homomorphic Encryption, abbreviated as LabHE, was recently introduced in [27]
and is a scheme that allows the computation of multivariate degree-two polynomials on
encrypted data. The appeal of LabHE is that it uses a simple addendum to an additively
homomorphic scheme in order to obtain, apart from unlimited additions between encrypted
values, also a multiplication between two encrypted values. The underlying homomorphic
encryption scheme can be instantiated with most of the existing schemes and inherits their
properties. LabHE exploits the common trait that the party that requests the result of the
encrypted computation knows what the computation is.
LabHE can process data from multiple users with different private keys, as long as the
requesting party has a master key. This scheme makes use of the fact that the decryptor
knows the query to be executed on the encrypted data, which we will refer to as a program.
Furthermore, we want a cloud server that only has access to the encrypted data to be able
to perform the program on the encrypted data and the decryptor to be able to decrypt the
result. To this end, the inputs to the program need to be uniquely identified. Therefore, an
encryptor assigns a unique label to each message and sends the encrypted data along with
the corresponding encrypted labels to the server. Labels can be time instances, locations, id
numbers etc. Denote byM the message space. A program that has labeled inputs is called
a labeled program [27]. The details of this scheme are described in Preamble 2.5.2.
We propose a two-party extension of LabHE that achieves more encrypted multiplica-
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tions at the expense of offline computation and communication. This extension is critical
for the execution of LQG described in Section 5.1.2 in an encrypted manner.
Definition 5.1.1. An admissible function f : Mn → M is a multivariate polynomial of
degree d on n variables, where d = 2 for the original version of LabHE and d ≥ 2 for the
extended version described below.
5.1.3.1 Extension of LabHE to degree d-polynomials
In [55], the authors show how to obtain the evaluation of degree-3 and 4 polynomials over
encrypted data by using, instead of AHE, schemes that are level-2 homomorphic, i.e., already
support encrypted additions and one encrypted multiplication, such as BGN [42]. In general,
higher level homomorphic schemes involve more complex computations than AHE schemes.
The solution proposed in [55] modifies the BGN scheme, and the resulting scheme allows only
a small message space, which is a problem since the secrets generated by the pseudorandom
generator are large and require expensive decryption (solving a discrete logarithm problem).
We propose an alternative extension for LabHE that achieves the evaluation of degree-d
polynomials over encrypted data. The advantage of our method is that the online computa-
tions and communication are replaced by offline computations and communication. However,
for general multivariate polynomials, the offline communication will be exponential in d.
The multiplication of two encrypted values in LabHE is possible because the party that
performs the multiplication has access to [[b1]] and [[b2]] for two ciphertexts C1, C2. We
notice that if a party that wants to perform a multiplication between three ciphertexts
C1 = (m1− b1, [[b1]]), C2 = (m2− b2, [[b2]]), C3 = (m3− b3, [[b3]]) has access to [[b1 · b2]], [[b1 ·
b3]], [[b2 · b3]], then it can compute [[m1 ·m2 ·m3 − b1 · b2 · b3]]:
m1m2m3 − b1b2b3 = (m1 − b1)(m2 − b2)(m3 − b3) + (m1 − b1)b2b3 + (m2 − b2)b1b3+
+ (m3 − b3)b1b2 + (m1 − b1)(m2 − b2)b3 + (m1 − b1)(m3 − b3)b2 + (m2 − b2)(m3 − b3)b1.
We first extend the label program definition from Definition 2.5.5. Given t labeled
programs P1, . . . ,Pt and an admissible function g : Mt → M, the composed program Pg
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is obtained by evaluating g on the outputs of P1, . . . ,Pt, and can be denoted compactly as
Pg = g(P1, . . . ,Pt). The labeled inputs of Pg are all the distinct labeled inputs of P1, . . . ,Pt.
We define the extension of LabHE as the tuple eLabHE = ( ˆInit, ˆKeyGen, Ê, ˆEval1, ˆEval2,
D̂), where the primitives ˆInit, ˆKeyGen, Ê and D̂ are inherited from the LabHE scheme. We
define ˆEval1, that is like an offline part of the ˆEval primitive, and has to be performed by
the decryptor:
4.1) ˆEval1(mpk,msk, upk,P): Takes the master public key, the master secret key, the users’
public keys and the program P = (f, τ1, . . . , τt). Let upk = (upk1, . . . ,upkl). For all
j ∈ [l], it uses the master secret key to get the users’ secret keys uskj ← D(msk, upkj).
Then, it computes bi ← F (uskji , τi), for i ∈ [t], j ∈ [l]. For each monomial of order k
in f , denoted as gk(τT ), for 2 < k < d and T ⊆ [t], |T | = k, it computes bi ← F (K, τi),
i ∈ T . Then, it outputs g̃k(b) =
{[[∏
i∈S bi
]]∣∣S ⊆ T, |S| > 2}.
We denote by g̃(b) the vector of all g̃k(b) corresponding to all monomials of order k in f for
2 < k < d. Then, we can overload the primitive ˆEval to compute admissible functions f
that consist of multivariate polynomials of degree d on encrypted data and denote it ˆEval2:
4.2) ˆEval2(mpk, f̃ , C1, . . . , Ct): Takes the master public key, a specification f̃ = (f, g̃(b)),
composed of an admissible function f :Mt →M and the tuple of monomials g̃(b). It
also takes t ciphertexts C1, . . . , Ct and returns a ciphertext C. ˆEval2 is composed of
the following computation blocks:
• M̂lt(C1, . . . , Cd, g̃d(b)): Takes Ci = (ai, βi) ∈ M× C for i ∈ [d] and the corresponding





















=: α ∈ C.
• ˆAdd(C1, C2): If Ci = (ai, βi) ∈ M × C for i = 1, 2, then outputs C = (a1 + a2,
β1 ⊕ β2) =: (a, β) ∈ M × C. If both Ci = αi ∈ C, for i = 1, 2, then outputs
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C = α1 ⊕ α2 =: α ∈ C. If C1 = (a1, β1) ∈ M × C and C2 = α2 ∈ C, then outputs
C = (a1, β1 ⊕ α2) =: (a, β) ∈M× C.
• ˆcMlt(c, C ′): Takes a plaintext c ∈ M and a ciphertext C ′. If C ′ = (a′, β′) ∈ M× C,
outputs C = (c · a′, c⊗ β′) =: (a, β) ∈ M× C. If C ′ = α′ ∈ C, outputs C = c⊗ α′ =:
α ∈ C.
Like LabHE, the extension eLabHE also satisfies correctness, semantic security and
context-hiding. Their definitions and proofs are provided in Appendix D.1.
Theorem 5.1.2. The eLabHE scheme is correct.
Theorem 5.1.3. The eLabHE scheme is semantically secure.
Theorem 5.1.4. The eLabHE scheme is context-hiding.
The LabHE extension we proposed can be used to evaluate degree-d multivariate poly-
nomials over encrypted data from every level-d′ homomorphic scheme, with d′ < d. The idea
is that, as long as the requester knows in advance the polynomial that has to be evaluated
and the labels of the inputs, it can send offline to the cloud the encryptions of the secrets




, where d′ ≤ |T | < d.
In what follows, we will compare the proposed extension of LabHE to other secure
methods of achieving the evaluation of a degree-d polynomial on encrypted data.
Consider a party A that has to compute a product of d > 2 encrypted messages
m1, . . . ,md and was given the corresponding ciphertexts C1, . . . , Cd. Party B has the secret
key and should only obtain the resultm1 ·. . .·md. Without the extension we proposed above,
and using a level-1 encryption scheme, party A can only compute encrypted products of two
factors and then has to require B to refresh the encryption, in the following way: A splits
[[mi ·mj − bi · bj ]] = α ∈ C in a secret r and α⊕ [[−r]] and sends the latter to B; B decrypts
and obtains mi ·mj − r, assigns it a different label τ and computes b ← F (K, τ), encrypts
it and sends back C = (a′ = mi ·mj − r − b, β′ = [[b]]) ∈M× C; A reconstructs (a′ + r, β′)
and continues the computation. For a product of d factors, B has to perform d − 1 times
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the additive sharing and merging and send to A d ciphertexts in C online, while B has to
perform d decryptions, d− 1 encryptions and send to A d− 1 ciphertexts inM×C online,
and d− 1 plaintext multiplications offline.
If we use the extension of LabHE proposed in [55], which uses a level-(d− 1) homo-
morphic scheme, A has to perform 2d − 1 encrypted additions, 2d − 2 plaintext-ciphertext
multiplications and 2d − d − 2 encrypted multiplications and send to B the final result in
C online. However, the decryption that B is required to perform is in the level-(d− 1)
homomorphic scheme and has substantially high complexity.
If we use the extended version of LabHE we proposed in this section, A has to perform
2d−1 encrypted additions and 2d−2 plaintext-ciphertext multiplications and then sends to
B only the final result in C online, while B offline computes and sends 2d−d−2 encryptions
in C and performs one online decryption. In conclusion, our extended version of LabHE
replaces the online computations from B and online communication by online computation
at A, offline computation at B and offline communication. However, one can see that for
large degrees d, this scheme loses its practicality, because the required offline communication
increases exponentially with the degree d and the number of monomials.
In particular, computing degree-d univariate polynomials over encrypted variables with
our proposed extension can be done more efficiently than degree-d multivariate polynomials.
Evaluating such polynomials can be very useful in approximating nonpolynomial functions
via Taylor series or Chebyshev series.
We use Newton’s binomial to observe:








Namely, for computing the encryption C ′ = [[md − bd]] ∈ C, A has to perform d − 1
encrypted additions and d− 2 plaintext-ciphertext multiplications and then sends to B only
the final result in C online, while B offline computes and sends d − 2 encryptions in C
([[b2]], . . . , [[bd−1]]) and performs one online decryption.
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Comparing this extension for univariate polynomials with a d-leveled homomorphic en-
cryption scheme, the advantages of the LabHE extension are: offline generation and trans-
mission of randomness, and smaller online size of ciphertexts sent from the agents. However,
its disadvantages are that we cannot perform tree multiplication (since once a multiplication
is done, we cannot perform another one) and we still need memory linear in the degree of
the polynomial.
5.1.4 Encrypted execution of LQG
5.1.4.1 Encrypted LQG with public system model
If the state matrices A, B, C, the noise covariances W, V, the costs Q, R can be public,
the setup sends them in plaintext to the cloud controller. Then, the cloud can compute the
Kalman gain L and feedback gain K as in (5.1.5). The subsystems encrypt with the public
key of the actuator their measurements and desired reference, along with the initial state,
and send them to the cloud controller. This case is linear in the encrypted data and AHE
is sufficient to ensure privacy of the measurements, states, reference and control inputs: the
cloud can compute locally, at each time step, the encrypted control input uk as in (5.1.6).
E(uk) = Add(cMlt(−K,Add(E(x̂k),E(−xr))),E(ur)) (5.1.6)
E(x̂k+1) = Add(cMlt(L,E(zk+1)), cMlt(I− LC,Add(cMlt(A,E(x̂k)), cMlt(B,E(uk))))).
After this computation, the cloud sends the encrypted control input to the actuator, which
decrypts it. This setup where the state matrices are public is considered, for example, in [92].
5.1.4.2 Encrypted LQG with private system model
As justified in the Introduction, in many situations it is important to protect not only the
signals (e.g., the states, measurements), but also the system model. To this end, we propose
a solution that uses Labeled Homomorphic Encryption to achieve encrypted multiplications
and the private execution of LQG on encrypted data. LabHE has a useful property called
unbalanced efficiency that can be observed from Section 5.1.3 and was described in [56],
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which states that only the server is required to perform operations on ciphertexts, while
the decryptor performs computations only on the plaintext messages. We will employ this
property by having the cloud perform the more complex operations and the actuator the
more efficient ones.
In Figure 5.2, the actuator holds the LQG query, denoted by fLQG, which describes the
functionality of LQG. Offline, the actuator generates a pair of master keys and distributes
the master public key to the rest of the parties. The setup and subsystems generate their
secret keys and send the corresponding public keys to the actuator. Still offline, these parties
generate the labels corresponding to their data with respect to the time stamp and the size
of the data. As explained in Section 5.1.3, the labels are crucial to achieving the encrypted
multiplications. Moreover, when generating them, it is important to make sure that no two
labels that will be encrypted with the same key are the same. When the private data are
times series, as in our problem, the labels can be easily generated using the time steps and
sizes corresponding to each signal, with no other complex synchronization process necessary
between the actors. This is shown in Protocol 5.1.1.
Figure 5.2: The setup and subsystems send their encrypted data to the cloud. The cloud runs the
LQG algorithm on the private measurements and the private coefficients and sends the encrypted
result to the actuator. The latter then actuates the system with the decrypted inputs received.
Our protocols consist of three phases: the offline phase, in which the computations that
are unrelated to the specific data of the users are performed, the initialization phase, in
which the computations related to the constant parameters in the problem are performed,
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and the online phase, in which computations on the variables of the problem are performed.
The initialization phase can be offline, if the constant parameters are a priori known, and
online otherwise.
The setup sends the LabHE encryptions of the state matrices and control gains to the
cloud controller, once, before the execution begins. The subsystems send the encryptions of
their initial states and desired reference to the cloud controller, also once, at the onset of the
execution. Then, at every time step, the subsystems encrypt their measurements and send
them to the cloud. After the cloud performs the encrypted LQG query for one time step, it
sends the encrypted control input at the current time step to the actuator, which decrypts it
and inputs it to the system. In Protocol 5.1.2, we describe how the encrypted LQG query is
performed by the parties, which involves the actuator sending an encryption of the processed
result back to the cloud such that the computation can continue in the future time steps.
When the state matrices, feedback gains and initial condition are private to the cloud
and are stored in an encrypted form Ê(A), Ê(B), Ê(C), Ê(K), Ê(L), Ê(x̂0), then the depth
of the LQG program in terms of multiplications is higher than two. However, if the cloud
computes the encryption of the coefficients:
Γ1 := (I− LC)(A−BK), Γ2 := (I− LC)BK, Γ3 := (I− LC)B, (5.1.7)
then, the multiplication depth in terms of full LabHE ciphertexts for the state estimate at
iteration 1 is one and for the control input is two. We assume for the moment that the cloud
has access to Ê(Γ1), Ê(Γ2), Ê(Γ3) and discuss how to achieve these products in Section 5.1.5.
For the subsequent time steps k ≥ 1, Protocol 5.1.2 ensures that the actuator receives the
control input at step k, corresponding to the program Pk. For the computation of the state
estimation at time k+1, the cloud needs to have the full LabHE ciphertext of Ê(x̂k) ∈M×C,
but as a result of the polynomial evaluations at time step k, it has the AHE ciphertext
[[x̂k]]. To privately refresh the encryption, which happens in lines 2–4 of Protocol 5.1.2, the
cloud uses a one-time pad rk, as described in Preamble 2.4, and sends [[x̂′k − rk]] to the
actuator, which is possible since the scheme is additively homomorphic. The actuator calls
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the decryption primitive and sends back Ê(x̂k − rk), from which the cloud retrieves Ê(x̂k).
Protocol 5.1.1: Initialization of LQG
Input: Actuator: fLQG; Subsystems: x0,xr,ur; Setup: K,L,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3.
Output: Actuator: u0; Cloud: Ê(x0), Ê(K), Ê(L), Ê(Γ1), Ê(Γ2), Ê(Γ3), [[ũr]], [[x̂Γ]].
Offline:
1: Actuator: Generate (mpk,msk)← ˆInit(1λ) and distribute mpk to the others.
2: Subsystems, Setup: Get (usk, upk)← ˆKeyGen(mpk) and send upk to the actuator.
3: Subsystems, Setup, Actuator: Allocate labels τ1, . . . , τt to the inputs of function fLQG:
Subsystem i: for each measurement at time k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, zik of size pi, generate
the corresponding labels τzik = [kp





r with the labels starting from where the previous signals ended.
Setup: for matrix K ∈ Rm×n, set l = 0, generate τk =
[
l l+1 ... l+n−1
...
...
l+(m−1)n l+(m−1)n+1 ... l+mn−1
]
and update l = mn, then follow the same steps for the rest of the matrices, starting
from l and updating it.
Actuator: follow the same steps as the subsystems and setup, and then generate similar
labels for the state estimates x̂k starting from the last l.
4: Subsystems, Setup, Actuator: Perform the offline part of the LabHE encryption primi-
tive and decryption for the actuator.
5: Cloud: Generate randomness for Protocol 5.1.2.
6: Actuator: Form the program P = (fLQG, τ1, . . . , τt).
Initialization:
7: Setup: Perform the online part of LabHE encryption and send to the cloud: Ê(Γ1),
Ê(Γ2), Ê(Γ3), Ê(K), Ê(L).
8: Subsystems: Perform the online part of LabHE encryption and send to the cloud:
Ê(x0), Ê(xr), Ê(ur).




10: Cloud: [[u0]]← Add(M̂lt(Ê(−K), Ê(x̂0)), [[ũr]]).
11: Cloud: Send to the actuator [[u0]].
12: Actuator: Decrypt u0.
Notice that, technically, the encryptions [[x̂k]] and [[uk]] obtained by the cloud are not
just AHE encryptions of x̂k and uk, but they also contain some products of secrets that
will disappear in the decryption process. In order to not burden the notation, we omit this
distinction in the protocols.
Protocol 5.1.2: Encrypted LQG at time step k
Input: Actuator: msk,mpk,Pk; Cloud: Ê(zk), Ê(x̂k−1), Ê(Γ1), Ê(L), Ê(K), [[ũr]], [[x̂Γ]].
Output: Actuator: uk; Cloud: Ê(x̂k).
Online:
1: Cloud: Compute [[x̂k]]← Add(M̂lt(Ê(Γ1), Ê(x̂k−1)), M̂lt(Ê(L), Ê(zk)), [[x̂Γ]]).
2: Cloud: Send to the actuator [[x̂′k]]← Add([[x̂k]], [[−rk]]), where rk
$←Mn.
3: Actuator: Decrypt [[x̂k − rk]] and send back a LabHE encryption of Ê(x̂k − rk).
4: Cloud: Ê(x̂k)← ˆAdd(Ê(x̂k − rk), rk).
5: Cloud: [[uk]]← Add(M̂lt(Ê(−K), Ê(x̂k)), [[ũr]]).
6: Cloud: Send to the actuator [[uk]] and output Ê(x̂k).
7: Actuator: Decrypt uk.
Protocol 5.1.3: Encrypted LQG
Input: Actuator: fLQG; Subsystems: x0; Setup: Γ1,Γ2,Γ3,K,L.
Output: Actuator: {uk}k=0,...,T−1.
Offline + Initialization:
1: Subsystems, Setup, Cloud and Actuator: Run Protocol 5.1.1.
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Online:
2: for k=1,. . . ,T-1 do
3: Cloud and Actuator: Run Protocol 5.1.2.
4: Actuator: Input uk to the system.
5: Subsystems: Measure zk+1, encrypt and send it to the cloud.
6: end for
In Protocols 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, the actuator does not need to know the system matrices in
order to compute the program and decrypt the results, but only their labels.
Theorem 5.1.5. Protocol 5.1.3 achieves privacy of the encrypted LQG with respect to semi-
honest parties, cf. Definition 2.2.5.
Let us now consider possible coalitions between the parties shown in Figure 5.2. The
cloud and the actuator are not allowed to collude, since the cloud has all the data in the
system encrypted with the actuator’s master key. Furthermore, all the subsystems and
setup cannot be corrupted by an adversary at the same time. Under these assumptions, the
following theorem holds:
Theorem 5.1.6. Protocol 5.1.3 achieves privacy of the encrypted LQG with respect to col-
lusions between semi-honest parties, cf. Definition 2.2.6.
The privacy of Protocol 5.1.3, composed of Protocol 5.1.1 and T−1 runs of Protocol 5.1.2
follows from the semantic security and context-hiding property of LabHE and the perfect
secrecy of the one-time pad. The proofs are given in Section D.2.
5.1.5 Encrypted computation of LQG coefficients
The setup party does not need to be online for the computation of LQG. For a given system,
the encryptions of the system model and gains Ê(A), Ê(B), Ê(C), Ê(K), Ê(L) might have
been given offline to the cloud or distributed among the subsystems. In such cases, the
encryptions of Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 or other polynomial functions of these matrices are not available,
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but they can be computed at the beginning of the protocol by the cloud and actuator as
the output of a program evaluating a degree-3 polynomial, using eLabHE, and stored as
Ê(Γ1), Ê(Γ2), Ê(Γ3). Notice from (5.1.7) that:
Γ3 = B− LCB, Γ2 = Γ3K, Γ1 = A− LCA + Γ2. (5.1.8)
Protocol 5.1.4: Initialization of LQG, extended version
Input: Actuator: fLQG, fΓ1 , fΓ2 , fΓ3 ; Subsystems: x0,xr,ur; Setup: A,B,C,K,L.
Output: Actuator: u0; Cloud: Ê(x0), Ê(K), Ê(L), Ê(Γ1), Ê(Γ2), Ê(Γ3), [[ũr]], [[x̂Γ]].
Offline:
1: Perform lines 1–4 from Protocol 5.1.1.
2: Actuator: Form the programs P = (fLQG, τ1, . . . , τt), PΓ3 = (fΓ3 , τB, τC , τL, τk), PΓ2 =
(fΓ2 , τΓ3 , τk), PΓ1 = (fΓ1 , τA, τC , τL, τk, τΓ3). Compute f̃i ← ˆEval1(mpk,msk,upk,PΓi),
for i = 1, 2, 3, corresponding to (5.1.8) and send it to the cloud. Create labels τΓi for
refreshing Γi.
3: Cloud: Generate randomness for Protocol 5.1.2 and Initialization.
Initialization:
4: Setup: Encrypt matrices and send them to the cloud: Ê(A), Ê(B), Ê(C), Ê(K), Ê(L).
5: Cloud: Compute [[Γ3]]← ˆEval2(mpk, f̃3, Ê(B), Ê(C), Ê(L)), share it and send it to the
actuator a share [[Γ′3]].
6: Actuator: Decrypt Γ′3, allocate it the label τΓ3 and send the LabHE encryption to the
cloud: Ê(Γ′3).
7: Cloud: Reconstruct and obtain Ê(Γ3).
8: Cloud: Compute [[Γ2]] ← ˆEval2(mpk, f̃2, Ê(Γ3), Ê(K)), [[Γ1]] ← ˆEval2(mpk, f̃1, Ê(A),
Ê(C), Ê(L), Ê(K), Ê(Γ3)), share them and send to the actuator the shares [[Γ′2]], [[Γ′1]].
9: Actuator: Decrypt Γi, allocate it the label τΓi and send the LabHE encryptions to the
cloud: Ê(Γ′i), for i = 1,2.
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10: Cloud: Reconstruct and obtain Ê(Γ1), Ê(Γ2).
11: The rest follows as in lines 7–12 in Protocol 5.1.1.
The privacy of Protocol 5.1.4 follows from the context-hiding and semantic security of
the eLabHE scheme described in Section 5.1.3.1 and the perfect privacy of one-time pads.
Remark 5.1.7. We can modify Protocol 5.1.2 such that the cloud sends the control input to
the actuator before requesting a refreshed encryption of the state estimate. Specifically, the
cloud can compute first, in an encrypted fashion:
uk = −KΓ1x̂k−1 −KLzk −K(Γ2xr + Γ3ur) + Kxr + ur,
and then follow with computing the state estimate x̂k. Such a change is recommended when
timing is crucial, because it allows the actuator to send the control input to the plant faster,
at the initial expense of four extra encrypted multiplication Ê(KΓ1), Ê(KΓ2), Ê(KΓ3),
Ê(KL) that can be performed in Protocol 5.1.4.
5.1.6 Numerical results
5.1.6.1 Implementation details
The message space for AHE is discrete and the messages need to be represented on bits.
Hence, we need to quantize the signals and their coefficients. We adopt a fixed-point number
representation, where a value is represented as a signed integer in the two’s complement
format, with one sign bit, li integer bits and lf fractional bits.
Most public space AHE schemes have the ring of integers ZN as message space, where
N is an RSA modulus. To prevent brute force factorization, N is required to be at least
1024 bits. Hence, the message space is large enough to represent messages with precision
of 128 bits, which is the standard quadruple precision. In this case, the quantization and
round-off errors can be considered negligible. Under stability conditions of the quantized
matrices, the stability of quantized Kalman Filter can be proved [205]. The quantization
effects of encryption over control performance are analyzed in [11, 138, 198, 199].
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We assume the channels are reliable and the packets cannot be tampered with. The
memory of the parties is finite, so we cannot consider that Protocol 5.1.3 runs for an infinite
time. In the offline phase, the labels are generated for a fixed number of time steps T . Once
these T time steps elapse, the parties have to generate new labels for the signals (not for
the state matrices and gains, if those are not desired to be changed). This can be done in
parallel with the computations that take place in the first T time steps.
5.1.6.2 Case study
We illustrate the performance of the proposed encrypted LQG controller on the problem of
temperature regulation in a smart building, where a central cloud controller computes the
control inputs in a private manner, based on encrypted data from sensors, so that sensitive
information like the occupancy of the rooms is not revealed.
We consider the data from the HAMLab ISE model in [217], available at [118], which
models the building as one zone. We use a modified model that considers the building to
be split into two zones, which we assume have two different owners, who want different set
points for the temperature in the zones, as well as privacy with respect to their presence
there and desired settings. The state consists of the temperatures for each of the two zones
(indoors air, floor, separating wall, internal facade and external facade temperature), the
control input represents the heating/cooling for the two zones and the disturbances consist of
the outdoors air temperature, the occupancy generated heat and the heat caused by the sun
through the windows for the two zones. The measurements are considered to be the same as
the states. The system has state dimension n = 10 and control input dimension m = 2. We
simulate the results for a sampling time of 420 seconds. Assume the states corresponding to
the indoors air temperature for the two zones have to be steered to 15◦C and 25◦C during
the day (considered between 6 am to 8 pm), and to 10◦C and 20◦C during the night.
Each zone has a local device that generates secret keys for encrypting the labels. The
matrices corresponding to the state model and the corresponding Kalman and control gains
have been encrypted with labels generated by a different secret key by another machine
in the building, called the Setup. The actuator generates a pair of master key and secret
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key and sends the master key to the three parties described so far, which encrypt their
secret keys with the master key and send them to the actuator. The local devices for the
two zones send the corresponding encrypted measurements and encrypted references to the
cloud controller. If the cloud readily receives all the coefficients encrypted from the Setup,
it executes Protocol 5.1.1, and otherwise, it executes Protocol 5.1.4 to obtain full LabHE
encryptions of the gains and rest of the coefficients. The cloud then computes the estimate
of the current state, refreshes the encryption with the help of the actuator, then computes
the control input and sends it to the actuator, as described in Protocol 5.1.2.
We instantiated the AHE scheme with the Paillier scheme [177], for which we chose a
modulus N of 1024 bits. The pseudorandom generator is chosen to be the SHA-3 hash
function with 224 output bits. The protocols were run on a standard MacBook Pro laptop
with a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16 GB of RAM.
Figure 5.3 shows the performance of estimation and tracking for a fixed-point represen-
tation with li = 24 integer bits and lf = 24 fractional bits, where r represents the set point,
T iin is the true temperature in zone i and T̂
i
in is the temperature estimate.





















State vs. estimated state
Figure 5.3: Performance of the estimation and tracking for encrypted LQG for li = 24, lf = 24.
For a simulation of T = 100 time steps, corresponding roughly to 12 hours with the
chosen sampling period, the offline execution times corresponding to the Protocol 5.1.1
and 5.1.4 and online execution times are shown in Table 5.1. The online time corresponding
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Time (s) Cloud Actuator Agent1,2 Setup
Offline P. 5.1.1 0.228 5.721 1.138 1.239
Initialization P. 5.1.1 0.156 0 4e-5 0.0024
Offline P. 5.1.4 0.226 33.32 1.131 0.744
Initialization P. 5.1.4 21.417 0.603 4e-5 0.0012
Online for one step 0.219 0.0029 4e-5 0
Table 5.1: Average times for the encrypted LQG computation for li = 24, lf = 24, Nσ = 1024,
224-bit secrets, 100 time steps.
to computing the estimate and control input in a time step are under 0.3 seconds for all
actors. Since the sampling times for buildings are usually large, the encrypted computations
finish much before a new measurement is acquired.
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Figure 5.4: Execution times for Protocol 5.1.3 for different system dimensions, with li = 24, lf = 24,
Nσ = 1024, 224-bit secrets, and 100 time steps.
The execution times for varying system dimensions, considering one agent with all the
states and control inputs for ease of comparison, are presented in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.4 compares which actor performs the most computational intense task for each
phase of Protocol 5.1.3, while Figure 5.5 shows how much time each actor spends on each
phase using a logarithmic scale for visualization purposes. In order to evaluate the time
performance of the proposed protocols, one should look at the online times for the subsystems
and actuator, since these are the most resource-sensitive actors. We observe that even for
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larger systems of 100 states and 20 inputs, the online time for one iteration for the agent is
0.0005 seconds and 0.27580 seconds for the actuator, which are excellent times.
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Figure 5.5: Execution times on a logarithmic scale for Protocol 5.1.3 for different system dimensions,
with li = 24, lf = 24, Nσ = 1024, 224-bit secrets, and 100 time steps.
Notice that in the initialization phase and in the online iterations, the cloud has the
most computational requirements, which is as desired, since the cloud is a powerful server,
and it has the necessary resources to improve the times. On the other hand, the rest of the
parties are expected to perform more offline computations than the cloud, which correspond
to the label generation and LabHE encryption process. The actuator is not required to do
anything in the initialization phase corresponding to Protocol 5.1.1 and the setup does not
play a role in the online iterations.
For larger system dimensions (n ≥ 50), the offline and initialization phases become
computationally and memory intensive for the execution of Protocol 5.1.4, due to computing
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 as products of encrypted matrices. As described in Section 5.1.3.1, the actuator
is required to compute the encryptions of products of the monomials in the polynomial
evaluations and transmit them to the cloud, which can take 4 hours on a 2.2 GHz Intel Core
i7 processor. However, the online execution times remain the same as in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.
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5.2 Secure evaluation of distributed linear control
5.2.1 Introduction
The recent drive towards increasing interconnectivity of systems has determined more and
more systems to be operated using distributed control schemes. Examples such as smart
grids, water-supply systems, robot swarms, or intelligent transportation systems benefit from
this distributed computing framework. Applying distributed but cooperative controllers re-
quires communication between the various subsystems or agents. In the resulting networked
control system, sensible data is transmitted via possibly public networks and processed
at neighboring agents, which can pose a privacy threat. Recent examples of data leakage
and abuse in (critical) infrastructures, such as disturbing the normal functionality of power
plants or inferring people’s presence at home from smart meter measurements, have drawn
attention to the risks of sharing data in the clear. The challenge thereby is to solve the
conflict of ensuring individual privacy while simultaneously allowing for cooperation.
5.2.1.1 Related work
Encrypted distributed control calls for slightly different techniques than encrypted cloud-
based control that we saw in the first part of the chapter. Recent works on encrypted
consensus [112, 113, 192], on encrypted distributed optimization [95, 155, 231, 237] and in
smart grid encrypted data aggregation [89, 142, 147] give insights about homomorphically
encrypted distributed computation, but treat different aspects than the ones we are inter-
ested in for this section. It has recently been shown in [199] that encrypted cooperative
control is capable of solving the privacy conflict using homomorphic encryption and allows
secure interaction between the participating agents. However, while [199] demonstrates that
private cooperative control is realizable, their proposed encrypted control scheme reveals
more information about some participants’ private local data than required to evaluate the
local control laws. This results in a privacy leak that is difficult to address with existing
approaches. We discuss more about this in Section 5.2.3.
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5.2.1.2 Contributions
This chapter presents a scheme that we call private control update aggregation (pCUA),
which ensures that an agent learns nothing apart from the unconcealable information, i.e.,
the sum of contributions from its neighbors. As a corollary, we close the identified privacy
leak of the scheme in [199]. Specifically, the values of the states, control actions and control
gains of each agent are hidden from the rest of the participants. To this end, we employ our
private weighted sum aggregation (pWSAh) scheme with hidden weights from Chapter 4.3.2,
where each agent acts as an aggregator for the contributions of its neighbors. The solution
relies on secret sharing and additively homomorphic encryption. We implement the proposed
solution for various connectivity degrees of a network and showcase its efficiency. Finally,
we analyze the observability of the system from the perspective of malicious agents.
5.2.2 Problem setup
We consider a control scheme tailored for multi-agent systems with linear dynamics. Specif-
ically, consider a system with M agents that obey the local dynamics:
xi(t+ 1) = Aixi(t) + Biui(t), xi(0) = xi,0, (5.2.1)
with xi ∈ Rni and ui ∈ Rmi , for every i ∈ [M ]. Assume that the agents are part of a simple,
connected, fixed and undirected communication graph G = (V, E), with vertex set denoted
as V = [M ] and the edge set denoted as E ⊆ V ×V. An edge (i, j) ∈ E specifies that agent i
can communicate with agent j, in which case we say agent i and agent j are neighbors.
In a cooperative structured control, we can use the following local control laws to stabilize
the systems, where Ni := {j ∈ V|(i, j) ∈ E} represents the set of neighbors of agent i:























that takes into account the structural constraints of the communication graph by requiring
Kij = 0 whenever j /∈ Ni ∪ {i}. The stabilizing local control feedback gains Kij can be
designed to take into account the structural constraints of the communication graph, see,
e.g. [151].
5.2.3 Previous solutions for cooperative control
Local control laws of the form (5.2.2) were considered in [7, 12, 199]. Specifically, [199]
introduces a private computation and exchange of the “input portions”:
vij(t) := Kijxj(t) ∈ Rmi . (5.2.4)
to compute the local control input as in (5.2.2).
However, in order to compute the aggregated value xa, the aggregator does not require
access to the individual vij ’s. In fact, if we want to ensure privacy of the data that is
unknown to the aggregator, the best we can do is for the aggregator to only be able to
compute the “aggregated portions”:




The “input portions” vi(t) reveal neither the exact local state xi nor the local controller
matrix Wi to the aggregator, but can at least reveal the relative rate of decrease/increase
of some signals of the agents over multiple time steps. More details about the information
leak can be found in Chapter 5.2.5 and in [12], where a solution to the pWSAh problem
that achieves aggregator obliviousness is proposed. The solution in [12] required generating
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fresh secrets at every time step and proposed an online decentralized method that reduced
the collusion threshold between participants.
Finally, [7] proposed a theoretical solution that addressed the two issues of [12] (this
solution is described in Chapter 4.5): it reduced the number of generated secrets, kept the
collusion threshold at M − 1 corrupted participants and reduced the number of messages
exchanged between the agents and aggregator. This comes at the cost of using a lattice-based
homomorphic encryption scheme and augmented learning with error ciphertexts, which can
be larger than Paillier ciphertexts and might require more expensive operations.
In the next section, we use our proposed solution for private weighted aggregation with
hidden weights from Chapter 4.3.2, that provides a compact and efficient private weighted
sum aggregation scheme by packing multiple values in one homomorphic Paillier ciphertext
and an online decentralized method of distributing the secret shares of zero among the agents
without reducing the collusion threshold.
5.2.4 Private control update aggregation and implementation
Each agent i is the aggregator of the contributions of its neighbors Kijxj(t). There is a
system operator that acts as the dealer, who designs and encrypts the control feedback
weights K. Notice that this formulation fits the pattern of weighted aggregation, described
in Chapter 4. Specifically, the private control update aggregation scheme pCUA is composed
of the following algorithms (SetuppCUA, InitWpCUAEncpCUA,AggrDecpCUA):
• SetuppCUA(1κ,V, E ,A,B, T ): The dealer generates the control gain K like in (5.2.3)
using the system parameters A,B. For every agent i ∈ V, run pWSAh∗.Setup and
generate a pair of keys (pki, ski). For every t ∈ [T ], generate and denote by Sij the
matrix of secret shares of zero of agent j has for its contribution to agent i. Set
prm = (κ, {pki}i∈V), ski = (ski,Kii,Sii,Sj∈Ni,i) for i ∈ V.
• InitWpCUA(prm,V, E , {Kij}i∈V,j∈Ni): given the public key of the Paillier scheme for
agent i ∈ V, encrypt Kji column-wise as in pWSAh∗.InitW and return to agent j ∈ V:
swj = {E(pki,Kij)}i∈[Nj ].
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• EncpCUA(prm, swi, ski, t,xi(t)): For each i ∈ V and j ∈ Ni, computes cj,i(t) as in
pWSAh∗.Enc.
• AggrDecpCUA(prm, ski, t, {cij(t)}i,j∈Ni): For each i ∈ V, aggregate and decrypt the
neighbors ciphertexts as in pWSAh∗.AggrDec then add the local value Kiixi(t) to
obtain ui(t).
In the rest of this section, we will directly apply the methods described in Chapter 4 as
illustrated above and showcase the numerical performance. Specifically, consider a network
of 50 agents, with each agent having local states and local control inputs both of dimension
6. We simulate pWSAh∗ for various values of the average node degree in the network,
obtained by varying the probability of drawing edges between agents. Simulations were run
in Python 3 on a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 processor. As usual when operating with encryption
schemes defined on groups of modular residues, we need to use a fixed-point representation
scheme in order to quantize the real values and encode them into integers. The effect of this
quantization on the cooperative control scheme is described in [199]. In the simulations, we
choose the message representation to be on l = 32 bits: 16 integer bits and 16 fractional
bits, the statistical security size to be 80 bits and the Paillier moduli for each agent to have
2048 bits. With these chosen values, all 6 elements of the local contributions can be encoded
into a single Paillier ciphertext in pWSAh∗.
We present the simulation results for the algorithmic solutions described in Sections 4.3.2,
4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2, in both naive implementation (Section 4.4.2.4) and using packing (Sec-
tion 4.4.2.5). The running times are averaged over 50 instances and represent the total
time it takes for an agent at a time step to generate and distribute the secret shares for the
computation for itself and its neighbors and to aggregate the contributions of its neighbors
and to compute and send out its own contribution to its neighbors. The shares are locally
encrypted with an AES cipher with 128-bit key–for the offline centralized phase, each agent
has an AES key with the dealer, and each pair of neighbors has their own AES key for
the online decentralized phase. Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.10 show the times for an agent
with the average connectivity degree, respectively the minimum and maximum connectivity
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degree (represented by the arrows).
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Figure 5.6: Average running times for the pWSAh∗ scheme with the steps described in Section 4.3.2
in a network of 50 agents.
Figure 5.6 compares the running times for the local computation at each agent in a
time step using the scheme with centralized offline generation of the secret shares, be-
tween naive and packed encryption. This method has the smallest online running time for
agents, but the largest offline time for the dealer that generates the shares for all agents,
for many time steps (see Figure 5.9). Figure 5.7 compares the online running times between
naive and packed encryption in the case of the one-step decentralized online generation
of shares and Figure 5.8 for the two-step decentralized online generation of shares. These
methods have roughly an eight-fold increase in the online time compared to the method that
makes heavy use of a trusted dealer, but the dealer has less work to do in the offline phase.
As expected, less security, in terms of reducing the collusion threshold, yields better online
time (Figure 5.7 vs. Figure 5.8).
In the centralized offline share generation scheme, packing decreases the maximum online
time between 64% and 71%. In the online decentralized cases, where the agents are also
responsible for generating, encrypting, sending and decrypting the shares, packing reduces
the maximum online running time between 76% and 80%. Overall, we see that in the packed
version, the sampling time needs to be at most 1.1 seconds.
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Figure 5.7: Average running times for the pWSAh∗ scheme with the steps described in Section 4.3.3
in a network of 50 agents.
Second, the communication load is reduced when using packing: one Paillier ciphertext
of 0.256 KB is sent from the neighboring agents to the aggregating agent, instead of six
ciphertexts amounting to 1.536 KB, and each agent sends four batches of 16 bytes AES-
encrypted shares to each neighbor, instead of seven batches of 16 bytes.
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Time for computing contributions per agent per time step
decentralized online phase B
packed
naive
Figure 5.8: Average running times for the pWSAh∗ scheme with the steps described in Section 4.3.3.2
in a network of 50 agents.
A third substantial advantage of packing is decreasing the offline time, consisting of the
weights encryption and the share generation and encryption at the system operator, depicted
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Figure 5.9: Offline setup phase running times for the pWSAh∗ scheme as in Section 4.3.2 in a network
of 50 agents with shares generated for 100 time steps. The offline setup times for the decentralized
share generation schemes in Section 4.3.3 consist only of the gain encryption times.
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Time for computing contributions per agent per time step
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Figure 5.10: Average running times for the pWSAh∗ scheme with the steps described in Sec-
tion 4.3.3.2 in a network of 25 agents.
in Figure 5.9. Specifically, we see up to 80% improvement in the offline running time when
using packing.
To further illustrate the efficiency of packing, we show in Figure 5.10 how the performance
improves with the number of control inputs, i.e., the number of values that are packed into
one value, in the case of decentralized online share generation. We simulate a network of
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25 agents with an average network connectivity degree of 10. Each agent has a local state
of dimension 10 and local control input of dimension varying between 2 and 10, which are
packed in one Paillier ciphertext. The online running time remains almost the same in the
packed version, despite having more control inputs, compared to the increasing online time
in the naive case.
5.2.5 Observability analysis
This section motivates the benefits of aggregation for the privacy of the agents from a
system-theoretic point of view.
5.2.5.1 Available information without aggregation
In the encrypted control scheme [199], agent i has access to the input portions vij(t) of all
neighboring agents j ∈ Ni. Thus, it can use (5.2.4) and stored data to estimate the matrices
Kij or the neighboring states xj(t). Under the assumption that mi ≤ ni, the corresponding
system of equations:
[




xj(0) . . . xj(t)
]
(5.2.6)
is underdetermined for every t. However, taking application-related restrictions on Kij and
xj into account, it might be possible to reconstruct the constant matrix Kij . Moreover,
especially for systems with similar agents, such as robot swarms, agent i might obtain
information about the dynamics of agent j in terms of Aj and Bj . The ability to reconstruct
xj from observations vij given Kij , Aj , and Bj then becomes an observability problem. In












5.2.5.2 Available information with aggregation
In the aggregated case described in Section 5.2.4, less data is available to agent i. The
system of equations (5.2.6) becomes:
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, and Ni = {j1, . . . , j|Ni|}. For
|Ni| > 1, the degree of freedom here is significantly higher than in (5.2.6). Still, it might
again be possible to infer the constant matrix Ki,Ni . In addition, agent i might know the
neighboring dynamics: ANi := blkdiag(Aj1 , . . . ,Aj|Ni|). However, the observability of xNi




















, combined with an analysis of the
|Ni| column-blocks of Vi,Ni and the Cayley-Hamilton theorem lead to the following result.
Lemma 5.2.1. The full rank of Vi,Ni implies the full rank of Vij for every j ∈ Ni.
Lemma 5.2.1 states that observability in the aggregated case implies observability in the
unaggregated case. In other words, observability in the aggregated case is less likely, which





This chapter explores the privacy of cloud outsourced Model Predictive Control (MPC) for
a linear system with input constraints. In our cloud-based architecture, a client sends the
private states to the cloud who performs the MPC computation and returns the control in-
puts. In order to guarantee that the cloud can perform this computation without obtaining
anything about the client’s private data, we employ homomorphic cryptosystems and obliv-
ious communication tools. In the first part of the chapter, we consider an MPC application
where only signals such as the states and control inputs are required to be private, but the
constant parameters and costs can be public. We propose protocols using an additively
homomorphic encryption scheme for two cloud-MPC architectures motivated by the current
developments in the Internet of Things: a client-server architecture and a two-server archi-
tecture. In the first case, a control input for the system is privately computed by the cloud
server, with the assistance of the client. In the second case, the control input is privately
computed by two independent, non-colluding servers, with no additional requirements from
the client. We prove that the proposed protocols preserve the privacy of the client’s data and
of the resulting control input. Furthermore, we compute bounds on the errors introduced
by encryption. We present numerical simulations for the two architectures and discuss the
trade-off between communication, MPC performance and privacy.
In the second part of the chapter, we consider a more restrictive MPC application where
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both signals and the constant parameters are required to be private. Moreover, we consider
the system to be split into multiple untrusted subsystems, and neither the cloud controller,
nor the actuator can be trusted. We propose a protocol that extends the above private two-
server protocol to work with somewhat homomorphic encryption and we prove it achieves
privacy even under collusions between the participants.
This chapter covers the work presented in [9, 11].
6.1 Introduction
Model Predictive Control (MPC) is a powerful scheme that is successfully deployed in prac-
tice [162] for systems of varying dimension and architecture, including on cloud platforms.
In competitive scenarios, such as energy generation in the power grid, domestic scenarios,
such as heating control in smart houses, or time-sensitive scenarios, such as traffic control,
the control scheme should come with privacy guarantees to protect from eavesdroppers or
from an untrustworthy cloud. For instance, in smart houses, client-server setups can be
envisioned, where a local trusted computer aggregates the measurements from the sensors,
but does not store their model and specifications, and depends on a server to compute the
control input or reference. The server can also posses other information, such as the weather.
In a heating application, the parameters of the system can be known by the server, i.e., the
energy consumption model of the house, but the data measurements and how much the
owner wants to consume should be private. In traffic control, the drivers are expected to
share their locations, which should remain private, but are not expected to contribute to the
computation. Hence, the locations are collected and processed at the server’s level, which
then sends the result back to the cars or to traffic lights.
Contributions
We investigate a privacy-preserving cloud-based Model Predictive Control application, which
at a high level, requires privately computing additions, multiplications, comparisons and
oblivious updates. Our solution encompasses several SMPC techniques: homomorphic en-
cryption, secret sharing, oblivious transfer.
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In Section 6.2, we discuss the implicit MPC computation for a linear system with input
constraints, where we privately compute a control input, while maintaining the privacy of
the state, using an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. In the first case we consider, the
control input is privately computed by a server, with the help of the client. In the second
case, the computation is performed by two non-colluding servers. The convergence of the
state trajectory to the reference is public knowledge, so it is crucial to not reveal anything
else about the state and other sensitive quantitities. Therefore, we use a privacy model that
stipulates that no computationally efficient algorithm run by the cloud can infer anything
about the private data, or, in other words, an adversary doesn’t know more about the private
data than a random guess. Although this model is very strict, it thoroughly characterizes
the loss of information.
This work explores a fundamental issue of privacy in control: the trade-off between com-
putation, communication, performance and privacy. Our main contributions are two privacy-
preserving protocols for MPC and the analysis of the errors induced by the encryption.
In Section 6.3, we extend the results from Section 6.2 to account for more privacy re-
quirements of the data in the system: we require the private computation of the control
input, while maintaining both the privacy of the state and the privacy of the system model
and MPC parameters. Furthermore, we consider that the system to be controlled is com-
prised of multiple subsystems and there is no client that holds all the information in the
clear. By using a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme that allows multiple keys, we
can securely evaluate the MPC functionality on the data coming from separate subsystems,
without revealing private information.
Related work
In control systems, ensuring the privacy of the measurements and control inputs from eaves-
droppers and from the controller has been so far tackled with differential privacy, homo-
morphic encryption and transformation methods. Kalman filtering with DP was addressed
in [144], current trajectory hiding in [141], linear distributed control [224], and distributed
MPC in [233]. The idea of encrypted controllers was introduced in [139] and [92], using
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AHE, and in [134] using FHE. Kalman filtering with AHE was further explored in [227].
Recent work in [198] has tackled the problem of privately computing the input for a
constrained linear system using explicit MPC, in a client-server setup. There, the client
performs the computationally intensive trajectory localization and sends the result to the
server, which then evaluates the corresponding affine control law on the encrypted state using
AHE. Although explicit MPC has the advantage of computing the parametric control laws
offline, the evaluation of the search tree at the cloud’s level is intractable when the number
of nodes is large, since all nodes have to be evaluated in order to not reveal the polyhedra
the in which the state lies, and comparison cannot be performed locally on encrypted data.
Furthermore, the binary search in explicit MPC is intensive and requires the client to store
all the characterization of the polyhedra, which we would like to avoid. Taking this into
consideration, we focus on implicit MPC.
The performance degradation of a linear controller due to encryption is analyzed in [138].
In our work, we investigate performance degradation for the nonlinear MPC control.
Special notation for this chapter
Given a real quantity x ∈ R, we use the notation x̄ for the corresponding quantity in
fixed-point representation on one sign bit, li integer and lf fractional bits.
6.2 Secure evaluation of MPC with public parameters
6.2.1 Problem setup
We consider a discrete-time linear time-invariant system:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t), (6.2.1)
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with the state x ∈ X ⊆ Rn and the control input u ∈ U ⊆ Rm. The Model Predictive
Control (MPC) is the optimal control receding horizon problem with constraints written as:











s.t. xk+1 = Axk + Buk, k = 0, . . . , N − 1; x0 = x(t);
uk ∈ U , k = 0, . . . , N − 1,
(6.2.2)
where N is the horizon length and P,Q,R  0 are cost matrices. We consider input
constrained systems: X = Rn, 0 ∈ U = {lu  u  hu}, and impose stability without
a terminal state constraint, Xf = Rn, but with appropriately chosen costs P,Q,R and
horizon N such that the closed-loop system has robust performance to bounded errors due
to encryption. A survey on the conditions for stability of MPC is given in [163]. We
chose the input constrained formulation for reasons related to error bounding, explained in
Section 6.2.4.
Through straightforward manipulations, (6.2.2) can be written as a quadratic program
(see details on obtaining the matrices H and F in [44, Ch. 8,11]) in the variable U :=[
uᵀ0 u
ᵀ








UᵀHU + UᵀFᵀx(t). (6.2.3)
For simplicity, we keep the same notation for the augmented constraint set U . After
obtaining the optimal solution, the first m components of U∗(x(t)) are applied as input to
the system (6.2.1): u∗(x(t)) = {U∗(x(t))}1:m. This problem easily extends to the case of
following a reference.
6.2.1.1 Solution without privacy requirements
The constraint set U is a hyperbox, so the projection step required for solving (6.2.3) has
a closed form solution, denoted by ΠU (·) and the optimization problem can be efficiently
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solved with the projected Fast Gradient Method (FGM) [173], given in (6.2.4):












uk+1 ← ΠU (tk) (6.2.4b)
zk+1 ← (1 + η)uk+1 − ηuk (6.2.4c)
where z0 ← u0. The objective function is strongly convex, since H  0, therefore we can




κ(H) + 1), where κ(H)
is the condition number of H. Warm starting can be used at subsequent time steps of the
receding horizon problem by using part of the previous solution uK to construct a feasible
initial iterate of the new optimization problem.
6.2.1.2 Privacy objectives
The unsecure cloud-MPC problem is depicted in Figure 6.1. In this section, the system’s
constant parameters A,B,P,Q,R, N are considered public, motivated by the fact the pa-
rameters are intrinsic to the system and hardware, and could be guessed or identified;
however, the measurements, control inputs and constraints are not known and should re-
main private. Nevertheless, in Section 6.3.2, we provide a secure solution when the system’s
constant parameters are desired to be private, motivated in the context of critical infrastruc-
ture. The goal of this work is to devise private cloud-outsourced versions of (6.2.4) such that
the client obtains the control input u∗(t) for system (6.2.1) with only a minimum amount
of computation. The cloud (consisting of either one or two servers) should not infer any-
thing else than what was known prior to the computation about the measurements x(t), the
control inputs u∗(t) and the constraints U . We tolerate semi-honest servers, meaning that
they correctly follow the steps of the protocol but may store the transcript of the messages
exchanged and process the data received to try to learn more information than allowed.
The purpose of the section is to design protocols with the functionality of (6.2.4) that
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Figure 6.1: Unsecure MPC: the system model A,B, horizon N and costs P,Q,R are public. The
state x(t), control input u∗(t) and input constraints U are privacy-sensitive.
satisfy client data confidentiality for one or two servers, as described in Definition 2.2.8 or
Definition 3.3.1. To this end, we use the additively encryption scheme defined in Pream-
ble 2.5.1. We discuss in Section 6.2.4 how we connect the domain of the inputs in the Paillier
encryption scheme with the domain of real numbers needed for the MPC problem. In Sec-
tions 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, we address two private cloud-MPC solutions that present a trade-off
between the computational effort at the client and the total time required to compute the
solution u∗(t), which is analyzed in Section 6.2.5.
6.2.2 Client-server architecture
To be able to use the Paillier encryption, we need to represent the messages on a finite set of
integers, parametrized byNσ, i.e., each message is an element in ZNσ . Usually, the values less
thanNσ/3 are interpreted to be positive, the numbers between 2Nσ/3 andNσ to be negative,
and the rest of the range allows for overflow detection. In this section and Section 6.2.3, we
consider a fixed-point representation of the values and perform implicit multiplication steps
to obtain integers and division steps to retrieve the true values. We analyze the implications
of the fixed-point representation over the MPC solution in Section 6.2.4.
We introduce a client-server model, depicted in Figure 6.2a. We present an interactive
protocol that privately computes the control input for the client, while maintaining the
privacy of the state in Protocol 6.2.1. The client generates the public key pk and secret
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key sk of a Paillier encrypted scheme and encrypts its data. The cloud will thus perform
computations on the encrypted data of the client.
The Paillier encryption is not order preserving, so the projection operation cannot be per-
formed locally by the server. Hence, the server sends the encrypted iterate [[tk]] for the client
to project it. Then, the client encrypts the feasible iterate and sends it back to the cloud.
We drop the (̄·) from the iterates in order to not burden the notation.
Protocol 6.2.1: Encrypted projected Fast Gradient Descent in a client-server
architecture
Input: C: x(t),Kc,Kw, li, lf , Ū ,pk, sk; S: H̄f , F̄, η̄,Kc,Kw, li, lf ,pk, cold-start, [[Uw]]
Output: C: u = (UK(x(t)))1:m
1: C: Encrypt and send [[x(t)]] to S
2: if cold-start then
3: S: [[U0]] = [[0Nm]]; C, S: K ← Kc
4: else




; C, S: K ← Kw
6: end if
7: S: [[z0]] = [[U0]]
8: for k=0. . . ,K-1 do
9: S: [[tk]] = (INm − H̄f )⊗ [[zk]]⊕ (−F̄ᵀf )⊗ [[x(t)]] and send it to C
10: C: Decrypt tk and truncate to lf fractional bits
11: C: Uk+1 = ΠŪ (tk) . Projection on Ū
12: C: Encrypt and send [[Uk+1]] to S
13: S: [[zk+1]] = (1 + η̄)⊗ [[Uk+1]]⊕ (−η̄)⊗ [[Uk]]
14: end for
15: C: Decrypt and output u = (UK)1:m
Theorem 6.2.1. Protocol 6.2.1 achieves privacy as in Definition 2.2.8 with respect to a
semi-honest server.
Proof. The initial value of the iterate does not give any information to the server about the
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result, as the final result is encrypted and the number of iterations is a priori fixed. The
view of the server, as in Definition 2.2.8, is composed of the server’s inputs, the messages
received {[[Uk]]}k=0,...,K , which are all encrypted, and no output. We construct a simulator
which replaces the messages with random encryptions of corresponding length. Due to the
semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem, which was proved in [177], the view of the
simulator is computationally indistinguishable from the view of the server.
(a) Private client-server MPC setup for a plant. (b) Private two-server MPC setup for a plant.
Figure 6.2: Secure MPC solution.
6.2.3 Two-server architecture
Although in Protocol 6.2.1 the client needs to store and process substantially less data than
the server, the computational requirements might be too stringent for large values of K and
Nσ. In such a case, we outsource the problem to two servers, and only require the client
to encrypt x(t) and send it to one server and decrypt the received the result [[u∗]]. In this
setup, depicted in Figure 6.2b, the existence of two non-colluding servers is assumed.
In Figure 6.2b and in Protocol 6.2.2, we will denote by [[·]] a message encrypted with
pk1 and by [{·}] a message encrypted by pk2. The reason we use two pairs of keys is so the
client and support server do not have the same private key and do not need to interact.
As before, we need an interactive protocol to achieve the projection. We use the ideas
from the private solution for a quadratic optimization problem outlined in Section 3.2, but
we work in the primal problem rather than in the dual. We use the DGK comparison
protocol, proposed in [77, 78], such that, given two encrypted values of l bits [[a]], [[b]] to
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S1, after the protocol, S2, who has the private key, obtains a bit (β = 1) ≡ (a ≤ b), without
finding anything about the inputs. Moreover, S1 finds nothing about β. We augment this
protocol by introducing a step (in line 11 of Protocol 6.2.2) before the comparison, in which
S1 randomizes the order of the two values to be compared, such that S2 does not know the
significance of β with respect to the inputs. Furthermore, by performing a blinded exchange,
S1 obtains the minimum (respectively, maximum) value of the two inputs, without any of the
two servers knowing what the result is. This is achieved via the oblivious transfer described
in Preamble 2.6. The above procedure is performed in line 13 in Protocol 6.2.2.
The comparison protocol works with inputs that are represented on l bits. The variables
we compare are results of additions and multiplications, which can increase the number of
bits, thus, we need to ensure that they are represented on l bits before inputting them to
the comparison protocol. This introduces an extra step in line 10 in which S1 communicates
with S2 in order to obtain the truncation of the comparison inputs: S1 adds noise to tk and
sends it to S2 which decrypts it, truncates the result to l bits and sends it back. S1 then
subtracts the truncated noise.
In order to guarantee that S2 does not find out the private values after decryption, S1
adds a sufficiently large random noise to the private data. The random numbers used for
blinding are chosen from (0, 2l+λσ) ∩ ZNσ , which ensures the statistical indistinguishability
between the sum of the random number and the private value and a random number of
equivalent length [45], where λσ is the statistical security parameter.
Lines 10–14 and lines 17–19 of Protocol 6.2.2 are performed element-wise on the en-
crypted vectors.
Protocol 6.2.2: Encrypted projected Fast Gradient Descent in a two-server architecture
Input: C : x(t),pk1,2, sk2; S1 : H̄f , F̄, η̄,Kc,Kw, li, lf ,pk1,2, cold-start, [[Uw]]; S2 : Kc,Kw, li, lf ,
pk1,2, sk1, cold-start
Output: C: u = (UK(x(t)))1:m
1: C: Encrypt and send [[x(t)]], [[hu]], [[lu]] to S1
2: if cold-start then
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; S1, S2:K ← Kw
6: end if
7: S1: [[z0]]← [[U0]]
8: for k=0. . . ,K-1 do
9: S1: [[tk]]← (INm − H̄f )⊗ [[zk]]⊕ (−F̄ᵀf )⊗ [[x(t)]]
10: S1, S2: [[tk]]← truncate [[tk]]
11: S1: ak,bk ← randomize [[tk]], [[hu]]
12: S1, S2: perform Protocol 2.7.2 s.t. S2 obtains (βk = 1) ≡ (ak ≤ bk)
13: S1, S2: [[Uk+1]]← OT′ ([[ak]], [[bk]],βk Y 1,msk). S1 receives [[Uk+1]]
. Uk+1 ← min(tk,hu)
14: S1, S2: Redo 11–13 to get [[Uk+1]]← max(Uk+1, lu)
15: S1: [[zk+1]]← (1 + η̄)⊗ [[Uk+1]]⊕ (−η̄)⊗ [[Uk]]
16: end for
17: S1: Pick ρ and send [[(UK)1:m]]⊕ [[ρ]] to S2
18: S2: Decrypt, encrypt with pk2 and send to S1: [{u + ρ}]
19: S1: [{u}]← [{u + ρ}]⊕ [{−ρ}] and send it to C
20: C: Decrypt and output u
Theorem 6.2.2. Protocol 6.2.2 achieves privacy as in Definition 3.3.1, as long as the two
semi-honest servers do not collude.
The proof is given in Appendix E.1.
Remark 6.2.3. One can expand Protocols 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 over multiple time steps, such that
U0 is obtained from the previous iteration and not given as input, and formally prove their
privacy. The fact that the state will converge to a neighborhood of the origin is public
knowledge, and is not revealed by the execution of the protocol.
Through communication, encryption and statistical blinding, the two servers can pri-
vately compute nonlinear operations. However, this causes an increase in the computation
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time due to the extra encryptions and decryptions and communication rounds, as will be
pointed out in Section 6.2.5.
6.2.4 Fixed-point arithmetics MPC
The values that are encrypted or added to or multiplied with encrypted values have to be
integers. We consider fixed-point representations with one sign bit, li integer bits and lf
fractional bits and multiply them by 2lf to obtain integers.
Working with fixed-point representations can lead to overflow, quantization and arith-
metic round-off errors. Thus, we want to compute the deviation between the fixed-point
solution and optimal solution of (6.2.4). The bounds on this deviation can be used in an
offline step prior to the online computation to choose an appropriate fixed-point precision
for the performance of the system.
Consider the following assumption:
Assumption 6.2.4. The number of fractional bits lf and constant c ≥ 1 are chosen large
enough such that:
(i) Ū ⊆ U : the fixed-point precision solution is still feasible.
(ii) The eigenvalues of the fixed-point representation H̄f are contained in the set (0, 1],
where Hf := H̄/(cL̄) and L̄ := λmax(H̄). The constant c is required in order to
overcome the possibility that (1/L̄)H̄ has the maximum eigenvalue larger than 1 due
to fixed-point arithmetic errors.







≤ η̄ < 1.
Item (i) ensures that the feasibility of the fixed-point precision solution is preserved,
item (ii) ensures that the strong convexity of the fixed-point objective function still holds
and item (iii) ensures that the fixed-point step size is such that the FGM converges.
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Overflow errors: Bounds on the infinity-norm on the fixed-point dynamic quantities of
interest in (6.2.4) were derived in [129] for each iteration k, and depend on a bounded set
X0 such that x(t) ∈ X0 and x̄(t) ∈ X̄0:
‖Ūk+1‖∞ ≤ max{‖̄lu‖∞, ‖h̄u‖∞} = RŪ
‖z̄k+1‖∞ ≤ (1 + 2η̄)RŪ =: ζ,
‖t̄k‖∞ ≤ ‖INm − H̄f‖∞ζ + ‖F̄f‖∞RX̄0 ,
where Ff = F̄/(cL̄) and RS represents the radius of a set S w.r.t. the infinity norm. We
select from these bounds the number of integer bits li such that there is no overflow.
6.2.4.1 Difference between real and fixed-point solution
We want to determine a bound on the error between the fixed-point precision solution and the
real solution of the MPC problem (6.2.3). The total error is composed of the error induced
by having fixed-point coefficients and variables in the optimization problem, and by the
round-off errors. Specifically, denote by UK the solution in exact arithmetic of the MPC
problem (6.2.3) obtained after K iterations of (6.2.4). Denote by ŨK the solution obtained
after K iterations but with H,F,x(t),U , L, η replaced by their fixed-point representations.
Finally, denote by ŪK the solution of Protocols 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 after K iterations, where the
iterates [[tk]], [[Uk]] have fixed-point representation (truncations are performed). We obtain
the following upper bound on the difference between the solution obtained on the encrypted
data and the nominal solution of the implicit MPC problem (6.2.3) after K iterations:
‖ŪK −UK‖2 ≤ ‖ŨK −UK‖2 + ‖ŪK − ŨK‖2.
We present the derivation of the bounds of these accumulated errors in Appendix E.2.
Denote by ε1 the bound on the quantization errors and by ε2 the bound on the arithmetic
round-off errors. As lf →∞, ε1 → 0 and ε2 → 0. The persistent noise in (E.2.2) and (E.2.4),
which is composed by quantization errors and round-off errors, becomes zero when the
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number of fractional bits mimics a real variable. This makes systems (E.2.2) and (E.2.4)
input-to-state stable.
6.2.4.2 Choice of error level
The error bound ε := ε1 + ε2 can be computed as a function of the number of fractional
bits lf . We can incorporate these errors as a bounded disturbance d(·) in system (6.2.1):
d(t) = Bξ(t), where ξ(t) = u∗(t)− ū(t). Then, we can design the terminal cost as described
in [180], such that the controller achieves inherent robust stability to process perturbations
‖d(t)‖2 ≤ δ, and choose: ε ≤ δ‖B‖ . Alternatively, we can incorporate the error in the
suboptimality of the cost and assume that we obtain a cost J̄N (x(t), ŪK) ≤ J∗N (x(t)) + ε′,
and compute ε such that asymptotic stability is achieved as in [164].
In the offline phase, the fixed-point precision of the variables is chosen such that there
is no overflow and one of the conditions on ε is satisfied. Note that these conditions can
be overly-conservative. This ensures that the MPC performance is guaranteed with a large
margin, but the computation is slower because of the large number of bits. Once li and lf
have been chosen, we can pick Nσ such that the there is no overflow in Protocol 6.2.1 and
Protocol 6.2.2, respectively. In Protocol 6.2.1, truncation cannot be done on encrypted data
by the server, thus, the multiplications by 2lf are accumulated between zk and tk, which
means that tk is multiplied by 23lf . Hence, we choose Nσ such that li+3lf +2 < log2(Nσ/3)
holds. For Protocol 6.2.2 we pick Nσ such that li + 3lf + 3 + λσ < log2(Nσ/3) holds, where
λσ is the statistical security parameter. If the Nσ that satisfies these requirements is too
large, one should use the simple gradient method, which will have multiplications up to 22lf .
Remark 6.2.5. Instead of the FGM, we can use the simple gradient descent method, where
fewer errors accumulate, and less memory is needed, but more iterations are necessary to
reach to the optimal solution.
6.2.5 Numerical results and trade-off
The number of bits in the representation is crucial for the performance of the MPC scheme.
At the same time, a more accurate representation slows down the private MPC computation.
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In Figure 6.3, for a toy model of a spacecraft from [94] based on [124], we compare
the predicted theoretical error bounds from Theorems E.2.1 and E.2.3 and the norm of the
actual errors between the control input obtained with the client-server protocol and the
control input of the unencrypted MPC. The simulation is run for a time step of MPC with
18 iterations, with three choices of the number of fractional bits: 16, 24 and 32 bits. The
results are similar for the two-server protocol. We can observe that the predicted errors are
around two orders of magnitude larger than the real errors caused by the encryption, and
even for 16 bits of precision, the actual error is small.
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Figure 6.3: Predicted and actual errors for the control input computed in Protocol 6.2.1 for the
Problem (6.2.3). The y-axis shows the errors (predicted and actual) as a percentage of the norm of
the true iterate Uk.
Furthermore, we implemented the above two protocols for various problem sizes, where n
is the number of states and m is the number of control inputs, with a horizon fixed to 7.
Table 6.1 shows the computation times for Protocols 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 for li = 16 integer bits
and lf ∈ {16, 32} fractional bits. We fix the number of iterations to 50. The times obtained
vary linearly with the number of iterations, so one can approximate how long it would take
to run a different number of iterations. The size of the Nσ for the encryption is chosen to
be 512 bits. The computations were effectuated on a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7.
The larger the number of fractional bits, the larger is the execution time, because the
157
computations involve larger numbers and more bits have to be sent from one party to an-
other in the case of encrypted comparisons. Communication is the reason for the significant
slow-down observed in the two-server architecture compared to the client-server architec-
ture. Performing the projection requires l communication rounds, where l is the number of
bits of the messages compared. Privately updating the iterates requires another communi-
cation round. However, the assumption is that the servers are powerful computers, and the












CS 16 1.21 4.08 13.38 39.56 84.28
CS 32 1.33 5.20 15.46 53.48 105.84
SS 16 23.27 59.81 123.19 261.75 457.87
SS 32 31.21 91.74 170.62 372.42 579.38
Table 6.1: Average execution time in seconds for Protocols 6.2.1, 6.2.2.
To summarize, privacy comes at the price of complexity: hiding the private data requires
working with large encrypted numbers, and the computations on private data require com-
munication. Furthermore, the more parties that need to be oblivious to the private data
(two servers in the second architecture compared to one server in the first architecture), the
more complex the private protocols become.
6.3 Secure Evaluation of MPC with private parameters
In this section, we change the problem setting from Section 6.2. The system in (6.2.1) is
considered to be partitioned in subsytems for i ∈ [M ], xi(t) ∈ Rni ,
∑M



















The privacy-absent cloud-MPC problem is depicted in Figure 6.4. The system (6.2.1)
is composed of M subsystems, that can be thought of as different agents, which measure
their states and receive control actions, and of a setup entity which holds the system’s
model and parameters. The control decision problem is solved at the cloud level, by a cloud
controller, which receives the system’s model and parameters, the measurements, as well
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as the constraint sets imposed by each subsystem. The control inputs are then applied by
one virtual actuator. Examples of such architecture include a smart building temperature
control application, where the subsystems are apartments and the actuator is a machine in
the basement, or the subsystems are robots in a swarm coordination application and the
actuator is a ground control that sends them waypoints.
Figure 6.4: Cloud-based MPC problem for a system composed of a number of subsystems that
measure their states and a setup entity which holds the system’s model and parameters. The
control action is computed by a cloud controller and sent to a virtual actuator.
6.3.1 Privacy objectives and overview of solution
The system model and MPC costs A,B,P,Q,R are known only to the system, but not to the
cloud and actuator, hence, the matrices H,F in (6.2.3) are also private. The measurements
and constraints are not known to parties other than the corresponding subsystem and should
remain private, such that the sensitive information of the subsystems is concealed. The
control inputs should not be known by the cloud.
The goal of this work is to design a private cloud-outsourced version of the fast gradient
method in (6.2.4) for the model predictive control problem, such that the actuator obtains
the control action u∗(t) for system (6.2.1), without learning anything else in the process
and with only a minimum amount of computation. At the same time, the cloud controller
should not learn anything other than what was known prior to the computation about the
measurements x(t), the control inputs u∗(t), the constraints U , and the system model H,F.
We consider that all parties are semi-honest, but they are allowed to collude. Specifically,
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coalitions between M − 1 subsystems and the controller or between M − 1 subsystems and
the actuators are allowed. Then, we require the protocol that implements the above satisfy
multi-party privacy, as defined in Definition 2.2.6.
As a primer to our private solution to the MPC problem, we briefly mention here the
cryptographic tools used to achieve privacy. We will encrypt the data with a labeled homo-
morphic encryption scheme, which allows us to evaluate an unlimited number of additions
and one multiplication over encrypted data, denoted as Ê(·). The labeled homomorphic
encryption builds on top of an additively homomorphic encryption scheme, which allows
only the evaluation of additions over encrypted data, denote as [[·]] or E(·), a secret sharing
scheme, which enables the splitting of a message into two random shares, that cannot be
used individually to retrieve the message, and a pseudorandom generator that, given a key
and a small seed, called label, outputs a larger sequence of bits that is indistinguishable
from random. The right choice of labels is essential for a seamless application of labeled
homomorphic encryption on dynamical data, and we choose the labels to be the time steps
at which the data is generated. These tools ensure that we can evaluate polynomials on
the private data. Furthermore, the computations for determining the control action also
involve projections on a feasible hyperbox. To achieve this in a private way, we make use of
two-party private comparison that involves exchanges of encrypted bits between two parties,
and oblivious transfer, that allows us to choose a value out of many values when the index
is secret. These cryptographic tools are be described in detail in Chapter 2, and our private
cloud-based MPC solution that incorporates them will be presented in Section 6.3.2.
6.3.2 MPC with encrypted model and encrypted signals
Notice that the setting is similar to the secure evaluation of LQG, presented in Chapter 5.1,
but for a non-linear control policy, given by MPC, which require extra computations. To this
end, we propose a solution that uses Labeled Homomorphic Encryption to achieve encrypted
multiplications and the private execution of MPC on encrypted data. LabHE has the useful
property called unbalanced efficiency and we will employ this property by having the cloud
perform the more complex operations and the actuator the more efficient ones.
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Our protocols consist of three phases: the offline phase, in which the computations that
are independent from the specific data of the users are performed, the initialization phase,
in which the computations related to the constant parameters in the problem are performed,
and the online phase, in which computations on the variables of the problem are performed.
The initialization phase can be offline, if the constant parameters are a priori known, or
online otherwise.
Figure 6.5 represents the private version of the MPC diagram from Figure 6.4, where the
quantities are briefly described next and in more detail in Section 6.3.2.1. The actuator holds
the MPC query functionality, denoted by fMPC. Offline, the actuator generates a pair of
master keys, as described in Preamble 2.5.2 and publishes the master public key. The setup
and subsystems generate their secret keys and send the corresponding public keys to the
actuator. Still offline, these parties generate the labels corresponding to their data with
respect to the time stamp and the size of the data, similarly to the solution in Chapter 5.1.
This is shown in Protocol 6.3.1.
The setup entity sends the LabHE encryptions of the state matrices and costs to the
cloud controller before the execution begins. The subsystems send the encryptions of the
input constraints to the cloud controller, also before the execution begins. Online, at every
time step, the subsystems encrypt their measurements and send them to the cloud. After
the cloud performs the encrypted MPC query for one time step, it sends the encrypted
control input at the current time step to the actuator, which decrypts it and inputs it to
the system. In Protocol 6.3.2, we describe how the encrypted MPC query is performed by
the parties, which involves the actuator sending an encryption of the processed result back
to the cloud such that the computation can continue in the future time steps.
We now show how to transform the FGM in Equation (6.2.4) into a private version, using
Labeled Homomorphic Encryption and private two-party comparison. The message space
M of the encryption schemes we use is ZN , the additive group of integers modulo a large
value N . This means that, prior to encryption, the values have to be represented as integers.
Assume that this preprocessing step has been already performed; see Remark 6.3.3.
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Figure 6.5: The setup and subsystems send their encrypted data to the cloud. The cloud has to run
the MPC algorithm on the private measurements and the system’s private matrices and send the
encrypted result to the actuator. The latter then actuates the system with the decrypted inputs.




































LF and variables Uk,Uk−1,x(t), then tk
can be written as a degree-two multivariate polynomial. This allows us to compute [[tk]]
using LabHE. Then, one encrypted iteration of the FGM, where we assume that the cloud














, Ê(x(t)), [[hu]], [[lu]] can be written as follows.
Denote the computation on the inputs mentioned previously as fiter. We use both ˆAdd and
⊕̂, 	̂, M̂lt and ⊗̂ for a better visual representation.






































where ρk is the secret obtained by applying fiter on the LabHE secrets of the inputs of fiter.
When the actuator applies the LabHE decryption primitive on [[tk − ρk]], ρk is removed.
Hence, for simplicity, we will write [[tk]] instead of [[tk − ρk]].
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Second, for (6.2.4b), we have to perform the projection of tk over the feasible domain
described by hu and lu, where all the variables are encrypted, as well as the private update
of Uk+1 with the projected iterate. Since the comparison needs to be done between AHE
ciphertexts and not LabHE ciphertexts, the solution for this is very similar to the solution
in the first part of the chapter, given in Section 6.2.3.
Finally, because the next iteration can proceed only if the cloud has access to the full
LabHE encryption Ê(Uk+1), instead of [[Uk+1]], the cloud and actuator have to refresh the
encryption. Specifically, the cloud secret-shares [[Uk+1]] in [[Uk+1 − rk+1]] and rk+1, and
sends [[Uk+1 − rk+1]] to the actuator. The actuator decrypts it, and, using a previously






. Then, the cloud
recovers the LabHE encryption as Ê(Uk+1) = ˆAdd(Ê(Uk+1− rk+1), rk+1). In what follows,
we will outline the private protocols obtained by integrating the above observations.
6.3.2.1 Private protocol
Assume that K,N are fixed and known by all parties. Subscript Si stands for the i-th
subsystem, for i ∈ [M ], subscript Set for the Setup, subscript A for the actuator and
subscript C for the cloud.
Protocol 6.3.1: Initialization of encrypted MPC
Input: Actuator: fMPC; Subsystems: U i; Setup: A,B,P,Q,R.
Output: Subsytems: mpk,upkSi ,uskSi , τSi ,bSi , [[bSi ]],RSi ; Setup: H,F, η, L, mpk, upkSet,















, Ê(η), [[hu]], [[lu]], RC .
Offline:
1: Actuator: Generate (mpk,msk) ← Init(1σ) and distribute mpk to the others. Also generate a
key usk for itself.
2: Subsystems, Setup: Each get (usk,upk)← KeyGen(mpk) and send upk to the actuator.
3: Subsystems, Setup, Actuator: Allocate labels to the inputs of function fMPC: τ1, . . . , τv, where
v is the total number of inputs, as follows:
Subsystem i: for xi(t) of size ni, where i denotes a subsystem, generate the corresponding labels
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τxi(t) = [0 1 ni . . . ni − 1]ᵀ.
Setup: for matrix H ∈ RMm×Mm, set l = 0, generate τH and update l = M2m2, then follow the
same steps for F, starting from l and updating it.
Actuator: follow the same steps as the subsystems and setup, and then generate similar labels
for the iterates Uk starting from the last l, for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1.
4: Subsystems, Setup, Actuator, Cloud: Generate randomness for blinding and encryptions R.
5: Subsystems, Setup, Actuator: Perform the offline part of the LabHE encryption primitive. The
actuator also performs the offline part for the decryption. The parties thus obtain b, [[b]].
6: Actuator: Generate initializations for the initial iterate U′0.
7: Actuator: Form the program P = (fMPC, τ1, . . . , τv).
Initialization:





















9: Subsystems: Perform the online part of LabHE encryption and send to the cloud, which aggre-
gates what it receives into: [[hu]], [[lu]].
Protocol 6.3.2: Encrypted MPC step
Input: Actuator: fMPC; Subsystems: xi(t), U i; Setup: A,B,P,Q,R.
Output: Actuator: u(t)
Offline + Initialization:



















3: Actuator: Send the initial iterate to the cloud: Ê(U′0).
4: Cloud: Change the initial iterate: Ê(U0) = ˆAdd
(
Ê (U′0) , r0
)
.
5: Cloud: Ê (U−1)← Ê (U0).
6: for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 do
7: Cloud: Compute [[tk]] as in Equation (6.3.1).
8: Cloud: ([[ak]], [[bk]])← randomize ([[hu]], [[tk]]).
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9: Cloud, Actuator: Execute comparison protocol 2.7.2; Actuator obtains δk.
10: Cloud, Actuator: [[Uk+1]]← OT′ ([[ak]], [[bk]], δk,msk).
11: Cloud: ([[ak]], [[bk]])← randomize ([[lu]], [[Uk+1]]).
12: Cloud, Actuator: Execute comparison protocol 2.7.2; Actuator obtains δk.
13: if k!=K-1 then
14: Cloud, Actuator: [[Uk+1]]← OT′ ([[ak]], [[bk]], δk Y 1,msk). Cloud receives [[Uk+1]].










and send back Ê(U′k+1).














22: Actuator: Input u(t) to the system.
Lines 3 and 4 ensure that neither the cloud nor the actuator knows the initial point of the
optimization problem.
Assumption 6.3.1. An adversary cannot corrupt at the same time both the cloud controller
and the virtual actuator or more than M − 1 subsystems.
Theorem 6.3.2. Under Assumption 6.3.1, the encrypted MPC solution presented in Pro-
tocol 6.3.2 achieves multi-party privacy, cf. Definition 2.2.6.
The proof is given in Appendix E.3.
We can also have the private MPC scheme run for multiple time steps. Protocol 6.3.1
can be modified to also generate the labels and secrets for T time steps. Protocol 6.3.2 can
be run for multiple time steps, and warm starts can be included by adding two lines such














Remark 6.3.3 (Analysis of errors). The same discussion related to the errors arising from
using a fixed-point representation as in Section 6.2.4 applies here. The bounds on these
deviatiosn can be used in an offline step to choose an appropriate fixed-point precision for
the desired performance of the system.
6.3.3 Discussion on efficiency
Secure multi-party computation protocols require many rounds of communication in general,
and the amount of communication depends on the amount of data that needs to be concealed.
This can also be observed in Protocol 6.3.2. Therefore, in order to be able to use this
protocol, we need fast and reliable communication between the cloud and the actuator.
In the architecture we considered, the subsystems are computationally and memory
constrained devices, hence, they are only required to generate the encryptions for their
measurements. The setup only holds constant data, and it only has to compute the matrices
in (6.2.4) and encrypt them in the initialization step. Furthermore, we considered the
existence of the setup entity for clarity in the exposition of the protocols, but the data held
by the setup could be distributed to the other participants in the computation. In this
case, the cloud would have to perform some extra steps in order to aggregate the encrypted
system parameters (see [6] for a related solution). Notice that the subsystems and setup
do not need to generate labels for the number of iterations, only the actuator does. The
actuator is supposed to be a machine with enough memory to store the labels and reasonable
amount of computation power such that the encryptions and decryptions are performed in
a practical amount of time (that will be dependent on the sampling time of the system),
but less powerful than the cloud. The cloud controller is assumed to be a server, which has
enough computational power and memory to be capable to deal with the computations on
the ciphertexts, which can be large, depending on the encryption schemes employed.
If fast and reliable communication is not available or if the actuator is a highly con-
strained device, then a fully homomorphic encryption solution that is solely executed by the
cloud might be more appropriate, although its execution can be substantially slower.
Compared to the two-server MPC with private signals but public model from Section 6.2,
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where only AHE is required, the MPC with private signals and private model we considered
in this chapter is only negligibly more expensive. Specifically, the ciphertexts are augmented
with one secret that has the number of bits substantially smaller than the number of bits in an
AHE ciphertext, and each online iteration only incurs one extra round of communication, one
decryption and one encryption. All the other computations regarding the secrets are done




In this chapter, we investigate a Control as a Service scenario, where a client employs a spe-
cialized outsourced control solution from a service provider. Control as a Service (CaaS) is
becoming a reality–particularly in the case of building automation and smart grid manage-
ment. Often, the control algorithms in CaaS focus on controlling the client’s system directly
from input-output data; the privacy-sensitive model parameters of the client’s system are
either not available or variable. Therefore, large quantities of data collected from the client
need to be uploaded to a cloud server. This data can be used by a malevolent cloud ser-
vice provider to infer sensitive information about the client and mount attacks. Hence, we
require the service provider to perform data-driven control in a privacy-preserving manner
on the input-output data samples from the client. To this end, we co-design the control
scheme with respect to both control performance and privacy specifications. First, we for-
mulate our control algorithm based on recent results from the behavioral framework, and
we prove closeness between the classical formulation and our formulation that accounts for
noise and precision errors arising from encryption. Second, we use a state-of-the-art leveled
homomorphic encryption scheme to enable the service provider to perform high complexity
computations on the client’s encrypted data, ensuring privacy. Finally, we streamline our
solution by exploiting the rich structure of data, and meticulously employing ciphertext
batching and rearranging operations to enable parallelization.
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The first part of the chapter studies the data-based predictive control under an `2-
regularization, while the second part of the chapter considers an `1-regularization. This
slight difference leads very different solutions.
This chapter covers the work presented in [14–16].
7.1 Introduction
As cloud services become pervasive, inspiring the term “Everything as a Service” [23], pri-
vacy of the underlying data and algorithms becomes indispensable. Distributed systems
coordination and process control enterprises can benefit from such services by commission-
ing cloud servers to aggregate and manipulate the increasing amounts of data or implement
reference governors. For example, in the context of smart building automation, Control as
a Service (CaaS) businesses offer high-performance algorithms to optimize a desired cost,
while achieving the required control goals. Clients like hospitals, factories, commercial and
residential buildings might prefer such specialized outsourced solutions rather than invest-
ing in local control solutions. However, the data that is outsourced, stored and processed
at a CaaS provider’s cloud server consists of privacy-sensitive measurements such as user
patterns, energy and temperature measurements, occupancy information etc. Nowadays,
data can be monetized and used to disrupt the normal functionality of a system, leading
to frequent database leakages and cyberattacks. This compels researchers and practitioners
to design decision algorithms that are optimized for both efficiency and privacy. In this
chapter, we provide prototypes for such private cloud-based control algorithms.
In a client-server context, homomorphic encryption provides an appealing tool that al-
lows one server to evaluate a functionality over the encrypted data of the client without the
need to decrypt the data locally, at independently specified precision and security levels. As
discussed in [215], private single client computing can be enabled using homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes. Moreover, this technology has matured enough for it to be deployed in prac-
tice, especially in the healthcare [127] and financial [161] sectors. Since its genesis in [102],
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) has been developed substantially, in terms of more
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theoretically efficient leveled constructions [50, 62, 103], bootstrapping methods [60, 63],
computational and hardware optimizations. There are many libraries that implement var-
ious FHE schemes and capabilities [66, 115, 166, 178] and a tremendous number of papers
that build on them.
Related work
Encrypted control, surveyed in [200], has been recently gaining momentum, due to the strong
privacy guarantees it offers even when the controller is located on an untrusted platform.
These works can be classified with respect to the type of control algorithms they implement
and the cryptographic tools they use. Linear control algorithms with public model and gains
are considered in most works and are implemented using partially homomorphic encryption
(PHE) schemes. Nonlinear control algorithms with public model are considered in [11, 198],
where PHE is combined either with secure multiparty computation schemes or the client
partakes in the computation. In [6, 134], somewhat or fully homomorphic encryption schemes
are preferred, either to guarantee more privacy for the system parameters (that are still
known at the client) or to achieve more complex control algorithms. The work in [204]
is based on data-driven techniques and uses leveled homomorphic encryption. There, the
cloud computes the value function in a reinforcement learning task over multiple time steps
in a one-shot way, while we collect encrypted data from the client at every time step and
compute on it iteratively.
In the case of controlling a system with known model and linear controller parameters,
the line of work [65, 135] has shown how to perform the computations at subsequent time
steps without the need of bootstrapping or ciphertext reset. In contrast, we deal with both
unknown model matrices and nonlinearities, which prevent the application of their methods.
As mentioned before, most private cloud-based control schemes assume that the model
of the system is known to the client or public. However, the model might not be al-
ways available and has to be computed from data. Identification and data-driven con-
trol of unknown systems have been extensively studied in classical and recent literature
[25, 35, 70, 82, 93, 154, 158, 196, 216, 226]. These methods are usually designed with the
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objective of sample-efficiency and control performance, without considering a private im-
plementation. For example, the standard system identification-certainty equivalence control
architecture might require solving non-convex problems [232] or might involve Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD) [216], which are prohibitive from an encrypted evaluation perspective.
On the other hand, the behavioral framework [35, 36, 70, 72, 82, 83, 158, 219, 226], which
has received renewed interest recently, is more compatible with modern encryption tools
and allows us to use less costly encrypted operations. The idea of the behavioral framework
is that the state representation can be replaced by a data-based representation which only
uses the trajectories of the system, bypassing the need for system identification.
Contributions
Our goal is to perform online data-based predictive control on encrypted data, while main-
taining the privacy of the client’s uploaded input-output data, desired setpoint and control
actions. In the context of private implementation, we need to depart from the typical
techniques used in the non-private versions and make compromises between tracking per-
formance and privacy. Our controller is based on the behavioral framework and the control
performance is captured by the LQR cost.
In the first part of the chapter, we consider two versions and adapt them to account
for an encrypted implementation: i) an offline version, where precollected data from the
system is encrypted and handed to the cloud to compute an offline feedback control law,
and ii) an online version, where the cloud server computes the control at every time step
based on both the offline precollected data and on the encrypted measurements received
from the client. We employ a new leveled homomorphic encryption scheme optimized for
efficiency and precision as the powerful base tool for encrypting and evaluating the private
data on the untrusted cloud machine. To account for noisy data and changes incurred by
encryption, we employ `2-regularization. At the same time, we rewrite the computation of
the control input as a low-depth arithmetic circuit by using mathematical tools such as the
Schur complement to facilitate matrix inversions, and carefully batching the private values
into ciphertexts. Specifically, our contributions are the following:
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• Present the first solution for encryption-aware control in the case of an unknown linear
system model.
• Formulate a setpoint tracking problem that learns the control action from the available
data at every time step and is amenable to encrypted implementation.
• Prove the closeness between this formulation and a data-driven LQR problem.
• Extend this approximation to allow the online collection and incorporation of samples
to improve robustness and adaptation to new data and to errors arising from the use
of encryption.
• Design storage and computation efficient encrypted versions of the offline and online
data-driven problems, by carefully encoding the values to facilitate parallelization and
re-engineering the way the operations are performed.
• Implement the algorithms for a standard security parameter and realistic client and
server machines. Present the results for a temperature control problem and show-
case the storage and complexity improvements compared to a more intuitive but less
efficient implementation.
We note that the work presented in the first part of the chapter enhances and im-
proves [15] in the following aspects: we propose a new encrypted solution that reduces more
than twofold the time and the memory requirements of the previous solution, allowing us to
simulate more realistic and more secure scenarios; we prove the close relationship between
the standard data-driven LQR and our reformulation; and we present many more extensions.
In the second part of the chapter, we investigate a sparse data-predictive control problem,
run at a cloud service to control a system with unknown model, using `1-regularization
to limit the behavior complexity. Specifically, our goal is to control an unknown system
using only the privacy-sensitive input-output data that are potentially noisy. In the case of
noisy data, inspired by [70, 83], we reformulate the data-based predictive control as a Lasso
problem. We propose:
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• a distributed encrypted solution for `1-regularized data predictive control, using an
optimized implementation;
• a non-homogeneous splitting of the data for better convergence;
• a customized distributed encrypted solution for this non-homogeneous splitting to a
non-homogeneous set of servers: one powerful server and a few less powerful devices,
added for security reasons.
We emphasize that the techniques for performing the encrypted computations efficiently
are one of main contributions of this chapter. These tools can easily be generalized and used
in implementing other related problems in an encryption-friendly way, such as learning and
adaptive control algorithms, recursive least squares, sequential update of inverses etc.
Special notation for this chapter
For a vector x ∈ Rn, we denote by x[i] the i’th element of the vector. The vector ei is the
vector of all zeros, except for position i− 1 where it has 1.
We will use + and  for Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD, see Preamble 2.5.3)
addition and multiplication between vectors and ρ(x, i) to denote the row vector x rotated
to the left by i positions (i < 0 means rotation to the right).
We denote by Ev0(x) the encryption of the vector x followed by trailing zeros in one
ciphertext and by Ev∗(x) the encryption of the vector x followed by junk elements (elements
whose value we do not care about, usually obtained through partial operations). We denote
by Evv(x) the encryption of the vector x repeated [x x . . .] in one ciphertext. Finally, we
also define the encryption of a vector repeated element-wise: for x =
[
x[1] x[2] . . . x[n]
]
, this
encryption is Evr0(x) =
[
x[1] . . . x[1] x[2] . . . x[2] . . . x[n] . . . x[n] 0 0 . . .
]
, where each element
is repeated for a specific number of times. Similarly, we use the notation Evr∗(·) when the
repeated elements are followed by junk elements.
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7.2 Data-driven LQR on encrypted data
Organization. We formulate the data-based predictive control problem and state the goals
for a private solution in Section 7.2.1. In Section 7.2.2, we present the reformulations for an
offline feedback and an offline feedback solutions, taking into account the encryption char-
acteristics, and we prove that the solution to reformulation is close to the solution to the
original problem. In Section 7.2.2.4 we describe the main challenges and corresponding solu-
tions. Then, we outline the private protocol for the offline feedback control in Section 7.2.3
and for the online feedback control in Section 7.2.4, along with optimizations that make an
efficient solution possible. Finally, extensive simulations are presented in Section 7.2.5.
7.2.1 Problem formulation
Let x ∈ Rn,u ∈ Rm,y ∈ Rp be the state, control input and measurement of a linear system.
A client contracts a cloud service to provide the control for system (7.2.1):
xt+1 = Axt + But, yt = Cxt, (7.2.1)
as depicted in Figure 7.1. A private CaaS should solve the control problem that mini-
mizes the cost associated to setpoint tracking while satisfying the unknown system’s dy-
namics (7.2.1).
Figure 7.1: Client-server diagram for data-based predictive control.
Control requirements. Assume we are given a batch of offline input-output data for
system (7.2.1). Then, at every time t, given u0:t−1 and y0:t−1 we want to compute in a
private and receding horizon fashion u∗,t ∈ RNm in order to track the reference rt, for some
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s.t. xk+1 = Axk + Buk, yk = Cxk,
(7.2.2)
with no prior knowledge about the system model A,B,C. We also want (7.2.2) to perform
well under unknown small process and measurement noise and bias.
In this section, we focus on investigating an approximation of problem (7.2.2) without
hard constraints on the inputs or outputs of the system. In Section 7.2.2, we describe a
data-driven reformulation of (7.2.2) that is encryption-friendly.
Privacy requirements. In the scenario we consider, the cloud service should not be able
to infer anything about the client’s private data, which consists of the input signals u, the
output signals y, the model A,B,C and state x (the last four quantities being unknown
in a data-driven control problem), and any intermediate values. The costs Q̄, R̄ can be
chosen by the cloud, as part of the CaaS service or chosen by the client. The cloud service
is considered to be semi-honest, as defined in Definition 2.1.1, which means that it does not
deviate from the client’s specifications. We assume this to be the case because the cloud
server is under contract.
The formal privacy definition is captured by Definition 2.2.8, i.e., all information ob-
tained by the server after the execution of the protocol (while also keeping a record of the
intermediate computations) on the client’s private data and its own data is indistinguishable
from what can be obtained solely from the inputs and outputs available to the server.
Efficiency requirements. The computation time of the control action at the current time
step should not exceed the sampling time, which is the time until the next measurement is
fetched. In the private case, we expect a large overhead for complex controllers and consider
applications with sampling time of the order of minutes. Moreover, we require the client to
be exempt from heavy computation and communication, and the bulk of the computation
(in the allowable time) should be performed at the server side.
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7.2.2 Encryption-aware formulation
We can formulate this control problem inspired by the behavioral and subspace identification
frameworks explored in [35, 70, 82, 158, 226]. First, we introduce some preliminary concepts.








∈ RmT and a positive
integer L ≤ T is given by the following:
HLU :=

u0 u1 . . . uT−L




uL−1 uL . . . uT−1

. (7.2.3)
Furthermore, the signal u is persistently exciting of order L if HLU ∈ RmL×(T−L+1) is full
row rank.
Let us construct block-Hankel matrices for the “past” and “future” input and output
data, u ∈ RmT , respectively, y ∈ RpT , for M samples for the past data and N samples for




















·HM+NY ∈ RpN×S .
(7.2.4)
7.2.2.1 Offline feedback data-based predictive control problem
Assume that we are given precollected input and output data, with Up,Yp,Uf ,Yf the
respective past and future Hankel matrices, for some past and future horizonsM,N . Assume
also that the precollected input is persistently exciting.
Assumption 7.2.1 (Data richness). We assume the offline precollected input trajectory u
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is persistently exciting of order M +N + n, where n is the order of the system [226].
Informally, the Fundamental Lemma in [226] says that under Assumption 7.2.1, the
behavior of a controllable linear system can be replaced by a data-based representation
which only uses the trajectories of the system, specifically, the column span of the block-
Hankel matrix for input-output trajectories, composed of Up,Yp,Uf ,Yf .
Fix a time t and let ūt = ut−M :t−1 be the batch vector of the last M inputs. The batch
vector of the lastM outputs ȳt is defined similarly. IfM ≥ n, then the standard LQR prob-




























where the state representation has been replaced with the precollected data and g repre-
sents the preimage of the system’s trajectory with respect to the precollected block-Hankel
matrices. Note that u∗,t[1:m], the first m elements of u
∗,t, will be input into the system in a
receding horizon fashion, and y∗,t is the predicted output.
We now depart from the behavioral control problem (7.2.5) considered in the existing
literature and explore a more encryption-friendly form.
First, we rewrite (7.2.5) as a minimization problem depending only on g by enforcing
u = Ufg and y = Yfg. Second, in practice, there will be noise affecting the output
measurement, as well as precision errors induced by encryption, which might prevent an
exact solution to the equality constraint of (7.2.5). Hence, we prefer a least-squares penalty
approach to the equality constraint in (7.2.5) with regularization weights λy and λu. Finally,
to reduce overfitting and precision errors due to encryption, we also penalize the magnitude
of g through `2-norm regularization. We opt for two-norm regularizations to obtain better
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efficiency for the encrypted algorithm, as well as more robustness with respect to noise,
and uniqueness of the solution g∗,t. We note that `2-norm regularization corresponds to
the two-norm robustness with respect to the output noise and is preferred also in works
that only consider the performance of the algorithm, and not its privacy, e.g. [35, 125].
(We will address a `1-norm regularization of the model surrogate in Section 7.3.) The
above consideration yield the following formulation, where Q = blockdiag(Q̄, . . . , Q̄) and






‖Yfg − rt‖2Q + ‖Ufg‖2R + λy‖Ypg − ȳt‖22 + λu‖Upg − ūt‖22 + λg‖g‖22
)
. (7.2.6)
Note that the resulting problem (7.2.6) is an approximation of (7.2.5). Finally, (7.2.6) can




















pᵀUp + λgI. (7.2.8)
Since (7.2.7) is a strongly convex optimization problem (ensured by the regularization






















from which we select the first m elements and input them to the unknown system.
As seen from (7.2.10), the controller has the form of a dynamic output-feedback law,
where the feedback terms are computed using only the offline precollected data.
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7.2.2.2 Closeness between approximate and original problems
We prove that if we select small enough regularization coefficient λg and large enough penalty
coefficients λy, λu, then the solution of the approximate problem (7.2.6) is very close to the
minimum norm solution of the behavioral control problem (7.2.5). The main challenge in
the proof of Theorem 7.2.2 is that the past and future Hankel matrices are rank-deficient.
Hence the behavioral control problem (7.2.5) involves singular matrices in both the objective
and the constraints, and has multiple optimal solutions. This requires an involved analysis,
where we deal with pseudo-inverses and subspaces, that we show in Appendix F.1. To
formally state the result we need two definitions. The set of optimal solutions of (7.2.5) is
denoted by Gopt:
Gopt := {g : g solves (7.2.5)} . (7.2.11)
The minimum norm element of Gopt is defined as
gmin := arg min
g∈Gopt
‖g‖2. (7.2.12)
Theorem 7.2.2. Consider the original behavioral control problem (7.2.5) and its approx-
imation (7.2.6), with penalty coefficient λy = λu = λ > 0 and regularization coefficient
λg > 0. Let gmin be the minimum norm solution of the behavioral problem (7.2.5) as defined
in (7.2.12). Let g∗ be the optimal solution of the approximate problem (7.2.6). Then:
‖gmin − g∗‖2 → 0, (7.2.13)
as (λg, λ)→ (0,∞) restricted on the set λg > 0, λ > 0.
Although the behavioral problem has infinite solutions, due to the regularization term the
approximate problem (7.2.6) will only return a solution close to the minimum norm one gmin.
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7.2.2.3 Online feedback data-based predictive control problem
To satisfy Assumption 7.2.1, it is necessary that the precollected input signal has length at
least (m + 1)(M + N + n) − 1, cf. [70]. In practice, Assumption 7.2.1 might be violated
if less precollected data is available. Another issue with the precollected data is that it
can be affected by perturbations, e.g., measurement noise. To alleviate these issues, we
prefer an online algorithm, where the Hankel matrices HM+NU and HM+NY are updated
at each time step for another T̄ steps with the used control input and the corresponding
output measured (while keeping the block Hankel form). This approach empirically ensures
richness of the data and robustness to perturbations. However, it is important that T̄ is not
too large, in order to prevent overfitting.
Note that the precollected and the online data in this online algorithm belong to different
trajectories. For this reason, we must compute the Hankel matrix for each data set sepa-
rately, then append them in a single matrix [218]. This means that the online adaptation of
the matrices Up,Uf ,Yp,Yf can only start at time t = M +N − 1, when we obtain enough
data u0,y0, . . . ,uM+N−1,yM+N−1 to fill the first Hankel matrix column for the online data
set. We call this phase between t = M − 1 and t = M +N − 1 trajectory concatenation.
The data-driven LQR algorithm is given in Algorithm 7.2.1.
Algorithm 7.2.1: Online data-based predictive control algorithm
Input: ūt, ȳt, Up, Uf , Yp, Yf , Q, R, λy, λu, λg, S = T −M −N + 1, T̄ .
Output: ut for t = 0, 1, . . ..
1: for t = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1 do
2: Randomly select and input ut and measure the output yt.
3: end for
4: Construct ūM = u0:M−1 and ȳM = y0:M−1.
5: for t = M,M + 1, . . . ,M +N + T̄ − 1 do
6: Solve (7.2.7) for g∗,t and obtain (7.2.9).
7: Compute u∗,t = Ufg∗,t and obtain (7.2.10).
8: Input to the system ut = u
t,∗
[1:m] and measure the output yt.
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10: if t = M +N − 1 then
11: Add u0:t and y0:t to the S+ 1’th column of the trajectory Hankel matrices HM+NU and
HM+NY.
12: else if t > M +N − 1 then
13: Set S = S + 1. Use ut, respectively yt, to add a new column to HM+NU, respectively
HM+NY, while keeping the block Hankel matrix form.
14: end if
15: end for
16: while t ≥M +N + T̄ do
17: Execute lines 6–9.
18: end while
7.2.2.4 Co-design of encrypted controller
According to the requirements in Section 7.2.1, the challenges for the encrypted data-based
predictive control can be summarized as:
• The computations are iterative and not readily formulated as low-depth arithmetic
circuits.
• The problem is computationally intensive: it requires large storage, large matrix in-
versions and many consecutive matrix multiplications.
• The precision loss due to encrypted computations might affect the control performance.
To deal with these challenges, we design an encrypted version of the closed-form solu-
tion (7.2.9) of the control problem stated in Section 7.2.1 and manipulate the computations
involving matrix inverses to reduce the multiplicative depth needed. We employ the CKKS
homomorphic scheme described in Preamble 2.5.3 to address the precision challenge.
First, we approximate problem (7.2.5) into optimization problem (7.2.7), as shown in
Section 7.2.2, to simplify the encrypted computations and to avoid infeasibility due to noise
and encryption errors. Second, we aim to write the computation of the solution of (7.2.7)
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as a low-depth arithmetic circuit. Despite being preferable to an iterative algorithm for
solving the optimization problem (7.2.7) (that would increase the depth at every iteration),
the closed-form solution (7.2.9) involves the encrypted inversion of a matrix, which cannot
be generally written as a low-depth arithmetic circuit. This is not a problem in the offline
feedback version of the problem (7.2.7), because this matrix inversion is required only once
and such complex computations can be all performed offline, leaving only three encrypted
matrix-vector multiplications to be performed at each time step, as shown in Section 7.2.3.
However, in the online feedback version of the problem, this matrix inversion and many
consecutive matrix-vector multiplications are required at every time step. Nevertheless, we
leverage the special structure of the matrix to be inverted by using Schur’s complement [32,
Ch. 0] to reformulate the inverse computation as some lower multiplicative depth matrix-
vector multiplications and one scalar division. Furthermore, to avoid performing the division,
which is costly on encrypted data, the server sends to the client the denominator such that
the client can return its inverse to the server, turning division into multiplication.
We also perform further valuable optimizations in terms of ciphertext packing, adding
redundancy in the encoded values, and manipulating the computations to be performed in
a SIMD mode, which are crucial to the tractability of the solution.
The multiplicative depth of the arithmetic circuit computing u∗,t[0:m−1] can be reduced
through reordering of the intermediate operations. Given a circuit that computes x and a
circuit that computes y, with multiplicative depth d(x) and d(y), the multiplicative depth
of the circuit that evaluates them in parallel and then computes their product is: d(xy) =
max(d(x), d(y))+1. The multiplicative depth should not be confounded with the number of
multiplications. Judiciously choosing the order in which to perform the multiplications can
reduce the multiplicative depth of the result. For example, consider we want to compute
y = x1x2x3x4, where d(xi) = 0. If we sequentially perform the multiplications, we obtain
d(y) = 3. However, if we perform y = (x1x2)(x3x4), we obtain d(y) = 2. In turn, this means
that the ciphertext encrypting the resulting quantity y will have 2 consumed levels. Note
that the fewer the number of levels necessary in the computation, the cheaper the operations
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on ciphertexts are. We will use this trick in Section 7.2.4.
As explained in Preamble 2.5.3, each ciphertext is created with a number of levels cor-
responding to the depth of multiplications it can support before the underlying plaintext
is corrupted by noise. After each multiplication and rescaling, a level is removed from the
ciphertext, leading to more efficient computations. We exploit this fact in our solution, by
making sure we compute each operation on ciphertexts that have the minimum required
number of moduli.
7.2.3 Offline feedback encrypted solution
Recall the closed-form solution of the optimization problem (7.2.7). We now compute the
multiplicative depth of the quantities of interest for consecutive time steps. First, the quan-
tities ū0, ȳ0, the reference signal and measurements are freshly encrypted at every time
step t, hence they are inputs to the circuit that computes ut and have a multiplicative
depth of 0. This means, ∀t ≥ 0, d(yt) = d(rt) = d(ū0) = d(ȳ0) = 0. Second, we as-
sume that all the quantities obtained offline will have multiplicative depth 0. We do not
address the offline computations here; since these computations depend only on the of-
fline data and are one-time, expensive secure solutions can be used, e.g., the cloud could
perform the encrypted computations, then perform bootstrapping to refresh the cipher-
















pᵀ ∈ Rm×mM , and the underlying messages are inputs to
the circuit and they have multiplicative depth 0. Then:
ut = Arrt + Ayȳt + Auūt. (7.2.14)
For t = 0, we obtain d(u0) = max(d(r0) + 1, d(ȳ0) + 1, d(ū0) + 1) = 1. Generalizing:
d(ut) = d(ūt) + 1, t ≥ 0. (7.2.15)
At time t+ 1, ūt+1 will be updated by ut.
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We next present three encrypted methods of computing (7.2.14), that exhibit trade-offs
in depth, memory and communication.
If we individually encrypt each element of the quantities in (7.2.14) in a separate cipher-
text (the inputs to the circuit computing ut will be all elements, rather than three vectors
and three matrices), ūt+1 will have the multiplicative depth of ut and d(ut) = t + 1, but
memory-wise, a step will require (m+ 1)(pN + pM +mM) ciphertexts.
It is more efficient from both storage and computation points of view to encode a vec-
tor instead of a scalar in a ciphertext and perform the matrix-vector multiplications by a
diagonal method. This vector encoding requires a different analysis.
7.2.3.1 Diagonal method
We explore a method for efficient matrix-vector multiplication where the diagonals of the
matrix are encrypted in separate ciphertexts (the notion of diagonal is extended for rectan-
gular matrices) [7, 132].
Tall matrix. Consider we want to multiply a tall matrix S ∈ Ru×v, u ≥ v, by a vector
p ∈ Rv. To this end, we extract the extended diagonals di of S such that di will have as
many elements as the number of rows u, for i = 0, . . . , v − 1. The corresponding result
q = Sp is computed as follows, where p̃ is p concatenated with itself as many times such




di  ρ(p̃, i).
This way of computing the encrypted matrix-vector multiplication is highly efficient
when using ciphertext batching. Specifically, we encrypt each extended diagonal of S in one
ciphertext, which gives us a storage of only v ≤ u ciphertexts and we encrypt p repeatedly
in one ciphertext. We can compute the necessary rotations in an efficient way using hoisted




Ev0(di) ρ(Evv(p), i). (7.2.16)
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Wide matrix. In the case of a wide matrix S ∈ Ru×v with u ≤ v, instead of using
extended diagonals, we use reduced diagonals. One reduced diagonal d̃i, for i = 0, . . . , v− 1
will have as many elements as the number of rows u. The storage is not as efficient since
we have to encrypt v ≥ u ciphertexts for the diagonals. Apart from this, the computation
is identical to (7.2.16) and produces Ev0(q).
We can improve the storage (at the cost of some extra rotations) when the number of
columns divides the number of rows. We extract the extended diagonals di ∈ Rv for i =















and produces Ev∗(q) instead of Ev0(q). When u << v, it is useful to append rows of zeros
such that u divides v, and then use this method.
Let us return to (7.2.14). In general, Ar,Ay,Au are wide matrices, but there can exist
particular cases when m >> p or when we want to compute all u∗,t, leading to tall matrices.
We assume that at the onset of time step t, the cloud server has Ev0(ūt),Ev0(ȳt),Ev0(rt).
The cloud server also has Ev0(diagiAr), Ev0(diagiAy), Ev0(diagiAu), i.e., each extended di-
agonal (whose exact definition varies with the shape of the matrix: tall or wide) of the
matrices Ar,Ay,Au is encrypted in a separate ciphertext. In order to be able to use
the diagonal methods, the cloud server first obtains Evv(ūt),Evv(ȳt),Evv(rt) by rotating
and adding Ev0(ūt),Ev0(ȳt),Ev0(rt). This vector packing substantially reduces memory:
3 + max(m, pN) + max(m, pM) +mM ciphertexts in the worst case and 3 + min(m, pN) +
min(m, pM) + m in the best case, depending on the shape of the matrix and the type of
diagonal chosen, but will require an extra level. From these quantities, the cloud server com-
putes and sends back to the client one ciphertext containing Ev0(ut) or Ev∗(ut), depending
on the type of diagonals chosen. Assume the cloud server obtained Ev0(ut). After that, the
cloud server has to create Evv(ūt+1) from Ev0(ūt) and Ev0(ut), so it:
• rotates Ev0(ūt) by m positions to the left;
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• rotates Ev0(ut) to the right by (M−1)m positions, then adds it to ρ(Ev0(ūt),m). This
yields Ev0(ūt+1) + Ev0([0 0 . . . 0 (ūt)[0:m−1]]), the last part appearing because of the
rotation to the left;
• masks the result in order to truly obtain Ev0(ūt+1) (otherwise, the summing and
rotation would not produce the correct result);
• repeatedly rotates and adds to obtain Evv(ūt+1).
Because of the CKKS encoding through the Discrete Fourier Transform, (which enables
SIMD multiplications, unlike other possible encodings), the masking operation needs to
consume a level in order to preserve precision [62]. The reason is that, in order to not lose
precision when performing the rounding of the inverse FFT in the canonical embedding, the
masking vector has to also be scaled upon encoding by a large positive scaling factor, which
then should be removed after the multiplication by a rescaling operation, which consumes
a level. Obtaining Ev∗(ut) instead of Ev0(ut) does not change the analysis, since the same
masking applied in the third step also removes the junk elements in Ev∗. Furthermore, the
analysis (not shown here) of other less efficient matrix-vector multiplication methods, such
as row and column methods, also require an extra masking.
For t ≥ 1, equation (7.2.15) becomes: d(ut) = d(ūt)+1 = d(ut−1)+2 = 2t+1. Evv(ȳt+1)
can be updated the same way Evv(ūt+1) is updated. However, it is the same cost for the
client to encrypt Ev0(yt) and Evv(ȳt+1), so it can encrypt and send the latter. Whenever
the allocated multiplicative budget is exhausted, the server can ask the client to send a fresh
encryption of ūt, at little extra cost.
Nevertheless, a reasonable and inexpensive option is to ask the client to send along with
the encryption of ȳt a fresh encryption of ūt at every time step. This implies that d(ut) = 1,
i.e., a multiplicative budget of only 1 is required for computing the control input for no
matter how many time steps.
Theorem 7.2.3. The encrypted offline data-based predictive control algorithm in Sec-
tion 7.2.3 achieves client privacy with respect to the server, cf. Definition 2.2.8.
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The proof is given in Appendix F.4.
7.2.4 Online feedback encrypted solution
7.2.4.1 Computing the solution using arithmetic circuits
Being capable of evaluating polynomials via homomorphic encryption theoretically gives us
the possibility of evaluating any function arbitrarily close (using Taylor series for example).
In practice, the multiplicative depth and loss of precision of these approximations limit the
types of functions we can evaluate. Consequently, division is still prohibitive. Furthermore,
large matrix inversion should be judiciously performed, in order to avoid computing products
of as many factors as the number of rows.




 , HY :=
Yp
Yf
 , hu :=
up
uf




where up,f ,yp,f are vectors added at the end of the Hankel matrices Up,f ,Yp,f . We will
drop the time subscripts t for conciseness, using prime to denote the next time step.
Let us investigate the inversion of matrix M. For step t = 0, all the values involved
in computing u∗ in (7.2.10), are precollected and can be computed offline. This includes











The last m elements on the last column of HU′, respectively of hu, are the values of ut at
the previous time step.








HU′ + λgI (7.2.18)
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Schur’s complement [32, Ch. 0] gives an efficient way to compute M′−1 from M−1 (assum-
ing M−1 exists), by inverting a scalar s and computing a few matrix-vector multiplications:









To avoid performing the division 1/s on encrypted data, the server will ask the client to
perform it on plaintext and send back an encryption of result.
7.2.4.2 Reducing memory and depth of the arithmetic circuit
In this chapter, for simplicity, we consider diagonal cost matrices Q and R. Otherwise, the
multiplication by these matrices requires more complicated encrypted operations.
At a given time, the cloud server has (in an encrypted form) HU, HY, ū, ȳ and M−1,
along with the unencrypted costs Q,R, penalties λg, λu, λy and reference signal r. The
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There is a vast number of parameters to tune in the encrypted implementation, such as
the packing method from the messages into the plaintexts, the storage redundancy, the order
of performing the operations and choice of refreshing some ciphertexts. The trade-offs that
these different versions bring are in terms of ciphertext storage, key storage (especially per-
mutation key storage), type and number of operations, precision at the end of the operations
and total multiplicative depth of the resulting circuit; these goals are intricately intertwined.
For example, designing the circuit to have a lower multiplicative depth reduces the size of
the ciphertexts and reduces the encryption load at the client, but might involve storing more
ciphertexts and performing more computations at the server, compared to a version with a
higher multiplicative depth. Thus, the main difficulty in making the computations tractable
is to astutely batch the vectors and matrices into ciphertexts in order to reduce the memory,
and manipulate the operations in order to reduce depth, number of operations and storage.
We describe here how to change the flow of operations in (7.2.20)–(7.2.23) in order to
minimize the number of ciphertexts representing the relevant quantities: HU, HY, M−1,
m, µ, ū, ȳ, u, and the number of operations, while keeping the depth to a minimum. We
make use of the feature of lattice-based homomorphic encryption schemes of encoding a
vector of values into a single plaintext, which is then encrypted in a single ciphertext. Since
we are also dealing with matrices, we explored several options of how to encode the matrices
in ciphertexts: columns, rows, (hybrid) diagonals, vectorized matrix.
Note that the same linear algebraic operation, implemented for different encodings, leads
to a different number of stored ciphertexts, multiplicative depth of circuit, and number of
SIMD operations. For the problem we tackle here, we found that encoding each column of
a matrix into a separate ciphertext minimizes the number of stored ciphertexts and number
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of operations, while keeping the same depth as when each element is encoded in a different
ciphertext and the usual (unencrypted) method of performing the operations is used, as
stated in Proposition 7.2.4. However, not all the matrices’ columns are encoded in the same
fashion, as we will see next. In summary, having some redundancy inside the ciphertexts,
i.e., having some values encoded multiple times, helps optimize the depth and complexity.
The following proposition summarizes the complexity of the online feedback algorithm,
when carrying out the steps in this section. The proof of Proposition 7.2.4 is constructive
and is given in the remaining of this subsection and Appendix F.2.
Proposition 7.2.4. We evaluate the arithmetic circuit for the online feedback algorithm
on encrypted data corresponding to Algorithm 7.2.1 for one time step with O((S + t)2)
operations, O(S + t) ciphertexts and O(S + t) rotation keys, at depth 2t + 4, where S is
the number of columns of the offline generated block-Hankel matrix and t is the number of
online samples accumulated so far.
Figure 7.2a shows how to obtain an inner product between two encoded vectors using
SIMD multiplications, rotations and additions. Due to rotations, the resulting vector will
have the relevant scalar in its first slot, and junk (partial sums) in the following slots. Fig-
ure 7.2b shows the most efficient way (in terms of required number of operations) to obtain
the product between a matrix and a vector when the matrix is encoded as separate columns.
Specifically, we need the elements of the vector to be repeated and separately encoded.
Once we have each column of M−1 encoded in a ciphertext, we want to also obtain the
columns of M′−1 from (7.2.23) encoded each in a ciphertext. To minimize the multiplica-
tive depth and number of operations, this suggests that we need to obtain M−1mᵀ and
M−1mᵀmM−1 encoded as columns.
Let us look first at M−1mᵀ. In order to use the efficient method outlined in Figure 7.2b,
we need to have a separate ciphertext that encodes each element of m, repeated as many
times as the number of columns in M−1. In turn, this suggests that we should use the method
outlined in Figure 7.2c when computing m as in (7.2.20), rather than the method outlined
in Figure 7.2a which would require extra masking and rotations afterwards. Specifically, we
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(a) Inner product of two vec-
tors.
(b) Inner product of a matrix and a vector.
(c) Inner product of two vectors with repeated result.
Figure 7.2: Inner product methods for encrypted data.
have to repeat each element of hy for S times, encode the resulting vector in a ciphertext
and do the same for each column of HY and the elements in the diagonal matrix Q and
λy. Then, we perform an element-wise multiplication between the ciphertext encoding hy
and the ciphertext encoding the elements of Q and λy, and then perform the inner product
with the encoded columns of HY. The same steps are taken for hu, HU,R and λu.
Remark 7.2.5. To account for all the time steps where new samples will be collected, when-
ever we encode values repeatedly, we need to encode from the beginning S+ T̄ copies of the
elements, where S is the initial number of columns in M and T̄ is the total number of new
samples intended to be collected.
One of the main realizations that makes this more efficient computation possible is how
to compute each column coli((mM−1)ᵀ(mM−1)) at a depth d(M−1) + 2 (when d(M−1) 6=
0), with O(S) storage and O(S2) operations. Define M̃ := (mM−1)ᵀ(mM−1). Then:
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(7.2.25)





m[i] . . . m[i]
]ᵀ
 ρ(M−1mᵀ, i).
The server asks the client to invert s. After the server receives from the client 1/s, it can
compute 1sM̃, as required in (7.2.23), by replacing ei in (7.2.25) by 1/s ei.
Finally, we construct the columns of M′−1 by adding at the end of columns of 1sM̃ the
corresponding extracted elements of −1sM
−1mᵀ. The new column that expands the matrix
is obtained by adding 1/s at the end of the column −1sM
−1mᵀ.
Regarding the computation of the control input u, we again need to reorder the opera-
tions in order to have the smallest depth possible, i.e., d(M′)+1. For that, we also encode ū
and ȳ with repeated elements, so we can compute the inner product as in Figure 7.2c, for the
elements of Z in (7.2.24) stored repeatedly. We also prefer some redundancy in storage to
avoid online processing, by having a ciphertext for the first m rows of Uf ′, encoded without


















To send only one ciphertext for the result u (instead of m ciphertexts), while avoiding
an extra masking, the server will pack the vectors υi (which have an encoding with trailing
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zeros, whereas the encoding of u[i] does not) into one ciphertext and ask the client to perform
the corresponding summation.
The cloud service performs the encrypted version of (7.2.20)–(7.2.23), taking the steps
outlined in this subsection, which we describe in detail in Appendix F.2 in equation (F.2.2)–
(F.2.4), along with the specific encoding of each quantity.
After the T̄ steps elapsed, we finish adapting and the server stores the encrypted values
of M−1t , HUt, HYt. The server can store the encryptions of ȳt, ūt and update them at the
subsequent time steps with the received encryptions of yt,ut, as done in the adaptation
phase. However, we prefer the client to send Evr0(ȳt),Evr0(ūt) instead of Evr0(yt),Evr0(ut),
in order to avoid future refreshing, see Remark F.2.1.
7.2.4.3 Precision discussion
Scaling. As described in Preamble 2.5.3, every encrypted operation introduces some noise
that corrupts the least significant bits of the encrypted values, which accumulates with the
depth of the circuit. This implies that values with a smaller magnitude are affected more by
this noise. In the problem we address, the smallest values are found in M−1t , hence scaling it
by a positive integer factor α and accordingly changing the computations such that at every
time step we obtain αM−1t and αut (such that the client can remove the scaling) allows us
to increase the precision of the result. In order to incorporate this scaling without increasing
the depth, the server has to perform more operations than before, e.g., recomputation from
scratch of some quantities. The scaling factor should be selected by the client, and if its
magnitude is sensitive, it can be sent as a ciphertext to the cloud server. We can modify
the circuit such that this scaling does not affect the depth.
Precision loss when computing the Schur complement. Given the particularity
of the matrix that has to be inverted, at each time step, some precision bits of the Schur
complement are lost (depending on the regularization parameter and the magnitude of the
measurements), which incurs a loss in precision in the subsequent computations.
Without the regularization term λgI added to the objective function of (7.2.6), the
resulting matrix M does not have full rank in the noiseless case (noise helps, but the inverse
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is not numerically stable). This suggests that the Schur complement (7.2.22) will have the









be a new column obtained by adding new
samples, as described in Section 7.2.4.1, and P := blkdiag(λyI,Q, λuI,R). Then,
s = µ−mM−1mᵀ = λg + hᵀPh− hᵀPH(HᵀPH + λgI)−1HᵀPh. (7.2.27)
We now show that, in the noiseless case, the Schur complement has the same order of
magnitude as λg. Formally:














(d) The function f(λg) = sλg is monotonously decreasing on [0, ∞).
The proof is given in Appendix F.3. The term in (b) hᵀP1/2(HᵀP1/2)†(P1/2H)†P1/2h
is small for slowly varying systems. Under small random noise, the results in Lemma 7.2.6
are not exact, but empirically follow closely.
This analysis is important from an encrypted implementation perspective. Lemma 7.2.6
shows that, for fixed cost values in P but regardless of the values in H and h, i.e., the values
of the y measurements and of the u control actions, s will be close to the regularization pa-
rameter λg. In the encrypted computations, we will compute µ = λg+hᵀPh and mM−1mᵀ
each with a fixed precision of x bits. For large values of the measurements, we obtain that
s ≈ λg << hᵀPh, which means that there will be a cancellation in the most significant bits
(e.g., the first y MSBs), leading to a loss of precision in s, which will now have only x−y bits
of precision. This is particularly crucial since such a cancellation of the MSBs will happen
at every time step we accumulate new data samples, leading to a cascading loss of precision.
Furthermore, due to using the Residue Number System implementation of the encryption
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scheme, which improves the efficiency by orders of magnitude by using native sizes of 64 bits
to store the “residue ciphertexts” rather than multi-precision arithmetic of arbitrary size, the
precision cannot be increased indefinitely (see [64, 117] for technical details).
As a side note, decreasing or increasing the values in the cost matrix P independently
from λg does not solve this precision issue, because it implies changing the problem (it is
equivalent to increasing or decreasing λg).
The conclusion of this discussion is that, apart from the role it has for regularization and
noise robustness, the parameter λg also affects the precision of the solution (meaning the
difference between the encrypted solution and the unencrypted solution), which suggests we
need to pick λg to not be too small. This introduces a precision versus accurate convergence
trade-off. We will comment more on this trade-off in Section 7.2.5.2.
7.2.4.4 Considerations for continuous running
Accumulating new samples serves to robustify the algorithm and adapt to new disturbances.
However, an important caveat is that adding too many new samples damages the perfor-
mance of the algorithm, both because of overfitting and because of the problem becoming
intractable as the number of variables in (7.2.7) grows. In future work, we will investigate
this issue more, along with having a sliding window of sample collection.
Nevertheless, there are cases where the number of new samples to be collected leads
to a circuit of a depth higher than the preselected multiplication budget. Our options for
continuing the computations are:
(i) Restore the initial precollected Hankel matrices which bypasses the refreshing step
altogether. Advantages: no extra computations needed. Disadvantages: this causes oscilla-
tions in the control actions.
(ii) Stop adding new information to the matrices after the multiplication budget is ex-
hausted. Advantages: no extra computations needed. Disadvantages: the multiplicative
budget has to be large enough such that enough samples are collected.












t ),−i(S + t− 1)
)
. (7.2.28)
Advantages: the server can continue collecting values for any desired time, without extra
multiplication depth. Disadvantages: the client has to decrypt, encrypt and send another
ciphertext; the rotation keys necessary for packing can occupy a lot of storage (but compared
to [15], here we only need S + t such rotations, not (S + t)2/2).
(iv) Bootstrap the ciphertext of M−1t . The computation advancements [60] regarding
the bootstrapping procedure suggest that it is likely to locally resolve the refreshing step.
Advantages: the server can continue collecting values for any desired time without the
client’s intervention. Disadvantages: the initial multiplication budget has to be larger to
also allow for the bootstrapping circuit.
Increasing the multiplicative depth of the circuit also increases the ring dimension in
order to ensure a fixed security level. Capping the maximum circuit depth (encouraging
refreshing or bootstrapping) is desirable. In the solution we implemented, we chose option
(iii). This gives us flexibility on the maximum multiplicative depth of the circuit, which will
now be 2trefresh + 4, at little extra cost for the client.
We can pack as many values as half the ring dimension ringDim in one ciphertext. Then,
the number of ciphertexts the server can pack M−1t into is d(S+t)(S+t)/(ringDim/2)e. This
is viable since the ring dimension is in general large (e.g. ≥ 2048), in order to accommodate
a reasonable multiplicative budget, plaintext precision and standard security parameter.
The client only has to decrypt, re-encrypt and send back this number of ciphertexts. The
server then uses one extra level to perform the reverse of (7.2.28) to unpack Ev0(M−1t )
into ciphertexts Ev0(coli(M−1t )). These multiplications can be absorbed in the same initial
multiplicative depth.
Theorem 7.2.7. The encrypted online data-based predictive control algorithm in Sec-
tion 7.2.4 achieves client privacy with respect to the server, cf. Definition 2.2.8.
The proof is given in Appendix F.4.
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Extensions
We now briefly describe extensions and possible modifications to the online algorithm.
7.2.4.5 Inputting blocks of control inputs
For simplicity of exposition, we illustrated the encrypted computations outline for when the
server sends only the first component of u∗,t to the client. In practice, it is common that
more consecutive components from the N computed control inputs are applied. This is also
beneficial for the encrypted solution, since the most expensive computations, the inversion
of Mt and its subsequent update, need to be computed only once for multiple time steps.
Similarly, the communication rounds between the client and the server would be reduced.
We recommend this for larger systems.
7.2.4.6 Batch collection of new samples
We can still use the Schur complement to compute the inverse of a rank-x update of the
matrix Mt, where x is how many new data samples we want to accumulate at once. The
server then packs the matrix representing the Schur complement into one ciphertext and
asks the client to invert it and send it back. The circuit depth will increase accordingly.
7.2.4.7 Sliding window of sample collection
In order to manage the growth in the number of variables, i.e., number of columns of HUt
and HYt, after collecting a sample and updating M−1t , we would like to remove the first
sample collected. We can again achieve this by using Schur’s complement and the Woodbury
matrix inversion lemma. We revert to the notation used in Section 7.2.2.4 for simplicity of
the exposition and we show how to remove the first sample, i.e., the first row and first
column of M′ (for removing rows and columns inside the matrix, we will have to multiply









The Schur complements expressions for the two matrices are:
M′/M := µ−mM−1mᵀ = mS , M′/N := ν − nN−1nᵀ, M′/ν := N− nᵀν−1n.










By the matrix inversion lemma,
L3 = N
−1 + N−1nᵀ(M′/N)−1(M′/N)(M′/N)−1nN−1 = N−1 + Lᵀ2l
−1
1 L2
N−1 = L3 − Lᵀ2l
−1
1 L2.
Removing a sample after collecting one sample incurs an increase by two in the total
depth of the computation and asking the client to perform the division of l1.
7.2.4.8 Reducing accumulated noise
As discussed in Section 7.2.4.3, noise accumulates in the stored ciphertexts of M−1t at the
server, because of the fixed precision imposed by the native dimension of 64 bits (in the
Residue Number System implementation of the encryption scheme). However, before the
noise grows too much, the server could try to keep track of it and reduce it by using the fact
it can also easily compute Mt as in (7.2.18). Denote the error on M−1t by X. Then:
Λ := Mt(M
−1
t + X) = I + MtX
(M−1t + X)(Λ− I) = X−XMtX.
(7.2.29)
It is safe to assume ‖X‖∞ ≤ ε‖Mt‖∞, with ε < 1. If it is true that ε satisfies the relation
ε‖Mt‖2∞ ≤ 1, then ‖XMtX‖∞ ≤ ‖X‖∞. This would mean that the server can compute
a better approximation of M−1t than M
−1
t + X as M
−1
t + XMtX. However, this second
approximation would imply a larger depth for M−1t , so the best option is for the server to
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compute this approximation right before it asks the client to refresh the ciphertext.
7.2.4.9 Function privacy
The algorithm run at the CaaS service provider might be proprietary. In that case, the
client should not get extra information about that algorithm, apart from what it agreed
to receive. This notion is captured by the function privacy property of a homomorphic
encryption scheme, which states that a ciphertext should not expose information about
the function that was evaluated in order to create that ciphertext. Inherently, the CKKS
scheme does not preserve function privacy because of the partial information stored in the
junk elements. The common ways to achieve function privacy is for the server to mask
out the irrelevant slots before handing a ciphertext to the client to decrypt, either by a
multiplicative mask (zeroing out the junk elements) or by adding large enough randomness
to them. The multiplicative mask increases the depth by one, whereas the randomness
masking can lead to an increase in the plaintext modulus since the randomness has to be
large enough to drown the relevant information.
In our scenario, the client is allowed to obtain the numerator and denominator of the
control input at every time step and also the inverse matrix M−1, which is only determined
from the inputs and outputs that the client knows. The server can zero out the extra
slots in Evr∗(st) and Ev∗(υt). This masking would add one extra level to the respective
ciphertext, but the level increase would not build up, since these masks are not used in
posterior computations. Further investigation on keeping the service provider’s algorithm
and costs private from the client will be subject to future work.
7.2.5 Implementation and evaluation
We use the version of the CKKS scheme [62], optimized to run on machine word size of
64-bit integer arithmetic [64, 117] instead of multiprecision integer arithmetic.
We focused on testing out our proposed algorithms on a temperature control problem,
because first, smart buildings can support flexible encryption methods for the collected
data, and second, the sampling time is of the order of minutes, which allows for complex
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computations and communication between the client and the server to take place.
7.2.5.1 Comparison with [15]
We first want to underline the improvements in both runtime and memory that the algo-
rithm presented here brings compared to the algorithm in our previous work [15], that used
a “hybrid” encoding and is briefly described in Appendix F.2. For the same parameters
considered in the zone temperature problem exemplified in [15], which had one input and
one output, used a ring dimension of 212 and 21 levels in the ciphertext, we used the same
commodity laptop with Intel Core i7, 8 GB of RAM and 8 virtual cores at 1.88 GHz fre-
quency. We obtained an improvement of 2.4x in terms of memory: 2.25 GB compared to
5.48 GB. We obtained an improvement of 4x in terms of total running time, and specifically,
the maximum runtime per step dropped from 308.8 s (previous algorithm) to 75 s (current
algorithm). Some of the changes (e.g., in terms of better thread parallelization) we applied
to our current algorithm can also be applied to the algorithm in [15], but the difference is
made mostly by a more efficient encoding and computation reorganization. These improve-
ments allowed us to simulate the encrypted control for larger systems with better security
parameters, as described in the next parts.
7.2.5.2 2x2 system with 73 bits of security
Setup. We considered a temperature control problem for a building with two zones. The
sampling time is of Ts = 420 s. The system parameters are: n = 2,m = 2, p = 2,M =
4, N = 4, T = 32 and the system is stable. To mimic a realistic example, we considered two
types of disturbances: unknown, characterized by zero mean Gaussians for the process noise
(covariance 0.001I) and for the measurement noise (covariance 0.01I), and known, slowly
varying disturbances caused by the exterior temperature and the ground temperature, which
we simulate as varying uniformly between [24.5◦, 25.5◦] and [9.5◦, 10.5◦], respectively. We
choose the cost matrices and regularization terms Q = I,R = 10−3I, λg = 5, λy = λu = 1.
For the offline data collection, we assume a different initial point than for the online
computation, and randomly sample the offline input trajectory so that the corresponding
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output trajectory lies in the interval [10◦, 40◦]. The M,N and T parameters mean that
we start from 25 columns in the Hankel matrices. We note that, due to noise, the offline
feedback control algorithm has suboptimal performance for these parameters–see Figure 7.3.
Thus, we collect data online for 15 more time steps, which means adding another 15 columns
to the Hankel matrices. Afterwards, we run the system with fixed gains. Figure 7.3 shows
the performance of the setpoint tracking with these parameters and under noise and dis-
turbances. To make the comparison meaningful, we use the same noise sequence for both
schemes, in both the encrypted and unencrypted runs of the algorithms.
















Figure 7.3: Tracking performance of the online versus offline feedback in the presence of noise. The
first vertical dashed line marks the first M time steps, corresponding to the initial offline data,
the second vertical dashed line marks the following N time steps, corresponding to the trajectory
concatenation, and the last vertical dashed line marks the end of sample collection.
Implementation details. For better benchmarking capabilities (less variability be-
tween runs), for these experiments we used an AWS EC2 c5.2xlarge machine, with 8 virtual
cores, 3.4GHz frequency and 16 GB of RAM. We implemented the encrypted solutions using
the PALISADE library [179].
We use a ring dimension of 214 and 15 levels (for a refresh step after 5 collected samples,
corresponding to depth 14). The resulting ciphertext modulus of a fresh ciphertext is of
760 bits (the first plaintext modulus has 60 bits and the following plaintext moduli have 50
bits). This gives a security size of 73 bits, according to the LWE estimator [4]. Choosing
a smaller refreshing time increases the communication rounds between the client and the
server (one extra exchange at every 35 minutes in this case), but at the same time decreases
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the multiplicative depth of the circuit, reducing the computational complexity and the size
of the parameters.
Precision. Figure 7.3 shows the tracking performance for the encrypted and unen-
crypted versions of the online and offline feedback algorithms. Due to the precision loss
incurred by working with a deep circuit on encrypted data, we see a small offset in the
measured output compared to the unecrypted measured output for the online feedback al-
gorithm. Since the offline feedback algorithm is a very shallow circuit (depth 1) when the
client returns a fresh encryption of the control input to the server, it incurs no precision loss.
We obtain a maximum magnitude of 0.129◦C and an average of 0.045◦C for the difference
between the unencrypted measured output and the encrypted output during the online
simulation of a noisy process. For the control input, the maximum difference is 0.248 kWatts
and an average difference of 0.053 kWatts. A typical such sample is depicted in Figure 7.3.
Notice that the maximum magnitude of the difference is smaller than the variation in the
disturbances and does not affect the performance and stability of the control algorithm. One
can increase the plaintext modulus in order to reduce the error introduced by encryption
(e.g., 53 bits instead of 50 bits in the moduli will lead to an almost tenfold decrease in
the differences). However, if we keep the ring dimension constant, this reduces the security
level to 69 bits. In Section 7.2.5.3, we show results for better precision at a standard
security level. As described in Section 7.2.4.3, the loss of precision can be alleviated by a
larger regularization parameter λg. For example, keeping all other parameters the same but
increasing λg = 10 will lead to a maximum magnitude of the difference in the measurements
of 0.037◦ and the maximum magnitude of the difference in the inputs of 0.043 kWatts, but
the tracking performance is slightly reduced (from 0.06◦C to 0.12◦C deviation from the
reference in the noiseless case).
Offline. The encrypted offline feedback algorithm is very fast, since it has only depth 1
when the client sends to the server encryptions of ūt and ȳt. A ring dimension of 212 gives
a security parameter of 126 bits, and a ciphertext has 110 KB. The peak online RAM is 42
MB. The average runtime for a time step is 57 ms for the server and 12 ms for the client.
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Online. We now examine the encrypted online control algorithm simulation adding
details that complement the information in Section 7.2.4.
Online - Memory. The peak RAM for both the client and the server incurred during
the three phases for 45 time steps was 6.26 GB, out of which, 3.9 MB is the public key, 2 MB
is the secret key, 15.7 MB is the relinearization key and 4.6 GB are the evaluation rotation
keys (corresponding to a key for each of the 336 rotation indices), generated offline. The
client discards the evaluation keys after it sends them to the server. At every iteration, the
client receives two ciphertexts from the server (the Schur complement and control action)
and sends three ciphertexts (inverse of the Schur complement, measurement, control action–
we assumed here that the setpoint is constant). During the refresh time steps, one extra
ciphertext is sent and received (the inverse matrix). The size of these ciphertexts depends
on the level where the ciphertext is at. Specifically, for our selected parameters described in
the beginning of the subsection, the ciphertexts are 2.77 MB at maximum size and 240 KB
at the minimum size.
Online - Time. The runtimes for the encrypted computation are given in Figure 7.4,
where three different phases are depicted: trajectory concatenation, online sample collection
and static update. The total offline initialization time for key generation and ciphertext
encryption is 60 s for both the client and the server. In all online phases, the client only
performs cheap and fast computations that take less that 0.3 s.
The first online phase is the trajectory concatenation phase from t = M − 1 = 3 to
t = M +N − 1 = 7, where the server computes the encrypted control action only with the
precollected data, as described in Section 7.2.2.3. This is very efficient, despite computing
on the maximum ciphertext sizes, and results in a total computation time for one time step
of 2 s. Before t = M − 1, the client applies random inputs.
The second phase is the online collection of new input-output samples, which implies
modifying the Hankel matrices and computing the inverse matrix via the Schur complement
at every time step M−1t from step 8 to step 22. This phase is split in as many parts as
the refreshing time dictates. In the simulation depicted in Figure 7.4, this corresponds to
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Figure 7.4: Running times for the computations performed at the client and the cloud server for the
encrypted online control algorithm. The plot is semi-logarithmic and the amounts of time required
by the client and the cloud server are stacked. The first M time steps are not depicted, because the
server has no computational load. The first vertical dashed line marks the following N time steps,
corresponding to the trajectory concatenation, and the second vertical dashed line marks the end of
sample collection.
three parts. At the established refresh times (t = 12, 17), the server packs the matrix M−1t
into one ciphertext, sends it to the client to re-encrypt it with the maximum number of
moduli, and unpacks it back into component-wise ciphertexts. First, the increase in runtime
between the subsequent time steps 13 and 12, respectively 18 and 17, is given by the fact
the ciphertexts are returned to the maximum number of moduli. Second, the increase in
computation time from the first refresh at time 12 and 13 (47.23 s and 104.6 s) to the
second refresh at time 17 and 18 (63.9 s and 144.2 s) is given by the fact that the server has
to deal with more collected samples ciphertexts than in the beginning of phase two. The
intermediate decrease in the computation time is given by the decrease in the ciphertext
size (we make sure to compute with only the minimal number of moduli required).
The third phase corresponds to the computations after stopping the collection of new
samples, which starts from time step 23 and can go for the rest of the desired simulation
time (accounting for Remark F.2.1 in Appendix F.2). The third phase is only slightly more
computationally intensive than the first. The time for the client halves compared to the
previous two phases, because the client has to decrypt and encrypt ciphertexts with two
moduli. The running time for the server substantially decreases compared to phase two but
204
doubles compared to phase one, because we use a less efficient matrix-vector multiplications
in order to minimize the multiplicative depth. Nevertheless, the running time required for
computing the control input at one time step is around 3 s.
7.2.5.3 More security
In practice, the desired security parameter for a cryptographic application is at least 100
bits. The refresh time after 5 time steps (35 minutes) gives a ciphertext modulus of 802
bits and the refresh time after 8 time steps (56 minutes), which means a deeper circuit,
gives a ciphertext modulus of 1120 bits. In Table 7.1, we present simulation results where
we choose the ring dimension 215 such that we satisfy this security requirement for the
chosen ciphertext modulus. We simulate for the above 2x2 system and for a 4x4 system
(where M = 4, N = 4, T = 64 and we again collect 15 more online samples, which gives a
maximum number of 72 unknowns). We use 53 bits of precision for the plaintext moduli,
such that we obtain 0.034◦C and 0.008◦C maximum, respectively average difference between
the encrypted and unencrypted measurements, and 0.05 kWatts and 0.008 kWatts maximum,
respectively average difference for the input.
We use different AWS cloud machines in order to satisfy the RAM and sampling time
requirements. The c5.2xlarge machine (16 GB RAM) used 8 threads, the c5.4xlarge machine
(32 GB RAM ) used 13 threads and the c5.9xlarge machine (72 GB RAM) used 28 threads.
In Table 7.1 we see the trade-off between a longer refresh time (the client refreshes a
ciphertext after more steps, which implies a deeper circuit and less security for the same
ring dimension) and the memory consumption and computation time. The conclusion is that
the refresh time is a tuning knob between security level, communication and computational
complexity which should be determined according to the application’s specifications.
Note that as the performance of the underlying homomorphic encryption library im-
proves, these improvements will reflect in our computation times as well.
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Experiment System # of steps Security Ciphertext Max. Server
id. dim. until refresh level [bits] modulus RAM [GB] machine
1 2× 2 8 100 1120 17.19 c5.4xlarge
2 2× 2 5 142 802 12.57 c5.2xlarge
3 4× 4 8 100 1120 34.32 c5.9xlarge
4 4× 4 5 142 802 27.29 c5.9xlarge
Experiment Max. runtime Max. runtime Max. runtime
id. phase I [s] phase II [s] phase III [s]
Client Server Client Server Client Server
1 0.88 3.48 0.84 220.2 0.23 4.36
2 0.6 3.23 0.5 298.1 0.17 6.21
3 0.88 4.06 0.84 413.07 0.23 4.94
4 0.6 2.95 0.5 325.72 0.17 4.42
Table 7.1: Simulation results for four experiments of the encrypted online feedback algorithm on
systems of two different sizes, at different security levels and different refresh times. In all entries,
the ring dimension is 215, to ensure a security level of at least 100 bits. The online times for the
client were obtained from a commodity laptop-like machine, c5.2xlarge.
7.3 Sparse data-based predictive control on encrypted data
In Section 7.2.2, we used an `2-regularization for the preimage in (7.2.5). We made this
choice for two reasons: first, it is an accepted and used solution to reduce overfitting due
to noisy data [35, 125], and second, it gives us a ridge regression formulation, that has a
closed-form solution, making it appealing from an encrypted implementation perspective.
On the other hand, `1-regularization is also preferred in the data-based predicted control
literature [70, 71, 83], thanks to a motivation coming from direct system identification tech-
niques, and in a hybrid regularization setting, where it is used alongside `2. More generally,
`1-regularization is widely employed for sparse learning, see [123]. Hence, in this section, we
investigate a private solution to the sparse data-based predictive control.
To summarize, in order to avoid overfitting due to noisy data, we penalize the magnitude
of g through an `1-regularization with penalty parameter λg in (7.3.1). The intuition behind
this choice comes from the fact that in the noiseless data predictive control formulation, the
block-Hankel matrix of the trajectory data has an inherent low-rank structure. Choosing
an `1-regularization acts like a convex relaxation of imposing a low-rank constraint–see [83,
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‖Yfg − rt‖2Q + ‖Ufg‖2R
)
+ λy‖Ypg − ȳt‖22 + λu‖Upg − ūt‖22 + λg‖g‖1. (7.3.1)





‖Hg − Jft‖22 + λg‖g‖1, (7.3.2)















In the case a hybrid regularization λg‖g‖1 + µg‖g‖22 is preferred, we can use the same
formulation (7.3.2) and appropriately modify H and ft.
Our goal is to provide a solution that outsources to a cloud service the computation
of the optimal solution g∗,t of (7.3.2) and of u∗,t = Ufg∗,t, while ensuring client data
confidentiality for all time steps, as described in Section 7.2.1.
In the rest of this chapter, we apply our cloud-based sparsity framework for encrypted
Lasso problems, developed in Chapter 3.3, to the problem of data-based predictive control.
This framework requires multiple servers for both efficiency and security reasons, compared
to the solution in the first part of the chapter, that used a single server (but asked the
client for refreshing). To alleviate the cost, we will present a solution that involves only one
powerful server, and a few computationally-weaker devices.
7.3.1 Encrypted sparse regularized data predictive control
Following the discussion in Section 3.3.3, we write the problem (7.3.2) as a distributed







‖Higi − (Jf)i‖22 + λg‖z‖1
s.t. gi − z = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,K.
(7.3.3)
In the context of this data-predictive problem, when we perform a homogenous split
of the data (a split of equal size), the distributed solution converges very slowly to the
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global optimal solution. The reason for that is that the homogeneous sub-problems have a
different optimal solution than the global solution. To gain intuition, consider splitting the
component matrices Up,Uf ,Yp,Yf of H equally between the K servers. This means that
each server solves a local optimization problem for the same system (7.2.1) that generated
the values, but being given fewer samples than necessary to characterize the behaviour of
the system, i.e., losing persistency of excitation (Assumption 7.2.1). The problem remains
when allocating a random set of rows of the equal size to the servers.
To avoid this issue, we prefer to unequally split the problem. Specifically, we designate
Server 1 to have most of the rows and the rest of the servers to hold fewer. Because the local
solution of Server 1 is close to the central solution, the empirical convergence to the optimal
solution is much faster. However, the more servers we add, the slower the convergence
(if we do not weight contributions differently). A valid option is to have only one server
do all the computation, i.e., central ADMM, and request help only for the distributed
bootstrapping from the rest of the servers (recall that we require multiple servers both for
an efficient distributed bootstrapping and for security of the private key). But since the rest
of the servers would be idle while the central server performs the computation, we prefer to
distribute some of the computations to them as well.
Let the matrix H1 denote the first (m+p)M +pN rows of matrix H ∈ R(m+p)(N+M)×S .
We split the remaining rows of H into blocks of mN/(K − 1) rows, denoted Hi for i =
2, . . . ,K. We similarly split HᵀJ ∈ RS×(m+p)(N+M) into H̄1 and H̄2 . . . , H̄K and ft ∈ Rm
into f1,t and f2,t, . . . , fK,t. We prefer to use more of less powerful devices in order to increase
the security threshold (by splitting the secret key into more values) and reduce the cost of
operating the cloud service. To this end, we shift some of the computations from the less
powerful servers to the more powerful Server 1 and remove online communication between
the client and the less powerful servers. Protocol 7.3.1 differs from Protocol 3.3.1 in this
different allocation of computation, described below.
First, we split problem (7.3.3) such that fi,t = 0, for i = 2, . . . ,K, see (7.3.4). Second,
Servers 2, . . . ,K have an easier offline computation, since they have to invert substantially
208
smaller matrices than Server 1, using the matrix inversion lemma. The bootstrapping step
is done the same as in Protocol 3.3.1, after all parties broadcast their local sums. However,







evaluation of the soft thresholding approximation, and then send the result zk+1 to the other
less powerful servers (the ciphertext zk+1 will have only lB + 1 levels so communication
is cheap; recall lB is the number of levels necessary for a statistically secure distributed
































k+1, i = 1, . . . ,K.
(7.3.4)
Moreover, because of the way we split the time-varying vector ft, such that the elements
corresponding to Servers 2, . . . ,K are 0, there is no need for them to update with the latest
values of ut and yt. This way, only Server 1 needs to have a connection with the client. The
ciphertexts communicated to the client are on level 0 (the predicted input u∗,t), while the
ciphertexts communicated from the client (ut and yt for assembling f1,t) are on level lB + 2.
Nevertheless, if the servers have different capacity, the more powerful server will likely
have to wait on the other servers for the bootstrapping synchronization (requiring completion
of the computation for gk+1i ). In the idle time, the more powerful Server 1 can perform
multiple local updates, which heuristically helps with convergence in our problem.
Theorem 7.3.1. Protocol 7.3.1 achieves client data confidentiality with respect to semi-
honest servers, assuming at least one of the servers is honest.
The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 3.3.4, regardless of having the servers
perform different tasks, since all tasks involve computations only on encrypted data.
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Protocol 7.3.1: Distributed encrypted protocol for (7.3.3) with unequal servers and
unequal data split for one time step t
Input: Public parameters: public key pk, parameters of the system and offline trajectory m, p,N,
M, S, the number of servers K, number of maximum iterations Kiter. C: (uτ ,yτ )τ=0,...,t. S1:
encryption of M1 = ρ(Hᵀ1H1 + ρI)
−1, encryption of F1 = 1ρ (M1H
ᵀ
1J), encryption of U
f ,
encryption of ȳt, rt,ut, share of the secret key sk1, the Chebyshev coefficients for evaluating
the soft threshold function for a given interval and bias λg/ρ. S2, . . . , SK : encryption of Mi =
ρ(Hᵀi Hi + ρI)
−1, share of the secret key ski, for i = 2, . . . ,K.
Output: C: ut+1
1: C: send to S1 the ciphertexts Ev0(ut), Ev0(yt), Ev0(rt);







3: Si=1,...,K : set initial values Ev0(g0i ), Ev0(w0i ), Ev0(z0) (the value of zk is previously agreed upon);
4: for k = 0, . . . ,Kiter − 1 do
5: S1: compute Ev0(gk1) = MultDiag(F1, f1,t) + MultDiag(M1, zk −wk1);
6: Si=2,...,K : compute Ev∗(gki ) = MultDiag(Mi, zk −wki );
7: Si=1,...,K : compute and send to the other servers the rotation of the sum Ev0(vi) := ρ(gk+1i +
wki ,−(i− 1)S);
8: Si=1,...,K : assemble Ev∗(v) := Ev∗([v1 v2 . . .vK ]) by summing own ciphertext and all re-
ceived shifted ciphertexts;
9: Si=1,...,K : perform part in the distributed boostratpping to get Ev∗(vb) := DBoot(Ev∗(v));
10: Si=1,...,K : extract its refreshed sum of local iterates Ev∗(vi) = ρ(Ev∗(v), (i− 1)S);






i ), then compute
Ev0(z







12: S1: send to all the other servers Ev0(zk);
13: Si=1,...,K : compute Ev0(wk+1i ) = [1
ᵀ
S 0
ᵀ]ᵀ  Ev∗(xi)− Ev0(zk);
14: end for
15: S1: compute Ev0(u∗) = MultDiag(Uf ,gK1 ) and send the result to the client C; . or directly
obtain only the first m components by multiplying by [Im 0]Uf
16: C: decrypt ut+1, plug it in the system to measure yt+1.
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Remark 7.3.2. An interesting remark is related to [134], where the authors propose to use
multiple controllers in parallel that perform asynchronous local bootstrapping to ensure that
at least one has a control input ready at each time step. In our case, we prefer multiple
servers to perform a distributed bootstrapping in order to reduce the time it takes to refresh
the ciphertexts.
7.3.2 Numerical results
We consider a data-driven temperature control of a 4x4 stable system representing a building
with four zones, with sampling time 300 seconds, and M = 4, N = 8, T = 84. We add
process noise and measurement noise, both zero mean Gaussian with covariance 0.01I. We
choose the cost matrices and regularization terms Q = 300I,R = I, λg = 300, λy = λu =
3000. The data was distributed among 3 servers: Server 1 holds 64 rows and Servers 2 and
3 hold 16 rows each. Convergence for the Lasso problem associated to one time step of the
above problem occurred after 20 ADMM iterations, for ρ = 1200. Figure 7.5 reflects the
tracking performance of the data predictive control problem with these parameters.
We evaluate Protocol 7.3.1 on Ubuntu 18.04 on a commodity laptop with 8 GB of
RAM and Intel Core i7, 1.88 GHz, implemented using the PALISADE library [178], using
8 threads. We set the parameters such that we get a security level of 128 bits, i.e., we use
a ciphertext modulus of 436 bits and a ring dimension of 214. We obtain 6 decimal places
precision for the results. The average time for the first iteration is 2.75 seconds and for any
iteration afterwards is 1.98 seconds. The time for Server 1 to assemble the vector f1,t from
the client and to compute the prediction is 0.61 seconds. The client needs 0.07 seconds to
decrypt the control input and to encrypt the new measurement and the input. This gives
a total computation time of 38.44 seconds per solving the optimization problem, not taking
communication into account. The setup takes 4.5 seconds, and is performed once for all
subsequent iterations.
If we artificially add a 150 ms delay of communication (serialization/deserialization and
transport) and assume the machines send the messages sequentially to the other machines,
then the total computation time increases by 6.45 seconds (450 ms delay per iteration, and
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Figure 7.5: Comparison between the tracking performance of the data predictive controller solv-
ing (7.3.2) exactly via the CVX solver, and solving (7.3.2) via distributed ADMM with 3 servers
and approximating the soft thresholding function with a degree-11 polynomial. The vertical dashed
line marks the first M time steps, corresponding to the initial offline data. The curves represent the
temperature measurements in the four rooms of the system.
450 ms delay for communication between Server 1 and Client).
Overall, the maximum amount of memory Server 1 needs to have is 1.22 GB, while Server
2 and 3 need 0.52 GB.
To simulate less powerful devices, we run Servers 2 and 3 on 2 threads instead of 8. The
total time necessary for the 20 iterations increases to 49.96 seconds. The majority of the dif-
ference comes from the final operation of bootstrapping (which can be done asynchronously,
i.e., it occurs after the communication so servers do not have to wait for each other): the
total bootstrapping time increases from 0.91 seconds to 1.48 seconds. The rest of the dif-
ference comes from the fact that computing gk+12 and g
k+1
3 takes 1.06 seconds compared to
the 0.83 seconds that Server 1 needs to compute gk+11 .
Because the servers only need to synchronize in order to bootstrap (Server 2 and 3 also
wait for zk+1 from Server 1, but in our instance this does not create idle time since Server
1 is more powerful), Server 1 can either wait for the other servers to finish the computation
or can perform two local updates of g1 . Heuristically, since the local solution of Server 1 is
closer to the global optimal solution, performing more local iterations helps convergence (in
our example, by needing 18 iterations instead of 20). Nevertheless, the computation of the




Encrypted control is a young research area. In this thesis, I focused on fundamental control
algorithms and on providing proof of concept solutions that achieve both privacy and effi-
ciency. In a sense, these solutions are only scratching the surface. There are many remaining
challenges ranging from the structured nature of the data in control and optimization prob-
lems, to the stability and performance requirements that are potentially disrupted under
encryption, to the possibility of malicious attacks over the controller, the sensors or the
actuator, and to scaling the solutions up to large systems, both in terms of data size and in
terms of number of participating actors. In the following, I will outline some of the future
research areas that complement the problems and solutions covered in this thesis. We have
collected more research directions in the tutorial on encrypted control in [200].
Parameter estimation for encrypted experiments
In this work, as well as in most of encrypted protocols for control and optimization, we as-
sumed knowledge of some bounds on the variables, which can themselves leak information.
In fact, an overarching problem when dealing with algorithms is figuring out the optimal
parameters for a correct and efficient execution: e.g., step size, number of iterations, nor-
malization, ranges etc. In some cases, it is reasonable to consider that all the algorithms
have been run on cleartext data in advance, so the parameters were determined with con-
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fidence. In other cases, proprietary algorithms and proprietary data can be involved in all
steps of the process, including what we usually call “the offline phase”. In such scenarios,
one can still make use of encrypted solutions to obliviously run the algorithms on data and
cross-validate.
An important avenue of research is to design encrypted and differentially private prior
experiments in order to compute differentially private bounds on parameters such as costs,
penalties and number of iterations. The loss in accuracy should not matter for a conservative
choice of parameters. Further, when a company desires to tune its algorithm on represen-
tative offline data from the client, we recommend an approach where the key is shared,
as described in Chapters 3.3 and 7.3. We can involve the client in these experiments, by
having it control a small device with one share of the secret key. In this way, the client can
assess whether the query is too revealing and has to agree on the computation that is being
effectuated to let the experiment continue and decrypt the result.
More general aggregation
In Chapter 4, we discussed an elementary type of aggregation, specifically weighted affine
combinations of private local data, with private weights. However, there are interesting
applications involving more complex aggregation schemes and it is worthwhile to explore
the efficiency of private nonlinear aggregation schemes in the future. For example, the
underlying leveled homomorphic encryption scheme used in Section 4.5 can support more






for a nonlinear function ϕ(·).
Beyond passive adversaries
My previous work assumed passive adversaries, i.e., adversaries that do not tamper with
the data, but try to infer information from it. Many of the agents and IoT devices are
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mobile and autonomous and are soon intended to be deployed as delivery, exploration,
information-providing and first-responder agents. Apart from the crucial aspects of pre-
emptively guaranteeing safety in human-robot and robot-robot interaction, there is also the
aspect of accounting for malicious behavior. One of the significant challenges is that non-
industrial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and robots can simply be programmed to ignore
any protocol and they can be made non-identifiable (by 3D printing components), thereby
transcending the passive adversary model. This requires setting up an extrinsic software
and hardware infrastructure to deal with otherwise impossible goals.
Dependable cyber-physical systems
A critical avenue of exploration is security research for verification and accountability under
privacy requirements and abuse prevention, for future networks of autonomous agents, such
as UAVs and robots that will carry out daily tasks and can be corrupted or misbehave.
A first part of the solution needs to design a system of granting and revoking privileges
to agents for their tasks, that can be privately locally verified, inspired from e.g., [18], but
accounting for faults and removing the reliance on a trusted certificate provider. Another
part of the solution needs to deal with anonymous reporting, provability and traceability of
unlawful actions, e.g., using tools from [143], without requiring publishing location, identity
information or other privacy sensitive-information related to the tasks carried out. A third
dimension of the solution should focus on competitive-collaborative tasks, where swarms of
autonomous agents need to collaborate to achieve a common goal, while possibly satisfying
their own private local goal. In such scenarios, communicating only encrypted data prevents
unintended privacy loss of the local data and also protects the data of the other participants
when an agent is captured in an adversarial environment and its memory seized. However,
encryption hampers the detection of incorrect and adversarially supplied data, which might
lead to failure in achieving the goal. My aim is to exploit the tight interconnection between
the cyber and physical parts in such systems and use physical information, such as admissible
velocity and location, to bound malicious behavior.
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Zero-knowledge of correct execution in control
Synthesis of control algorithms with provable guarantees is a research field in itself. How-
ever, there are very few works that deal with the verification of a malicious controller that
cheats during the execution of the protocol. A first step would be to address computations
performed unencrypted at a user or a server, through a verifier that checks in zero-knowledge
that the computation was correctly executed. Such a use case is key in industry, where a
company wants to protect its proprietary data and algorithms, but a regulatory agency or
clients should check that laws are being followed (e.g., emission control in autovehicles) or
perform quality control (e.g., concentration of chemical products, faults in batch devices),
without learning proprietary details. In the context of statistical tests, optimization and con-
trol, the challenges lie in designing and adapting the required checks in order to be efficiently
and correctly performed in zero-knowledge, as well as in dealing with the multi-dimensional
nature of the data, such that the verification step does not become a computational burden.
The next steps would be to incorporate malicious adversaries and formal verification in the
setting of control algorithms, in order to ensure that the protocols behave correctly even
under the misbehavior of the other participants in the computation, and crucially, under
privacy requirements and in the required sampling time.
Internet of secure multi-party computation
More than simply being connected and gathering data, the trend for the “things” in the
Internet of Things is to also be computing devices in a heterogeneous computation network.
Blockchains are establishing themselves as distributed solutions for reliable computations,
and new proposals achieve secure, private and anonymous computation on blockchains, even
under malicious faults, e.g., [34]. An interesting research direction is the design of proto-
cols for mapping computations to networks of computing devices and reusing computations






A.1 Decisional Composite Residuosity
Consider the additive group of integers modulo N , ZN , where N = pq is a large modulus
composed of two prime numbers of equal bit-length, p and q, such that gcd(φ(N), N) = 1.
φ(N) = (p− 1)(q− 1) is the order of Z∗N . Now consider the multiplicative group of integers
modulo N2, Z∗N2 . The order of Z
∗
N2 is Nφ(N). An important subgroup of Z
∗
N2 is:
ΓN :={(1 +N)α mod N2|α ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}} = {1 + αN |α ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}}, (A.1.1)
where the equality follows from the binomial theorem: (1 +N)α = 1 + αN mod N2. Com-
puting discrete logarithms in ΓN is easy [131, 177]: given x, y ∈ ΓN , we can find β such that
y = xβ mod N2 by β = (y − 1)/(x− 1) mod N .
Another important subgroup in Z∗N2 is:
GN :={xN mod N2|x ∈ Z∗N}. (A.1.2)
GN has order φ(N). Computing discrete logarithms in GN is as hard as computing discrete
logarithms in Z∗N [131].
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We also have the modular equalities for x ∈ Z∗N2 :
xφ(N) = 1 mod N, xNφ(N) = 1 mod N2. (A.1.3)
Definition A.1.1. Let N = pq be a product of two large primes. The Decisional Com-
posite Residuosity (DCR) problem in Z∗N2 is to distinguish among the following two
distributions given N = pq:
D0 = {xN mod N2|x ∈R ZN}, D1 = {x ∈R Z∗N2},
where ∈R means drawn at random. The DCR assumption states that the advantage of any
distinguisher D, defined as the distance:
AdvDCR(D) =
∣∣Pr [D(y,N) = 1|y = xN mod N2, x ∈R ZN]−Pr [D(y,N) = 1|y ∈R Z∗N2]∣∣
where probabilities are taken over all coin tosses, is a negligible function.
The name of the assumption comes from the fact a value y = xN mod N2 is called an
N ′th residue modN2, for a composite modulus N = pq.
Under the DCR assumption (i.e., distinguishing between an element from GN and an
element from Z∗N2 is hard), the Paillier scheme is semantically secure.
A.2 Ring Learning with Errors
Let κ denote the security parameter and q = q(κ) a prime. Consider the ring R =
Z[X]/〈Φ(X)〉, where Φ(x) = xN + 1 is a cyclotomic polynomial with N = 2r, for r > 2, and
the quotient ring Rq = R/qR = Zq[X]/〈Φ(X)〉. A Ring Learning with Errors (R-LWE)
term is composed of:
(ai,bi) ∈ Rq ×Rq, where bi = ai · s + ei, (A.2.1)
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with ai
$← Rq a polynomial from Rq and the secret s
$← Rq. The error term ei ∈ Rq is
sampled independently according to a discretized Gaussian distribution.
Given polynomially many pairs (ai,bi), the Decisional R-LWE problem asks to de-
termine whether bi were constructed as in (A.2.1) or were randomly sampled from Rq.
Informally, given these pairs, it is infeasible to recover the secret s, see [156].
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.6.1
We will show in the following proof how to construct the simulators in Definition 2.2.5 in
order to prove the privacy of the oblivious transfer variant we use.
The public key pk and secret key sk of the Paillier scheme are fixed, because the inputs
to party A are Paillier encryptions under these keys. Let us construct the view of A, with
inputs pk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]] and output [[σi]]:
VA(pk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]]) = (pk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], r0, r1, [[i]], [[vi]], [[σi]], coins) ,
where coins are the random values used for encrypting r0 and r1 and [[−1]]. The view of
party B, that has inputs i,pk, sk and no output, is:
VB(i,pk, sk) = (i,pk, sk, [[v0]], [[v1]], coins) ,
where coins are the random values used for encrypting vi, i and 0.
Now let us construct a simulator SA that generates an indistinguishable view from
party A. SA takes as inputs pk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], [[σi]] and generates r̃0 and r̃1 as random val-
ues in M. It then selects a random bit ĩ and encrypts it with pk and computes [[ṽi]] =
Add
(
[[σi]], cMlt(−r̃0,Add([[̃i]], [[−1]])), cMlt(r̃1, [[̃i]])
)
. It also generates c̃oins for three en-
cryptions. SA outputs:
SA(pk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], [[σi]]) =
(




First, r̃0, r̃1 and c̃oins are statistically indistinguishable from r0, r1 and coins because they
were generated from the same distributions. Second, [[̃i]] and [[ṽi]] are indistinguishable from
[[i]] and [[vi]] because AHE is semantically secure and has indistinguishable encryptions,
and because [[σi]] is a refreshed value of [[σ0]] or [[σ1]]. This means A cannot learn any
information about i, hence [[i]] looks like the encryption of a random bit, i.e., like [[̃i]].
Thus, VA(pk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]])
c≡ SA(pk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], [[σi]]).
A simulator SB for party B takes as inputs i,pk, sk and generates two random values
from M, names them ṽ0 and ṽ1 and encrypts them. It then generates c̃oins as random
values for three encryptions. SB outputs:
SB(i,pk, sk) =
(
i,pk, sk, [[ṽ0]], [[ṽ1]], c̃oins
)
.
First, c̃oins are statistically indistinguishable from coins because they were generated
from the same distribution. Second, ṽ0 and ṽ1 are also statistically indistinguishable from
each other and from v0 and v1 due to the security of the one-time pad. Their encryptions




Technical details for Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2.2
For simplicity of the exposition, we avoid mentioning the public data (public keys pkR,
pkDGK, number of iterations K and number of bits l) in the views, since all parties have
access to them. In what follows, we will successively discuss the views of each type of party
participating in the protocol: agents, cloud and requester. As mentioned in Definitions 2.2.5
and 2.2.6, the views of the parties during the execution of Protocol 3.2.4 are constructed
on all the inputs of the parties involved and symbolize the real values the parties get in the
execution of the protocol. We will denote by I the inputs of all the parties:
I = {bA, cA,AC ,QC , skR, skDGK}.
Furthermore, in order to construct a simulator that simulates the actions of a party, we need
to feed into it the inputs and outputs of that respective party.
Simulator for one agent Ai
Agent Ai, for every i = 1, . . . , p, has the following inputs IAi = ({bj}j=1,...,mi , {cj}j=1,...,ni).
To avoid cluttering, we will drop the subscripts j = 1, . . . ,mi and j = 1, . . . , ni. Then agent
222
Ai has the following view:
VAi(I) := (bj , cj , [[bj ]], [[cj ]], coins),
where coins represent the random values used for encryption.
The agents are only online to send their encrypted data to the cloud, and they do not
have any role and output afterwards. Hence, a simulator SAi would simply generate the
random values necessary to encrypt its inputs as specified by the protocol and output the
view obtained such:
SAi := (bj , cj , [̃[bj ]], [̃[cj ]], c̃oins),
where by (̃·) we denote the quantities obtained by the simulator, which are different than
the quantities of the agents, but follow the same distribution. Hence, it is trivial to see that
the protocol is secure in the semi-honest model from the point of view of the interaction
with the agents.
Next, we want to prove the privacy of the protocol from the point of view of the interac-
tions with the cloud and the requester. We will construct a sequence of algorithms such that
we obtain that the view of the real parties after the execution of K iterations is the same as
the view of simulators that simply execute K iterations with random exchanged messages.
For the simplicity of the exposition, we will treat all our variables as scalars µ, bA, cA,
AC , QC , x∗ as scalars. The same steps are repeated for every element in the vectors, when
we consider multi-dimensional variables (recall that some of the protocols are performed
element-wise).
Simulator for the cloud C
For clarity, we will form the view of the cloud in steps, using pointers to the lines in Proto-
col 3.2.4. The view of the cloud during the execution of lines 5-7 is:
V −1C (I) =
(
AC , QC , η, [[bA]], [[cA]], [[µ0]], coins
)
=: I−1C , (B.1.1)
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where coins represent the random values generated for the Paillier encryption. Furthermore,
we construct the view of the cloud at iteration k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 during the execution of
an instance of Protocol 3.2.3, which will be constructed on the inputs of all parties: the
inputs I and the data the parties had at iteration k− 1. We denote the view of the cloud at
iteration k− 1 by Ik−1C which, along with I and the view of the requester at iteration k− 1,
denoted by Ik−1R (B.1.5), will be what the view is constructed on at iteration k.







Ik−1C , [[µk]], [[µ̄k]], πk, coins1k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 3.2.1
, (B.1.3)
ρk, [[δk]],mcompk , coins2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 2.7.2




where mcompk are messages exchanged in the comparison protocol, and coinsjk, for j = 1, 2, 3
are the random numbers generated in Protocol j. Finally, the view of the cloud after the
execution of line 11 in Protocol 3.2.4 is:




Therefore, the view of the cloud during the whole execution of Protocol 3.2.4 is:
VC(I) := V KC (ĪK−1).
We first construct a simulator on inputs IC = {AC , QC} that mimics V −1C (I) in (B.1.1):
(i) Generate n + m random numbers of l bits b̃A, c̃A; (ii) Generate a random positive
initial value µ̃0; (iii) Generate n+m+1 uniformly random numbers for the Paillier encryption
and denote them c̃oins; (iv) Compute [[b̃A]], [[c̃A]], [[µ̃0]]; (v) Compute η following line 6;




AC , QC , [[b̃A]], [[c̃A]], η, [[µ̃0]], c̃oins
)
.
Since Protocol 3.2.3 is secure in the semi-honest model (Proposition 3.2.1), we know
that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) simulator for the functionality of
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Protocol 3.2.3 on inputs (AC , QC , [[bA]], [[cA]], η, [[µk]]) and output [[µk+1]]. However, we
need to show that we can simulate the functionality of consecutive calls of Protocol 3.2.3,
or, equivalently, on one call of Protocol 3.2.3 but on the augmented input that contains the
data of the cloud in the previous iterations. Call such a simulator SkC , that on the input
Ik−1C mimics V
k
C (Īk−1) in (B.1.3), for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1:
(i) Compute [[∇g(µk)]] and [[µ̄k]] as in lines 1-2 of Protocol 3.2.3 from [[µk]], [[bA]], [[cA]]
which are included in Ik−1C ; (ii) Generate a random permutation π̃k and apply it on
([[0]], [[µ̄k]]) as in Protocol 3.2.1; (iii) Follow Protocol 2.7.2 and replace the incoming
messages by DGK encryptions of appropriately sized random values to obtain ρ̃k, m̃compk ;
(iv) Generate random bit δ̃k and its encryption [[δ̃k]]; (v) Generate random values r̃k and s̃k
as in line 1 in Protocol 3.2.2 and their encryptions [[r̃k]], [[s̃k]]; (vi) Obtain [[ṽk]] by choosing
between the elements of π̃k([[0]], [[µ̄k]]) + (r̃k, s̃k) according to the generated δ̃k; (vii) Com-
pute [[µ̃k+1]] as in line 8 of Protocol 3.2.2; (viii) Denote the rest of the random values used for




C ) = (I
k−1
C , [[µ̄k]], [[π̃k]], [[z̃k]],
m̃compk , [[δ̃k]], [[r̃k]], [[s̃k]], [[ṽk]], [[µ̃k+1]], c̃oinsk).




C ) for V
K
C (ĪK−1) is obtained by simply per-




c≡ V kC (Īk−1), for k = −1, . . . ,K, where I
k−2
C := IC.
Proof. For k = −1, due to the fact that the coins and the initial iterate are generated by the
simulator via the same distributions as specified in the protocol, and due to the semantic
security of the Paillier encryption, which guarantees indistinguishability of encryptions, we
obtain that V −1C (I)
c≡ S−1C (IC).
For 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, (coins1k, coins2k, coins3k)
s≡ c̃oinsk because they are generated from
the same distributions. Similarly, the ensemble distributions of (π̃k, π̃k([[0]], [[µ̄k]])) and
(πk, πk([[0]], [[µ̄k]])) are the same and π̃k, πk are independent of the other parameters. The
quantities from the DGK protocol ρ̃k
s≡ ρk and m̃compk
c≡ mcompk either due to the semantic
security of the DGK scheme, e.g. [t̃′], [δ̃R], or due to having the same distributions, e.g.
ρ̃k, δ̃C , α̃. The values in the update step r̃k, s̃k are sampled from the same distribution as
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rk, sk, and, finally, [[δ̃k]], [[ṽk]], [[µ̃k+1]]
c≡ [[δk]], [[vk]], [[µk+1]] due to the semantic security of
the Paillier encryption. Thus, Sk(Ik−1C )
c≡ V kC (Īk−1).
For k = K, SKC (I
K−1
C )
c≡ V KC (ĪK−1) follows from the fact that the simulator simply
executes the last part of the protocol and from the Paillier scheme’s semantic security.
Hence, we obtained that IkC
c≡ ĨkC , for k = −1, . . . ,K. The essence of the proof of
Proposition B.1.1 is that all the messages the cloud receives are encrypted. Then, thanks
to the semantic security of the Paillier and DGK schemes, the extra information included
in Īk−1 from the previous iterations cannot be used to extract other information about the













c≡ Sk+1C (V kC (Īk−1)),
for any k = 0, . . . ,K − 1.
Finally, we construct a simulator SC(IC) for the execution of Protocol 3.2.4 and we will
show that its view will be computationally indistinguishable from VC(I). To this end, we
define the following sequence of views–obtained as hybrids between the real views and the
views of the simulators:
VC(I) = H−1(I) = V KC (ĪK−1)
H0(I) = SKC ◦ V K−1C (Ī
K−2)





HK(I) = SKC ◦ SK−1C ◦ . . . ◦ S
0
C ◦ V −1C (I)
SC(IC) = HK+1(IC) = S
K
C ◦ SK−1C ◦ . . . ◦ S
0
C ◦ S−1C (IC).
By transitivity, H−1 and HK+1 are computationally indistinguishable if:
H−1
c≡ H0
c≡ . . . c≡ Hk
c≡ Hk+1
c≡ Hk+2
c≡ . . . c≡ HK+1.
This result follows from induction on Corollary B.1.2. In conclusion, we obtain that SC(IC)
c≡
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VC(I), which verifies that Protocol 3.2.4 achieves privacy with respect to the cloud.
Simulator for the requester R
We proceed with the same steps in order to show that the consecutive K iterations form
a protocol that is secure in the semi-honest model from the point of view of the requester.
The main difference is that for the cloud we used the semantic security of the Paillier and
DGK cryptosystems, while for the requester we will use the secrecy of the one-time pad
variant used for blinding. The symmetric encryption used in this chapter, as discussed in
Preamble 2.4, to which we refer as blinding, guarantees that a value of l bits additively
blinded by a random value of l+λ bits is statistically indistinguishable from a random value
of l + λ+ 1 bits.
The inputs and output of the requester in Protocol 3.2.4 are IR = (skR, skDGK, x∗). As
in (B.1.2), Īk−1 represents the inputs of all the parties at iteration k, with Ī−1 = I. Then,
the view of the requester during iteration k = 0, . . . ,K − 1 is:
IkR :=V
k
R(Īk−1) = (skR, skDGK, zk, δk,mcompk , coins2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 2.7.2
, āk, b̄k, vk, coins3k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Protocol 3.2.2
). (B.1.5)
The view of the requester during the last step of the protocol is:
V KR (ĪK−1) := (IK−1R , [[x
∗]]). (B.1.6)
As before, the view of the requester during the execution of Protocol 3.2.4 is:
VR(I) := V KR (ĪK−1).
In order to be able to construct a simulator with indistinguishable view from the view
of the requester, we need to show that the requester is not capable of inferring new relevant
information about the private data (other than what can be inferred solely from its inputs
and outputs) although it knows the optimal solution x∗ and has access to the messages from
multiple iterations.
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Apart from the last message, which is the encryption of the optimization solution [[x∗]],
and the comparison results δk, all the values the requester receives are blinded, with different
sufficiently large values at each iteration. The requester knows that QCx∗ = A
ᵀ
CµK − cA
and that µK = vK − r̄K , for some random value r̄K . However, from these two equations,
although it has access to x∗ and vK , the requester cannot infer any new information about
the private data of the agents or about µK , even when QC , AC are public, thanks to the
large enough randomization.
Let ak, bk = πk(0, µ̄k), where πk is a random permutation. From Protocol 2.7.2, the
requester receives zk which is the additively blinded value of bk − ak + 2l, and other blinded
values, denoted in (B.1.5) as mcompk . Hence, provided the blinding noises are refreshed at
every iteration, the requester cannot infer any information, as follows from Preamble 2.4. At
the end of the protocol, it receives the bit δk which is 1 if ak ≤ bk and 0 otherwise. However,
due to the uniform randomization between the order of µ̄k and 0 at every iteration for
assigning the values of ak and bk, described in Protocol 3.2.1, the requester cannot identify
the sign of µ̄k, and by induction, the sign of µ̄K−1 and magnitude of µK . This means that
having access to x∗ = xK does not bring more information about the blinded values from
the intermediary steps.
We now investigate the relation between the messages from consecutive iterations. From
the update protocol 3.2.2, we know:
vk = (ak + rk)(1− δk) + (bk + sk)δk
µk+1 = vk − rk(1− δk)− skδk = ak(1− δk) + bkδk,
The requester knows the values of vk and δk, but πk, µ̄k, rk, sk are unknown to it. Further-
more, let πk+1 be the permutation applied by the cloud at step k + 1 in Protocol 3.2.1,
unknown to the requester. Take for example the case when δk = 0 and δk+1 = 0. Let
Q̃ = I − ηACQ−1C A
ᵀ
C and E = [I 0]. Then:
vk+1 = ak+1 + rk+1 = Eπk+1(0, Q̃(vk − rk)− ηACQ−1C cA − ηbA) + rk+1.
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The above equation shows the requester cannot construct vk+1 from vk. Similar equations
arise when considering the other values for δk and δk+1. This guarantees that an integer ṽik
obtained by selecting uniformly at random from (2l+λ, 2l+λ+1)∩ZN will have the distribution
statistically indistinguishable from vik. Moreover:
µk+2 = max{0, Q̃µk+1 − ηACQ−1C cA − ηbA}
= max{0, Q̃(vk − rk(1− δk)− skδk)− ηACQ−1C cA − ηbA}
= vk+1 − rk+1(1− δk+1)− sk+1δk+1.
Since the blinding noise is different at each iteration and uniformly sampled, the requester
cannot retrieve µk+2 from vk and vk+1. In short, if the requester receives some random
values ˜̄ak, ˜̄bk ∈ (2l+λ, 2l+λ+1) ∩ ZN instead of ak + rk and bk + sk respectively, it would not
be able to distinguish the difference. Similar arguments hold for the blinded messages ci
from the comparison protocol 2.7.1.
Hence, by processing multiple iterations, the requester can only obtain functions of the
private data that involve at least one large random value, which does not break privacy.
We now build a simulator SR that applies the steps of the protocol on randomly generated
values. As before, since Protocol 3.2.3 is secure in the semi-honest model (Proposition 3.2.1),
we know that there exists a ppt simulator for the functionality of Protocol 3.2.3 on inputs
I−1R = {skR, skDGK}. However, we need to show that we can simulate the functionality
of consecutive calls of Protocol 3.2.3, or, equivalently, on one call of Protocol 3.2.3 but on
inputs (IkR, x
∗). Call such a simulator SkR, that on the inputs (I
k
R, x
∗) should output a
view that is statistically indistinguishable from V kR(Īk−1) in (B.1.5), for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1.
We already showed that although the requester has access to the output x∗ and to blinded
messages from all the iterations of Protocol 3.2.4, it cannot extract information from them
or correlate the messages to the iteration they arise from, so x∗ will only be relevant in the
last simulator:
(i) Generate a λ + l-length random integer ρ̃k and add 2l and obtain z̃k; (ii) Generate
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a random bit δ̃k; (iii) Choose a random bit δ̃R. If it is 0, then generate l nonzero values
of 2t bits, otherwise generate l − 1 nonzero random values and one 0 value. Those will be
the m̃compk (see Protocol 2.7.1); (iv) Generate random integers of length l + λ + 1 ˜̄ak and˜̄bk; (v) Compute ṽk according to δ̃k; (vi) Denote all Paillier and DGK generated coins by





∗) = (Ik−1R , z̃k, δ̃k, m̃compk , ˜̄ak, ˜̄bk, ṽk, c̃oins).





∗) for V KR (ĪK−1) is obtained by simply





c≡ V k(Īk−1), for k = 0, . . . ,K.
Proof. For 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, (coins2k, coins3k)
s≡ c̃oinsk because they are generated from the
same distributions. Similarly, z̃k
s≡ zk because ρ̃k
s≡ bk−ak+ρk. From the discussion above,
the same holds for m̃compk and their counterparts mcompk . Furthermore, (δ̃k, ˜̄ak, ˜̄bk, ṽk) are
statistically indistinguishable from (δk, āk, b̄k, vk) due to the way they are generated, and ṽk
being consistent with δ̃k. Thus, Sk(Ik−1R , x
∗)
c≡ V k(Ik−1R ∪ I).
For k = K, SK(IK−1R , x
∗)
c≡ V K(ĪK−1) trivially follows from the fact that both [[x∗]]
and [̃[x∗]] are decrypted in x∗.
Hence, we obtained that ĨkR
c≡ IkR, for k = 0, . . . ,K. The essence of the proof of
Proposition B.1.3 is that all the messages the requester receives are blinded with large
enough random noise and the comparison bits are randomized. This results in the messages
being statistically indistinguishable from random values of the same length, which means
that the extra information included in (Ik−1R , x
∗) from the previous iterations cannot be used
to extract other information about the current values at iteration k. The next corollary then
















k(Īk−1), x∗), for any k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
Finally, we construct a simulator SR(IR) for the execution of Protocol 3.2.4 and we show
that its view will be statistically indistinguishable from VR(I). We define the following
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sequence, from which we drop the input x∗ to the simulators to not burden the notation:
VR(I) = H0(I) = V KR (ĪK−1)
H1(I, x∗) = SKR ◦ V K−1R (Ī
K−2)





HK(I, x∗) = SKR ◦ SK−1R ◦ . . . ◦ S
1
R ◦ V 0R(I)
SR(IR) = HK+1(IR) = S
K
R ◦ SK−1R ◦ . . . ◦ S
1
R ◦ S0R(IR)
By transitivity, H0 and HK+1 are statistically indistinguishable if:
H0
c≡ H1
c≡ . . . c≡ Hk
c≡ Hk+1
c≡ Hk+2
c≡ . . . c≡ HK+1.
The result follows from induction on Corollary B.1.4. In conclusion, we obtain that SR(IR)
c≡
VR(I) which verifies that Protocol 3.2.4 achieves privacy with respect to the requester.
The proof of Theorem 3.2.2 is now complete.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2.3
We will now show that any coalition consistent with the setup of Propositions 3.2.6, 3.2.7
and with the assumption that the cloud and requester do not collude does not gain any new
information about the private data of the honest agents, other than what can be inferred
solely from the inputs and outputs of the coalition. As mentioned in Section 3.2.3.6, the
agents in a coalition only add their inputs to the view of the coalition, but do not have any
messages in the protocol.
Simulator for the cloud C and p̄ agents Ai
Consider the coalition between a set of agents Ai=1,...,p̄ and the cloud C, which has the inputs
({bi}i=1,...,m̄, {ci}i=1,...,n̄,AC ,QC) and no output from the execution of Protocol 3.2.4. Since
p̄ < p, the coalition is not able to compute µ1 by itself, and the semantic security of the
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Paillier cryptosystem is again enough to ensure the privacy of the rest of the sensitive data.
A simulator for this coalition can be constructed following the same steps as in the simulator
for the cloud on the augmented inputs defined above, from the fact that every value the
cloud receives is encrypted by a semantically secure cryptosystem.
Simulator for the requester R and p̄ agents Ai
Consider the coalition between a set of agents Ai=1,...,p̄ and the requester R, which has
the inputs ({bi}i=1,...,m̄, {ci}i=1,...,n̄, skR, skDGK) and output (x∗) from the execution of Pro-
tocol 3.2.4. If both matrices QC ,AC are public, if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , p̄} such that
aᵀi x
∗ < bi, the coalitions finds out µ∗i = 0, which comes from public knowledge in the KKT
conditions (3.2.15). From this, the coalition is able to find some coins of the cloud: rK
and sK associated to element i. However, these values are independent from the rest of the
parameters and do not reveal any information about the private inputs of the parties. Apart
from this, the coalition is not able to compute any private data of the honest parties from
the execution of the protocol, due to the secure blinding. A simulator for this coalition can
be build by following the same steps as described in the simulator for the requester on the
augmented inputs defined above.
The proof is now complete.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2.6
The coalition has access to the following data, which is fixed: AC ,QC ,x∗, {bi}1,...,m̄, {ci}i,...,n̄.
Proof of (1). We need to address two cases: the non-strict satisfaction of the constraints
and the equality satisfaction of the constraints.
(I) Suppose there exists a solution {bi}m̄+1,...,m and {ci}n̄+1,...,n and µ to the KKT conditions
such that aᵀi x
∗ < bi for some m̄+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In particular this implies that µi = 0. Define




The new set of points (b′, c′,µ′) is also a solution to the KKT conditions, by construction.
(II) Alternatively, suppose there exists a solution {bi}m̄+1,...,m and {ci}n̄+1,...,n and µ to the
KKT conditions such that aᵀjx
∗ = bj for all j = m̄+ 1, . . . ,m. Consider there exists a vector
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that satisfies µ′  0 and µ′i = 0 for some m̄+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m
that is the argument of the above minimum.





and b′ such that b′j := bj for all j 6= i and b′i
to be any value b′i > bi. Then (b
′, c′,µ′) is also a solution to the KKT conditions. More




∗ − b′j) = µ′j(a
ᵀ
jx
∗ − bj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0




∗ − b′i) = 0, j = i.
(B.3.1)
Then we can check the gradient condition:
QCx
∗ + AᵀCµ













∗ + AᵀCµ + cA = 0.
(B.3.2)
Hence, b′ 6= bA satisfies the KKT conditions and the coalition cannot uniquely deter-
mine bA.
Proof of (2). Consider a solution {bi}m̄+1,...,m and {ci}n̄+1,...,n and µ to the KKT condi-










. Define b′ such that
for all j, it holds that b′j = a
ᵀ
jx
∗. Then (b′, c′,µ′) is also a solution to the KKT conditions.
Specifically, it follows that µ′ ≥ 0. Moreover the complementarity slackness condition holds
by construction of b′, and as before the gradient condition holds. Hence, c′ 6= cA satisfies
the KKT solution, and the coalition cannot uniquely determine cA.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3.3
Let yk := xk + wk−1. Manipulating (3.3.3), we get:
yk+1 = (I− ρM−1)yk + (2ρM−1 − I)zk + n = ρM−1yk + (2ρM−1 − I)(zk − yk) + n.
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The expression of the thresholding operator gives the following bound: −λ/ρ ≤ zki − yki ≤
λ/ρ, for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, using the triangle inequality and submultiplicative property:
‖yk+1‖2 ≤ ‖ρM−1yk‖2 + ‖(2ρM−1 − I)(zk − yk)‖2 + ‖n‖2
≤ ‖ρM−1‖2‖yk‖2 +
√
nλ/ρ‖2ρM−1 − I‖2 + ‖n‖2.
We select z0 = w0 = 0, compress the geometric progression and use ‖yk+1‖∞ ≤ ‖yk+1‖2,
getting the bounds in (3.3.4).
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.3.4
We use two theoretical results in the proof. First, we need the underlying homomorphic
encryption scheme, CKKS, to be semantically secure, in order to ensure that an adversary
that does not have access to the private key of the scheme cannot decrypt or even distinguish
ciphertexts encrypting different values. This has been proven in [62] and assumes that the
Decisional Ring Learning with Errors problem is computationally hard [156]. We select
the scheme parameters to ensure that this problem is hard in practice, specifically that it
achieves a security level of 128 bits, according to the Learning with Errors estimator of [4].
Second, we need that the interactive part of the multi-party CKKS scheme, in our case, the
distributed bootstrapping protocol, preserves the indistinguishability of the ciphertexts and
does not reveal the private key. This has been proven in [96] and assumes that at least one
servers is honest and that the masks used in DBoot are statistically hiding. Our adversarial
model indeed considers that at most K − 1 servers can be corrupted and we choose the
masks to be 80 bits larger than the messages, while ensuring enough levels such that the
result does not overflow.
In Protocol 3.3.1, the data of the client is sent encrypted to the servers. Since the servers
cannot all collude in order to reveal the private key, and no information about the messages
underlying is leaked by viewing or computing on the respective ciphertexts, Protocol 3.3.1
achieves client data confidentiality.
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Appendix C
Technical details for Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3.2
We are going to treat two cases: I, the adversary does not corrupt the aggregator and II,
the adversary corrupts the aggregator:
Pr[b′ = b] =
1
2
Pr[b′ = b|i /∈ C] + 1
2
Pr[b′ = b|i ∈ C].
We will consider the stronger case where S∗ = U∗; the weaker case where S∗ ⊆ U∗
follows.
I. a /∈ C. From the compromise queries, the adversary holds the following information
{κ,pk, {si(t)}i∈C , {wi}i∈C}t∈[T ] and
∑
i∈U si(t) = −
∑
i∈C si(t), for all t ∈ [T ]. From the
encryption queries at time t, the adversary knows {ci(t) = E(wAi xi(t)) + si(t))}i∈E(t). Then,
the adversary chooses t∗ ∈ T and a series of {x0i (t∗)}i∈U∗ and {x1i (t∗)}i∈U∗ and receives from
the challenger {ci(t∗) = E(wA,bi xbi(t∗)) + si(t∗))}i∈U∗ .
Because the adversary doesn’t have the secret key of the Paillier scheme and does not
have the individual secrets of the uncorrupted agents, the following holds, where η1(κ), η2(κ)
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are negligible functions, according to Theorems 2.5.2 and 2.4.1:
Pr[A breaks Paillier scheme] ≤ η1(κ),
Pr[A breaks secret sharing] ≤ η2(κ),




II. a ∈ C. From the compromise queries, the adversary holds the following information ∀t ∈
[T ]: {κ,pk, {si(t)}j∈C , {wi}i∈C , sk}t∈[T ], and
∑
i∈U si(t) = −
∑
i∈C si(t). From the encryp-
tion queries, and after using sk to decrypt, the adversary knows {pi(t) = wAi x(t)+si(t)}i∈E(t).




















∗)}i∈U∗ . The adversary uses the secret key of the Paillier scheme to






∗) mod N , for
i ∈ U∗. Because the secret shares of zero are different for each time t 6= t∗, the adversary
cannot infer information about the challenge query from the previous encryption queries.
Then, the probability that the adversary wins is the probability that the adversary breaks
secret sharing:
Pr[A breaks secret sharing] ≤ η2(κ),




From (C.1.1) and (C.1.2): AdvpWSAh(A) ≤ η2(κ).
C.2 Further discussion on the secret shares in pWSAh
In this part, we will discuss some details from the pWSAh scheme in Section 4.3.2. There, we
require that si(t) ∈ ZN . With a small probability, si(t) ∈ ZN \Z∗N , i.e., it is a multiple of p or
q. Say si(t) is a multiple of q. This means that psi(t) = 0 mod N . In that case, a strategy
that an adversary that has corrupted the aggregator can try is to multiply wixi(t) + si(t)
by p and then try to find if there is an element in ZN which multiplied by p gives the same
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answer, which has complexity approximately O(p):
γi(t) := wixi(t) + si(t) mod N
pγi(t) = pwixi(t) mod N, if si(t) mod q = 0.
Then, the probability that the adversary decrypts wixi(t) is:
Pr
[















which is a negligible function in the security parameter κ.
The above bound holds when plaintexts are from ZN , and not only from a smaller
subgroup. In this section, we made no assumptions about the local data. However, in
Section 4.4.2.3 we need plaintexts to be on l bits, where l will almost never be larger than
128, which is less than the number of bits of p and q. Then, solving pz = γ mod N for
some z on l bits and known γ, is easy – it can essentially be solved in Z, as there is no
wrap-around. In this case:
Pr
[







The aggregator could try the same trick on all combinations of partial sums from the
agents. In this case, the probability that the aggregator learns any partial information is
2/(min(p, q) −M). Nevertheless, for the current acceptable value of bit size for N , which
is 2048 bits, this scheme would still give around 1000 bits of security, which is substantially
larger than what the Decisional Composite Residue gives, or even the possible values the
local data can take.
Nevertheless, we can introduce an extra round of communication to ensure si(t) ∈ Z∗N :
agent i ∈ [M ] verifies if gcd(si(t), N) = 1 and if not, it changes the values σii(t), σai(t) so that
(4.3.4) is still satisfied and gcd(si(t), N) = 1, then sends the new σai(t) to the aggregator.
This works because sa(t) is not used for masking, so it is not required to be in Z∗N .
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C.3 Technical details for packed pWSA
We detail the steps for packing the pWSA scheme from Section 4.4.2.5 and depict the bit
gains due to the operations performed on the packed columns in Figure C.1.
Figure C.1: The operations performed on the packed columns and the corresponding number of bits




i (t) 0 . . . 0 ζ
[2]
i (t) . . . ζ
[na]
i (t) 0 . . . 0
]
and ζ[k]i (t) =
s
[k]
i (t) + 2
γz
[k]
i (t), for k ∈ [na].
1) Prepare the values to be packed as per (4.4.2), (4.4.3), with γ to be determined later.










3) Multiply the encrypted column E(Wci ) by a pre-processed scalar x̃
[c]
i (t). One slot of


























From (C.3.1), one can retrieve the desired result W[kc]i x
[c]
i (t) by taking the lefthand side
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which can reveal intermediate information to the decryptor. In order to avoid this infor-





i (t). It is more efficient to add this noise in step 5), after summing over ni.
4) Sum the ni ciphertexts to output a ciphertext that contains the vector result of the
matrix-vector multiplication product.
5) For each slot k ∈ [na], an agent i ∈ [M ] selects z[k]i (t) ∈ (0, 2l+1+λ+dlog2 nie), such that














i (t) is concealed:
ci(t) := s
[k]






































Due to the masking with 2γz[k]i (t), we can reduce the size of the mask s
[k]
i (t). More specifi-
cally, s[k]i (t) can be sampled uniformly at random from (0, 2
γ), because it acts like a one-time






i (t) once the decryptor takes equation (C.3.3) modulo
2γ . The whole quantity s[k]i (t) + 2
γz
[k]





i (t) = 0.
6) The aggregator obtains c(t) by taking the product of all ciphertexts ci(t) it received.
7) The aggregator decrypts the ciphertext c(t), adds its own secret share of zero sa(t).
It then retrieves the na elements of x̃a(t) by recursively taking the quotient and rest by 2δ,
and from each resulting element, it obtains the elements of xa(t) by taking modulo 2γ and
dividing by 22lf .
We now compute the number of bits and corresponding padding one slot can have such
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that no overflow occurs during the private weighted sum aggregation. We assume that the
values of ni, for i ∈ [M ] are similar and define n := max
i∈[M ]
ni. The value that is packed in



















from which we obtain that:
δ > max
(
γ + 1, l + λ
)
+ dlog2 ne+ dlog2Me+ γ + 2.









i (t) < 2
γ . (C.3.4)
From (C.3.4), we choose γ = 2l + 1 + dlog2 ne+ dlog2Me and:
δ = max
(
l + 2 + dlog2 ne+ dlog2Me, λ
)
+ 3l + 4 + 2(dlog2 ne+ dlog2Me). (C.3.5)
Proof of Theorem 4.4.1. The correctness follows from the appropriate padding and packing
to avoid overflow, as stated in (C.3.5). The aggregator obliviousness proof follows from
Theorem 4.3.2, along with the intermediate values masking from (C.3.3).
C.4 Proof of Theorem 4.5.3


































































The correctness of the result follows from construction: (C.4.4) follows from (C.4.3)
because the keys were selected such that sa = −
∑
i∈[M ] si, (C.4.5) follows from (C.4.4) due
to the linearity of G, and the correct transition from the transition from (C.4.1) to (C.4.6)
is allowed by the fact that the PAHE scheme satisfies Dsk(c1 + c2) = Dsk(c1) + Dsk(c2).
From the setup phase, the adversary learns the public parameters At∈[T ], q, λ, κ, σ,M,
gᵀ,pk and constructs G.
We treat two cases: I, the adversary does not corrupt the aggregator and II, the adversary
corrupts the aggregator:
Pr[b′ = b] =
1
2
Pr[b′ = b|a /∈ C] + 1
2
Pr[b′ = b|a ∈ C].
From the compromise queries, the adversary holds the following information:
I. a /∈ C. {si}i∈C , {Epk(wi)}i∈C and
∑
i∈U si = −
∑
i∈C si.
II. a ∈ C. sk, {si}i∈C , {wi}i∈C and
∑
i∈U si = −
∑
i∈C si.
Because At is different at every time step, the adversary cannot obtain meaningful
information from ci(t1)− ci(t2).
From the encryption queries at time t, for which the adversary submits (i ∈ E(t), t, wAi ,








that Gei(t) mod q ≡ Epk(wAi xAi (t)) is satisfied for i ∈ E(t). Because PAHE is not a de-
terministic encryption, the adversary cannot recover information about si from computing
ci(t)−G†Epk(wAi xAi (t)) 6= s
ᵀ
iAt.
In the challenge phase, the adversary chooses t∗ ∈ T and a series of {x0i (t∗)}i∈U∗ and





















The challenger picks a random bit b and sends {ci(t∗) = sᵀiAt∗ + ebi(t∗)
ᵀ}i∈U∗ to the
adversary, such that Gebi(t
∗) mod q ≡ Epk(wA,bi xbi(t∗)) holds for i ∈ U∗. The adversary does
not have the individual secrets of the uncorrupted agents so it cannot recover the individual
error terms or keys from {ci(t∗)}i∈U∗ due to the hardness of A-LWE.
The adversary can sum all the ciphertexts from the encrypted queries and uncompro-





































































p(t∗) does not reveal any information.
Then, for both I and II, the probability that the adversary wins is the probability that
it solves the A-LWE problem:
Pr[A solves A-LWE problem ] ≤ η(λ),
Pr[b′ = b|i /∈ C] ≤ 1
2
+ η(λ), Pr[b′ = b|i ∈ C] ≤ 1
2
+ η(λ).
where η(λ) is a negligible function, according to Theorem 2 in [88], Theorem 1 in [28] and
the semantic security of the PAHE scheme.
This results in AdvpWSA(A) ≤ η(λ).
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Appendix D
Technical details for Chapter 5
D.1 Further details on LabHE
Let fid : M → M be the identity function and τ ∈ {0, 1}∗ be a label. Denote the iden-
tity program for input label τ by Iτ = (fid, τ). Any labeled program P = (f, τ1, . . . , τn)
(as in Definition 2.5.5) can be expressed as the composition of n identity programs P =
f(Iτ1 , . . . , Iτn).
The definitions of correctness, semantic security, circuit privacy and context-hiding are
taken from [27, 55].
Definition D.1.1. (Correctness) A multi-user Labeled Homomorphic Encryption scheme
correctly evaluates a family of functions F if for all honestly generated keys (mpk,msk) $←
ˆInit(1λ), all user keys (upkk,uskk)
$← ˆKeyGen(mpk), k ∈ [l], for all f ∈ F , all labels
τ1, . . . , τt ∈ L, messages m1, . . . ,mt ∈ M, any Ci ← Ê(mpk, uskji , τi,mi), ∀i ∈ [t], ji ∈ [l]
and g̃ ← (f, ˆEval1(mpk,msk,upk, (f, τ1, . . . , τt))):
Pr
[
D̂(msk,upk,P, ˆEval2(mpk, g̃, C1, . . . , Ct)) = f(m1, . . . ,mt)
]
> 1− negl(λ),
where the probability is taken over the random choices.
Proof. (Theorem 5.1.2) The proof can be easily extended from the proof of correctness




i∈[d] bi ∈ M, where d is the degree of f . Consider ciphertexts produced by the Ê
primitive. For every (τ,m) ∈ L ×M, the encryption primitive yields Ê(mpk,upk, τ,m) →
C = (a, β), where a = m − fid(F (usk, τ)) and it follows by the correctness of AHE that
m← D̂(msk, Iτ , C).









and t ciphertexts Ci such that mi ← D̂(msk, usk,Pi, Ci). Then,
for any f ∈ F , we want to evaluate f(P1, . . . ,Pt) =: P∗ on ciphertexts C1, . . . , Ct. For















the resulting ciphertext as C ← ˆEval2(mpk, g̃, C1, . . . , Ct). By construction, a ciphertext

























, i ∈ [t]. It is clear that g̃ will contain f̃i for i ∈ [t]. After the
evaluation of f , we obtain the ciphertext C that is either (f(m1, . . . ,mt) − f(b1, . . . , bt),
[[f(b1, . . . , bt)]]) or [[f(m1, . . . ,mt) − f(b1, . . . , bt)]]. Then, by construction of D̂, correct-
























, we obtain the
correctness of the eLabHE scheme, i.e., D̂(msk,usk,P∗, C)← f
(
m1, . . . ,mt
)
.
The definition of semantic security [107], [105, Ch. 5] is adapted for labeled homomorphic
encryption schemes in [27]:
Definition D.1.2. (Semantic security) Let eLabHE = ( ˆInit, ˆKeyGen, Ê, ˆEval1, ˆEval2, D̂) be
a multi-user labeled homomorphic encryption scheme and A be a PPT adversary. Consider
the following experiment where A is given access to an oracle Ê(mpk,usk, ·, ·), for usk =
(usk1, . . . ,uskl) that on input a pair (τ,m) outputs Ê(mpk,usk, τ,m):
ExpeLabHE,A(λ) : b










$← Ê(mpk, usk, τ∗b ,mb)
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b′ ← AÊ(mpk,usk,·,·)(C)
If b′ = b return 1. Else, return 0.
We say A is a legitimate adversary if it queries the encryption oracle on distinct labels
(each label τ is never queried more than once) and never on the two challenge labels τ∗0 , τ∗1 .
We define the adversary’s advantage as AdveLabHE,A(λ) = Pr[ExpeLabHE,A(λ) = 1] − 12 .
Then, we say that eLabHE has semantic security if for any PPT legitimate algorithm A,
the following holds AdveLabHE,A(λ) = negl(λ).
Proof. (Theorem 5.1.3) The scheme eLabHE has the same encryption and decryption prim-
itives as LabHE and identically looking ciphertexts. Hence, the proof follows the semantic
security of the LabHE scheme, which depends on the semantic security of the underlying
AHE scheme and on the pseudorandomness of F .
Semantic security is equivalent to ciphertext indistinguishability [107], [105, Ch. 4], so
we can write it as:
SD[Ê(mpk,usk, τ,m), ˆSim(1λ,mpk,usk)] ≤ negl(λ),
where ˆSim is a PPT simulator that simply outputs a LabHE (or AHE) encryption of zeros.
The same can be written for the secret sharing scheme which has perfect secrecy, with ˆSim
outputting a random value sampled fromM.
Definition D.1.3. (Context-hiding) A multi-user labeled homomorphic encryption scheme
satisfies context-hiding for a family of functions F if there exists a PPT simulator ˆSim and a
negligible function negl(λ) such that the following holds: for any λ ∈ N, any pair of master
keys mpk,msk $← ˆInit(1λ), any l user keys (upkk,uskk)
$← ˆKeyGen(mpk), k ∈ [l], any
function f ∈ F with t inputs, any tuple of messages m1, . . . ,mt ∈ M, labels τ1, . . . , τt ∈ L,
and ciphertexts Ci
$← Ê(mpk,uskji , τi,mi), i ∈ [t] and ji ∈ [l]:
SD[ ˆEval2(mpk, f̃ , C1, . . . , Ct), ˆSim(1
λ,msk, upk,P,m)] ≤ negl(λ),
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where we defined P = (f, τ1, . . . , τt), m = f(m1, . . . ,mt), f̃ = (f, ˆEval1(mpk,msk,upk,P)).
Context-hiding describes the property that a party that decrypts a ciphertext C as
m ← D̂(msk, upk,P, C), with P = (f, τ1, . . . , τt), does not find out anything about the
inputs m′1, . . . ,m′t, except for the fact that m = f(m′1, . . . , m′t). In order to prove that
eLabHE is context-hiding, we need to make use of the concept of circuit privacy.
For any admissible linear function f , we can abstract the evaluation primitives in AHE
as Eval(pk, f, C1, . . . , Ct). We will use this notation when defining circuit privacy:
Definition D.1.4. (Circuit privacy) A homomorphic encryption scheme is circuit private
for a family of circuits F if there exists a PPT simulator ˆSim and a negligible function
negl(λ) such that the following holds. For any λ, any pair of keys (pk, sk) $← KeyGen(1λ),
any circuit f ∈ F , any tuple of messages m1, . . . ,mt ∈ M and m = f(m1, . . . ,mt) and








The difference between circuit privacy and context-hiding is that in context-hiding, the
decryptor has access to the function, whereas in circuit privacy, it does not.
Proof. (Theorem 5.1.4) The proof relies on the circuit privacy of the underlying AHE
scheme. Let Sim be the simulator for the circuit privacy of AHE. A simulator ˆSim(1λ,
msk,upk, (f, τ1, . . . , τt),m) computes for upk = (upk1, . . . , upkl), uskj ← D(msk, upkj),
j ∈ [l], and bi ← F (uskji , τi), i ∈ [t]. Then, it computes b ← f(b1, . . . , bt). Notice that
ˆSim has the inputs necessary to compute f̃ . If f is a degree-1 polynomial, then ˆSim
outputs C = (m − b,Sim(1λ,mpk, b)). Else, if f is degree-d, with d ≥ 2, ˆSim outputs
C = Sim(1λ,mpk,m − b). Using the circuit privacy of AHE, the outputs of ˆSim are dis-
tributed identically to the corresponding outputs produced by ˆEval2.
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D.2 Privacy of Protocol 5.1.3
Proof of Theorem 5.1.5. We can build simulators for Protocol 5.1.3 from the simulators for
semantic security, context hiding and perfect privacy and contrast them to the views of the
parties, as in Definition 2.2.5.
The view of the actuator is:
VA(fLQG) =
(
fLQG, upk, {ui}i∈0∪[T−1], {x̂i − ri}i∈[T−1], coins
)
.





ˆInit(1λ), (ũsk, ũpk) ← ˆKeyGen(mpk), samples random values {r̃i}i∈[T−1] ∈ Mn and then
outputs: (
fLQG, ũpk, {ui}i∈0∪[T−1], {r̃i}i∈[T−1], c̃oins
)
.





the context-hiding property of LabHE and perfect secrecy of the one-time pad.
The cloud’s view is:
VC(∅) =
(
Ê(x0), Ê(xr), Ê(ur), Ê(Ω), {Ê(zi)}i∈[T ], {Ê(x̂i)}i∈[T−1], coins
)
,
where Ω is the collection of K,L,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3. We build a simulator ˆSimC that on input (1λ)
runs ˆKeyGen(1λ), generates randomness for the shares, and creates encryptions of random
values for all model parameters and signals received from the subsystems and actuators, and
outputs: (˜̂E(x0),˜̂E(xr),˜̂E(ur), ˜̂E(Ω), {˜̂E(zi)}i∈[T ], {˜̂E(x̂i)}i∈[T−1], c̃oins).
The indistinguishability between VC(∅) and ˆSimA(1λ) follows from the semantic security of
LabHE.
The setup’s view is VS(K,L,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3) = (K,L,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3). We build a simulator ˆSimS
that simply outputs its inputs (K,L,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3), which is trivially indistinguishable from
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VS(K,L,Γ1,Γ2,Γ3). Similarly, the view of each subsystems is VSi(xi0,xir,uir) = (xi0,xir,uir).
We then build simulators ˆSimSi that simply output their inputs (xi0,xir,uir), being trivially
indistinguishable from VSi(xi0,xir,uir).
The correctness of Protocol 5.1.3 follows from the correctness of the LQG algorithm and
of the LabHE scheme. The proof is now complete.
Proof of Theorem 5.1.6. The proof of multi-party privacy uses the fact that neither the
cloud nor the actuator can be in a coalition that has all the private data in the system
and they cannot extract any information from the communication between themselves: the
cloud receives encrypted data from the actuator, and does not have access to the key, and
the actuator receives only random shares from the cloud.
A coalition between the cloud and the setup reduces to the case presented in Sec-
tion 5.1.4.1. Consider now a coalition between the cloud, the setup and N̄ subsystems,
where 0 ≤ N̄ < N . Because the data of the non-colluding subsystems is encrypted with
a semantically secure encryption scheme, and the coalition has access neither to the mas-
ter key nor to the secret key of the non-colluding subsystems, the coalitions cannot infer
anything new about the private data of the non-colluding parties.
Similarly, a coalition between the actuator and the setup reduces to the case presented in
Section 5.1.4.1. Consider now a coalition between the actuator, the setup and N̄ subsystems,
where 0 ≤ N̄ < N . The outputs of the actuator consist in uk = −Kx̂k + Kxr + ur, where
K is known because of the collusion with the setup and some entries in xr and ur are
known from the collusion with some subsystems. However, because the communication
with the cloud is additively blinded by large random numbers (the secrets from the shares),
the actuator cannot infer anything more about x̂k than what it can infer solely from the
colluding parties’ data.
With this observations, one can construct simulators on the inputs of coalitions like in
the proof of Theorem 5.1.5.
248
Appendix E
Technical details for Chapter 6
E.1 Proof of Theorem 6.2.2
The view of S1 is composed by its inputs and exchanged messages, and no output. All
the messages the first server receives are encrypted. Furthermore, in the oblivious transfer
procedure in line 13, an encryption of zero is added to the quantity S1 receives such that
the encryption is re-randomized and S1 cannot recognize it. Due to the semantic security of
the cryptosystems, the view of S1 is computationally indistinguishable from the view of a
simulator which follows the same steps as S1, but replaces the incoming messages by random
encryptions of corresponding length.
The view of S2 is composed by its inputs and exchanged messages, and no output.
Apart from the comparison bits, the latter are always blinded by noise that has at least
λσ bits more than the private data being sent. For λσ chosen appropriately large (e.g. 100
bits [45]), the following is true: a+ r
s≡ r′, where a is a value of p bits, r is the noise chosen
uniformly at random from (0, 2p+λσ) ∩ ZNσ and r′ is a value chosen uniformly at random
from (0, 2p+λσ+1) ∩ ZNσ . In Protocol 2.7.2, a similar blinding is performed.
Crucially, the noise selected by S1 is different at each iteration. Hence, S2 cannot extract
any information by combining messages from multiple iterations, as they are always blinded
by a different large enough noise. Moreover, the randomization step in line 11 ensures that
S2 cannot infer anything from the values of βk, as the order of the inputs is unknown. Thus,
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we construct a simulator that follows the same steps as S2, but instead of the received
messages, it randomly generates values of appropriate length, corresponding to the blinded
private values, and random bits corresponding to the comparison bits. The view of such a
simulator will be computationally indistinguishable from the view of S2.
A more detailed proof that explicitly constructs the simulators can be adapted from
Appendix B.1.
E.2 Analysis of errors
Quantization errors
We will use the following observation to investigate the quantization error bounds. Define
εa = ā− a and εb = b̄− b. Then: āb̄− ab = āb̄− āb+ āb− ab = εab+ āεb.
Consider problem (6.2.3) where the coefficients are replaced by the fixed-point represen-
tations of the matrices H/(cL),F/(cL), of the vector x(t) and of the set U , but otherwise
the iterates Ũk, t̃k, z̃k are real values. Now, consider iteration k of the projected FGM.
The errors induced by quantization of the coefficients between the original iterates and the
approximation iterates will be:
t̃k − tk =− εHf zk + (INm − H̄f )εz,k − εFx
ξqk+1 := Ũk+1 −Uk+1 = D
q
k(t̃k − tk)




where we used the notation: ∆Uk = Uk+1 −Uk; εη = η̄ − η; εHf = H̄f −H/(cL); εFx =
F̄ᵀf x̄(t)− F
ᵀx(t)/(cL) = εᵀFfx(t) + F̄fεx; εx = x̄(t)− x(t); εFf = F̄f − F/(cL).
The error between Ũk+1 and Uk+1 is reduced from t̃k − tk due to the projection on the
hyperbox. Hence, to represent ξqk+1 in (E.2.1), we multiply t̃k − tk by the diagonal matrix
Dqk that has positive elements at most one.
We set ξq−1 = ξ
q
0. From (E.2.1), we derive a recursive iteration that characterizes the
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error of the primal iterate, for k = 0, . . . ,K, which we can write as a linear system:
Ã(Dqk) :=
















We choose this representation in order to have a relevant error bound in Theorem E.2.1
that shrinks to zero as the number of fractional bits grows. In the following, we find an
upper bound of the error using Ã := Ã(INm) and B̃ := B̃(INm).
Theorem E.2.1. Under Assumption 6.2.4, the system defined by (E.2.2) is bounded. Fur-
thermore, the norm of the error between the primal iterates of the original problem and of























γ = (3 + 2η̄)
√
NmRŪ ,




where E = [INm 0Nm], R2X0 is the radius of the compact set X0 w.r.t. the 2-norm and
RŪ = max{‖lu‖∞, ‖hu‖∞}.
Proof. The stability of the system is given by the fact that Ã has spectral radius ρ(Ã) < 1
which is proven in Lemma 1 in [129]. The same holds for Ã(Dqk). Since we want to give a
bound of the error in terms of computable values, we use the fact that ‖Ã(Dqk)‖2 ≤ ‖Ã‖2
(respectively, ‖B̃(Dqk)‖2 ≤ ‖B̃‖2) and express the bounds in terms of the latter.
From (E.2.2), one can obtain the following expression for the errors at time k and k− 1,
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and the first term goes to zero as k → ∞. We multiply this by E = [INm 0Nm] to obtain
the expression of ‖ξqk‖.
Subsequently, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1:
∣∣∣∣[zᵀk ∆Uᵀk−1]ᵀ∣∣∣∣2 = ‖zk‖2 + ‖∆Uk−1‖2 ≤ ‖Uk + η̄∆Uk−1‖2 + ‖∆Uk‖2









One can eliminate the initial error ξq0 and its effect by choosing in both exact and
fixed-point coefficient-FGM algorithms the initial iterate to be represented on lf fractional
bits. Therefore, only the persistent noise counts.
Remark E.2.2. In primal-dual algorithms, the maximum values of the dual variables corre-
sponding to the complicating constraints cannot be bounded a priori, i.e., we cannot give
overflow or coefficient quantization error bounds. This justifies our focus on a problem with
only simple input constraints. The work in [183] considers the bound on the dual variables
as a parameter that can be tuned by the user.
Arithmetic round-off errors
Let us now investigate the error between the solution of the previous problem and the
solution of the fixed-point FGM corresponding to Protocols 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. The encrypted
values do not necessarily maintain the same number of bits after operations, so we will
consider round-off errors where we perform truncations. This happens in line 10 in both
protocols. In this case, we obtain similar results to [129], where the quantization errors were
not analyzed, i.e., as if the nominal coefficients of the problem were represented with lf
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fractional bits from the problem formulation. Consider iteration k of the projected FGM.
The errors due to round-off between the primal iterates of the two solutions will be:
t̄k − t̃k =(INm − H̄f )(z̄k − z̃k) + ε′t,k
ξrk+1 :=Ūk+1 − Ũk+1 = Drk(t̄k − tk)
z̄k+1 − z̃k+1 =(1 + η̄)ξrk+1 − η̄ξrk.
(E.2.3)
Again, the projection on the hyperbox reduces the error, so Drk is a diagonal matrix with
positive elements less than one. For Protocol 6.2.1, the round-off error due to truncation
is (ε′t,k)
i ∈ [−Nm2−lf , 0], i = 1, . . . , Nm. The encrypted truncation step in Protocol 6.2.2
introduces an extra term due to blinding, making (ε′t,k)
i ∈ [−(1 +Nm)2−lf , 2−lf ].
We set set ξr−1 = ξr0. From (E.2.3), we can derive a recursive iteration that characterizes







Theorem E.2.3. Under Assumption 6.2.4, the system defined by (E.2.4) is bounded. Fur-

























The proof is straightforward.
As before, one can eliminate the initial error ξr0 and its effect by choosing the same initial
iterate represented on lf fractional bits for both problems.
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E.3 Proof of Theorem 6.3.2
The components of the protocol: AHE, secret sharing, pseudorandom generator, LabHE,
oblivious transfer and the comparison protocol are individually secure, meaning either their
output is computationally indistinguishable from a random output or they already satisfy
Definition 2.2.6. We next build the views of the allowed coalitions and their corresponding
simulators and use the previous results to prove they are computationally indistinguishable.











































which includes the keys mpk,msk because their generation involve randomness.
The setup’s inputs are the model and costs of the system and no output after the






Finally, for a subsystem i, i ∈ [M ], the inputs are the local control action constraints
and the measured states and there is no output obtained through computation after the







In general, the indistinguishability between the view of the adversary corrupting the
real-world parties and the simulator is proved through sequential games in which some
real components of the view are replaced by components that could be generated by the
simulator, which are indistinguishable from each other. In our case, we can directly make
the leap between the real view and the simulator by showing that the cloud only receives
encrypted messages, and the actuator receives only messages blinded by one-time pads.
In [13], the proof for the privacy of a quadratic optimization problem solved in the same
architecture is given with sequential games.
For the cloud, consider a simulator SC that generates m̃pk, m̃sk ← Init(1σ), gener-
ates ũskj ← KeyGen(m̃pk), for j ∈ {Si, Set, A}, i ∈ [M ] and then (τ̃ , b̃, [̃[b]])j . We
use (̃·) also over the encryptions to show that the keys are different from the ones in the















,˜̂E(η), [̃[hu]], ˜[[lu]],˜̂E(U′0). SC generates the coins R̃C as in
line 4 in Protocol 6.3.1 and obtains Ê(U0) as in line 4 in Protocol 6.3.2. Then, for each
k = {0, . . . ,K − 1}, it computes [̃[tk]] as in line 7 in Protocol 6.3.2 and shuffles [̃[tk]] and
[̃[hu]] into [̃[ak]], [̃[bk]]. SC then performs the same steps as the simulator for party A in
Protocol 2.7.2 and gets m̃sgPr.2.7.2. Furthermore, SC generates an encryption of random bits
δ̃k and of
˜̂E(Uk) and performs the same steps as the simulator for party A as in the proof of



























,˜̂E(η), [̃[hu]], ˜[[lu]], R̃C ,˜̂E(U′0),




All the values in the view of the cloud in (E.3.1)–with the exception of the random values
RC and the key mpk, which are statistically indistinguishable from R̃C and m̃pk because they
are drawn from the same distributions–are encrypted with semantically secure encryptions
schemes (AHE and LabHE). This means they are computationally indistinguishable from
the encryptions of random values in (E.3.5). This happens even when the values from
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different iterations are encryptions of correlated quantities. Thus, VC(∅)
c≡ SC(∅).
We now build a simulator SA for the actuator that takes as input fMPC,u(t). SA will
take the same steps as in lines 1, 3–7 in Protocol 6.3.1, obtaining m̃pk, m̃sk, ũpk, ũsk, τ̃A,
b̃A, [̃[bA]], R̃A, Ũ′0 and instead of line 2, it generates ũpkj , ũskj ← KeyGen(m̃pk) itself, for
j ∈ {Si, Set}, i ∈ [M ]. For k = 0, . . . ,K − 1, SA performs the same steps as the simulator
for party B in Protocol 2.7.2 and gets m̃sgPr.2.7.2. Furthermore, SA performs the same steps
as the simulator for party B as in the proof of Proposition 2.6.1 (or the simulator for the
standard OT) and gets m̃sgOT. It then outputs:
SA(fMPC,u(t)) =
(









All the values in the view of the actuator in (E.3.2)–with the exception of the random
values RA and the keys upk, which are statistically indistinguishable from R̃A and ũpk be-
cause they are drawn from the same distributions and u(t)–are blinded by random numbers,
different at every iteration, which means that they are statistically indistinguishable from
the random values in (E.3.6). This again holds even when the values that are blinded at
different iterations are correlated and the actuator knows the solution u(t), because the
values of interest are drowned in large noise. Thus, VA(fMPC)
c≡ SA(fMPC,u(t)).
The setup and subsystems do not receive any other messages apart from the master
public key (E.3.3), (E.3.4). Hence, a simulator SSet for the setup and a simulator SSi for
a subsystem i can simply generate m̃pk← Init(1σ) and then proceed with the execution of
lines 2–5 in Protocol 6.3.1 and output their inputs, messages and coins. The outputs of the
simulators are trivially indistinguishable from the views.
When an adversary corrupts a coalition, the view of the coalition contains the inputs
of all parties, and a simulator takes the coalition’s inputs and outputs. The view of the
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= VC(∅) ∪ VSet(A,B,P,Q,R)∪
∪VSi1 (U i1 ,xi1(t)) ∪ . . . ∪ VSil (U
il ,xil(t)).
A simulator SCSl for this coalition takes in the inputs of the coalition and no output and
performs almost the same steps as SC , SSet, SSi , without randomly generating the quantities
that are known by the coalition. The same argument of having the messages drawn from
the same distributions and encrypted with semantically secure encryption schemes proves
the indistinguishability between VCSl(·) and SCSl(·).
The view of the coalition between the actuator, the setup, and l subsystems is:
VASl
(
fMPC,u(t), A,B,P,Q,R, {U i,xi(t)}i∈i1,...,il
)
= VA(fMPC,u(t))∪
∪VSet(A,B,P,Q,R) ∪ VSi1 (U i1 ,xi1(t)) ∪ . . . ∪ VSil (U
il ,xil(t)).
A simulator SASl for this coalition takes in the inputs of the coalition and u(t) and
performs almost the same steps as SA, SSet, SSi , without randomly generating the quantities
that are now known. The same argument of having the messages drawn from the same
distributions and blinded with one-time pads proves the indistinguishability between VASl(·)
and SASl(·).
The proof is now complete.
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Appendix F
Technical details for Chapter 7
F.1 Proof of closeness
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 7.2.2. First, we characterize the solution set
of the original behavioral problem (7.2.5). Then, we characterize the solution of the approx-
imate problem (7.2.6). To prove closeness, we make suitable use of the inversion lemma, the
pseudoinverse (denoted by †) limit definition, and Singular Value Decomposition (SVD).





RUf + λgI (F.1.1)
M̂0 := Y
f ᵀQYf + Uf
ᵀ
RUf , (F.1.2)
where M̂ is matrix M defined in (7.2.8), without the penalty terms. Similarly, M̂0 is matrix
M without any regularization or penalty terms.
For compactness, we denote the matrix of past precollected data as Dp and the vector




















where Σ ∈ Rq×q is an invertible diagonal matrix, containing the nonzero singular values









that the set of optimal solutions of the original behavioral problem (7.2.5) is denoted by
Gopt–see (7.2.11). The minimum norm element of Gopt is denoted by gmin–see (7.2.12).
For completeness we present some inversion formulae.
Lemma F.1.1. Let K,L,V be matrices of appropriate dimensions. Then:
a) Provided the respective inverses exist:
(K + VᵀLV)−1 = K−1 −K−1Vᵀ(L−1 + VK−1Vᵀ)−1VK−1





be an orthonormal matrix. Then, if L is invertible:





Proof. Part a) is standard, also known as the Woodbury matrix identity. To prove (F.1.5),
we use the identity V⊥V
ᵀ
⊥ + VV
ᵀ = I and verify that the properties of the inverse hold.
To prove (F.1.6), we use (F.1.5).
Original behavioral problem
In the following lemma, we characterize the solution set Gopt of the original constrained
behavioral problem (7.2.5). In general, there are infinite optimal solutions since M̂0 and Dp
have low rank.
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Lemma F.1.2. Consider optimization problem (7.2.5). Recall the SVD decomposition of
Dp in (F.1.4). Then:
a) g ∈ Gopt is an optimal solution of (7.2.5) if and only if g lies in the following affine










b) Vector Yf ᵀQrt lies in the column space of M̂0.
c) The above affine subspace can be equivalently described by the closed form expression:
g = g1 + g2 + g3, (F.1.8)













g3 = F⊥(I− (F⊥ᵀM̂0F⊥)†F⊥ᵀM̂0F⊥)s. (F.1.11)
d) As a result, the minimum norm element of Gopt is
gmin = g1 + g2. (F.1.12)
Proof. Proof of a) Since dt lies in the range space of Dp, we can replace the singular
equality constraint Dpg = dt by Fᵀg = Σ−1Eᵀdt, where now F has full rank. If we also
replace u, y with Ufg and Yf respectively, and we ignore the constant terms, then we







Qrt s.t. Fᵀg = Σ−1Eᵀdt, (F.1.13)
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µᵀ(Fᵀg − Σ−1Eᵀdt), where µ ∈ Rq are the Lagrange multipliers. The result follows by
applying standard first order optimality conditions.























. Then, using the fact
that for a matrix A, Range(A) = Range(AAᵀ) (the proof easily follows from using SVD on
A), we also show that Yf ᵀQrt lies in the column space of M̂0.





orthonormal basis, we can express all solutions g as:
g = FΣ−1Eᵀdt + F⊥ξ = g1 + F⊥ξ, (F.1.14)
where F⊥ξ captures the components of g in the kernel of Fᵀ, and ξ is to be determined.
Second, we solve subequation M̂0g + Fµ = Yf
ᵀ





results in the equivalent system of subequations:









Equation (F.1.15) determines the Lagrange multiplier µ. Replacing (F.1.14) into (F.1.16)
gives: F⊥ᵀM̂0F⊥ξ = F⊥ᵀYf
ᵀ
Qrt − F⊥ᵀM̂0g1. By the standard property of the pseudoin-



















The two components ξ1, ξ2 are orthogonal. Combining (F.1.14) and (F.1.17) gives: g =
g1 + F⊥ξ1 + F⊥ξ2, where all components are orthogonal to each other.
Proof of d) Follows from b), orthogonality of the three summands and setting the only
free parameter s to zero.
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Approximate problem
Due to the regularization term, the solution of the approximate problem (7.2.6) is unique–
see (7.2.9). We can show that if we chose large enough λ, then we can show that the solution
of (7.2.6) converges to an intermediate one. Let F̂ := FᵀM̂−1F.
Lemma F.1.3. Consider optimization problem (7.2.6) with λu = λy = λ > 0 and λg > 0
and let g∗ be the optimal solution. Define the intermediate solution:







Then, as λ→∞ and λg → 0+:
‖g∗ − ḡ‖2 ≤ O(λ
−1), (F.1.19)
where we used big-O notation to hide quantities which do not depend on λ, λg.
Proof. Step a). Recall that g∗ is given by (7.2.9). We will use the inversion lemma to






















where the second equality follows from DᵀpDp = FΣ2Fᵀ and the last equality follows from
FᵀF = I. By Lemma F.1.1 a):





















where the equality follows from A−1 + B−1 = B−1(A + B)A−1. The error g∗ − ḡ can be
written as:
g∗ − ḡ =− M̂−1F∆FᵀM̂−1Yf ᵀQrt + M̂−1F∆Σ−1Eᵀdt.





and M̂−1Yf ᵀQrt are bounded as λg → 0+, λ→∞.
Step c) Boundedness of M̂−1FF̂−1 follows by Lemma F.1.4.
Step d) The following matrix is always bounded:
∥∥∥(λ−1Σ2 + F̂)−1 ∥∥∥
2
≤ O(1). It follows
from M̂  (λg + ‖M̂0‖2)I, which in turn implies: λ−1Σ2 + F̂  F̂  (λg + ‖M̂0‖2)−1I.
Step e). The norm of M̂−1Yf ᵀQrt is O(1). From Lemma F.1.2 b), Yf
ᵀ
Qrt lies in the





f ᵀQrt. Hence, ‖M̂−1Yf
ᵀ
Qrt‖2 ≤
O(‖M̂−1M̂0‖2) = O(1), since M̂ = M̂0 + λgI  M̂0, and ‖M̂−1M̂0‖2 ≤ 1.
Proof of Theorem 7.2.2
Consider the intermediate solution ḡ defined in (F.1.18). By the triangle inequality we have:
‖gmin − g∗‖2 ≤ ‖gmin − ḡ‖2 + ‖ḡ − g∗‖2.
In Lemma F.1.3, we show that the second error term decays to zero as fast as λ−1. To
complete the proof, we invoke the following Lemma, which states that the first error term
decays to zero as well.
Lemma F.1.4. Consider the minimum norm solution gmin defined in (7.2.12) and the
intermediate solution ḡ defined in (F.1.18). Let λg > 0. Then:















c) The intermediate solution converges to the minimum norm solution as λg goes to zero
lim
λg→0+
‖gmin − ḡ‖2 = 0. (F.1.22)









The result follows from the pseudoinverse limit definition and T† = (TᵀT)†Tᵀ [32, Ch 1].
























leaves the norm unchanged. Submatrix F⊥(F⊥ᵀM̂F⊥)−1F⊥ᵀM̂F⊥ = F⊥ has bounded


















Hence, both submatrices have bounded norm, implying boundedness for the original matrix.
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Proof of c). Using (F.1.6), we can rewrite ḡ in a form that resembles gmin:




By (F.1.23), the second term converges to −F⊥ᵀ(F⊥ᵀM̂0F⊥)†F⊥ᵀM̂0FΣ−1Eᵀdt. For the
third term, recall from Lemma F.1.2 b), that Yf ᵀQrt lies in the column space of M̂0,
which implies that Yf ᵀQrt = M̂0M̂
†
0Y
f ᵀQrt. Using this identity and (F.1.20), we also
get that the third term converges to F⊥ᵀ(F⊥ᵀM̂0F⊥)†F⊥ᵀYf
ᵀ
Qrt. The result follows
by (F.1.12), (F.1.24) and the convergence of the aforementioned terms.
F.2 Implementation details for online solution
Ciphertext packing
Assume without loss of generality that we shift the time axis to the left by M + N , such
that the trajectory concatenation mentioned in Section 7.2.2.3 is performed before t = 0.
This will simplify the circuit depth expression.
In the following, we will address some of the encoding methods we investigated, with the
goals to minimize the depth of the resulting circuit and to reduce the memory consumption
and time complexity. When encoding vectors in plaintexts, we use similar notations as the
vector encryptions: ev0(x), ev∗(x), evv(x), evr0(x) and evr∗(x).
Scalar encoding: each ciphertext only encodes and encrypts a scalar, i.e., element of
a vector or matrix. This version achieves the smallest multiplicative depth compared to the
other packing methods, no rotation key storage, but the largest ciphertext storage and the
largest number of operations. It returns m ciphertexts instead of one to the client, unless
we add more processing to mask and rotate the elements of ut to obtain a single ciphertext.
“Hybrid” encoding: some ciphertexts encode and encrypt individual elements while
other ciphertexts encode and encrypt vectors. Specifically, we pack the input and output
vectors and columns of input and output matrices (without repetitions or other redundancy),
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but hold the entries of the matrix M−1t and intermediate vectors mt as individual ciphertexts.
This version returns only one vector for the client to decrypt.
The “hybrid” encoding was implemented in our prior work [15]. For the best compromise
of depth versus client computation and communication, we asked the client to send back an
encryption of 1/st, along with an encryption of the input ut and output yt. This gives the
depth expression of the denominator and numerator of ut, for t > 1:
d(Dut) = d(st) = 2t+ 1, d(Nut) = 2t+ 4. (F.2.1)
However, this “hybrid” solution still incurred a large storage: namely O((S+ t)2) cipher-
texts and O((S+ t)2) rotation keys (only O(S+ t) rotation keys when there is no refreshing
and packing of the matrix M−1t required), and O((S + t)2) computations at the cloud, with
large hidden constants. This suggests the need for a more tractable solution, involving a
more efficient encoding.
Vector encoding: each ciphertext encodes and encrypts multiple values, i.e. a vector
or a column matrix. Via this type of encoding, we aim to keep the minimum possible depth
as in the previous two versions, but minimize the memory requirements for ciphertexts, from
O((S + t)2) to O(S + t). At the same time, we want to decrease the rotation key storage
from O((S + t)2) to O(S + t), and keep the number of computations at O((S + t)2).
With the previous “hybrid” encoding on the inputs we found it preferable to encode
the entries of M−1t in individual ciphertexts in order to avoid masking when computing
the desired result, which would have increased the depth. However, we found that using
redundancy in the stored variables, i.e., repeating the elements in vector encoding of the
input columns, along with completely rewriting the way the operations are performed, can
alleviate this issue and keep the same depth as before.
We will use the encryption of the repeated elements encoding, Evr0(·), for the columns
of the Hankel matrices HUt and HYt, the vectors ūt, ȳt, the inputs and outputs ut,yt, the
reference rt, and to encode the costs. In the encoding, each element is repeated for S + T̄
times, where T̄ is the maximum number of online collected samples.
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For t = −M−N+1 : 0, follow the steps in the offline feedback solution, cf. Section 7.2.3.
Let S′ := S + t − 1, for t ≥ 1. The following plaintexts and ciphertexts are stored
at the cloud: λy and Q encoded as evr0(λQ) := evr0
([
λy . . . λy q[0] . . . q[pN−1]
])
,
λu and R encoded as evr0(λR) := evr0
([
λu . . . λu r[0] . . . r[mN−1]
])
, λg encoded
as evr0(λg), Evr0(yt), Evr0(ut), Evr0(rt), Evr0(ȳt−1), Evr0(ūt−1) and for i ∈ {0, . . . , S′ + 1}:
Ev0(coli(M
−1
t−1)), Evr0(coli(HYt)), Evr0(coli(HUt)). To avoid some masking operations, the
cloud also stores the rows of Uft : Ev0(rowi(U
f
t )) for i ∈ {0, . . . ,mN ]}.
The cloud service then locally computes the following, corresponding to lines 9 and 13
of Algorithm 7.2.1.
Evr0(ȳt) = ρ(Evr0(ȳt−1), p(S
′ + 1)) + ρ(Evr0(yt), (1− p)M(S′ + 1))
Evr0(ūt) = ρ(Evr0(ūt−1),m(S
′ + 1)) + ρ(Evr0(ut), (1−m)M(S′ + 1))
Evr0(colS′+1HYt) = ρ(Evr0(colS′HYt), p(S
′ + 1)) + ρ(Evr0(yt),−p(M +N − 1)(S′ + 1))
Evr0(colS′+1HUt) = ρ(Evr0(colS′HUt),m(S
′ + 1)) + ρ(Evr0(ut),−m(M +N − 1)(S′ + 1))
Ev0(rowi(U
f
t )) = Ev0(rowi(U
f
t )) + ρ(Evr0(colS′+1(HUt)) ei(S+T̄ ), S′ + 1), i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}
Evr0(ȳt, rt) = Evr0(ȳt) + ρ(Evr0(rt),−pM(S′ + 1)).
The precollected input and output measurements have a multiplicative depth of 0. To
reduce the total circuit depth, at time t + 1, although the cloud service has computed
the encryption of ut, the client sends a fresh encryption of it. This allows us to have,
∀t ≥ 0: d(colsHUt) = d(colsHYt) = d(ūt) = d(ȳt) = d(rt) = 0. The update of the row
representation of Uf needs a masking, so d(rowsUf ) = 1. From the offline computations,
we assume that we have fresh encryptions for the columns of M−10 , hence d(colsM
−1
0 ) = 0.
The encrypted operations, their flow and motivations are described in Section 7.2.4.2.
Compared to the previous approach in [15] (described in “Hybrid encoding”), we observed
that we can avoid extra computations and a possible extra level in the computations if the
server asks the client to compute 1/st immediately after it computes st. Hence, the server




Nut. The encrypted operations are described in (F.2.2)–(F.2.4), which correspond to lines 6
and 7 from Algorithm 7.2.1. EvalSumS+T̄ refers to rotating and summing batches of S + T̄



















Evr∗(mt[i]) ρ (Ev0(vt), i) .
After receiving a fresh encryption of 1/st from the client:
Ev0(colS′+1(M
−1












t )) = Ev0(vt)
S′∑
j=0
ρ (Ev0(wi), i− j) , i ∈ {0, . . . , S′ + 1}
Ev0(coli(M
−1
t )) = Ev0(coliM
−1





Ev0(vt) (−ei  Evr0(1/st)), S′ + 1
)
, i ∈ {0, . . . , S′ + 2}
Evr∗(Zt[j]) = EvalSumS+T̄
(
Evr0(coljHYt) evr0(λQ) Evr0(ȳt, rt)+
+ Evr0(coljHUt) evr0(λR) Evr0(ūt)
)
























After decryption: ut[i] =
i(S+T̄ )+S′+1∑
j=i(S+T̄ )
υt,i, i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. (F.2.4)
Following (F.2.2)–(F.2.4), we get the depth expressions for t ≥ 1:
d(M−1t ) = 2t+ 3, d(ut) = d(υt) = 2t+ 4. (F.2.5)
Remark F.2.1. We make an abuse of notation when writing that we obtain Ev0(·) and Evr0(·)
after the rotation of a ciphertext with trailing zeros. Actually, the initial nonzero values will
be shifted to the end of the encoded vector and we need to maintain a counter on how many
times we can perform these rotations. In the vector packing case, we need the parameters
to satisfy the following rules, before a masking is necessary:
ringDim/2 > max(m, p)(N +M + T̄ )(S + T̄ )
ringDim/2 > (S + T̄ )2
ringDim/2 > max(mM, p(N +M))t(S + T̄ ),
(F.2.6)
where the first line is for the online collection of samples (T̄ is the total number of samples
collected online), the second line is for the correct packing of the matrix into one ciphertext
and the last line is the rule for after finalizing the collection of new samples t ≥ T̄ (instead
of masking, here we can ask the client to prune the junk elements in ū, ȳ).
It is more efficient (and not problematic for the client when M is small) that after the
adaptation ends, the client sends to the server encryptions of ūt and ȳt instead of ut and yt.
Then, the last line of (F.2.6) is not needed and the computation can go on without the need
of refreshing. If the rules in Remark F.2.1 are not satisfied for the desired parameters of an
application, the values can be split into the necessary number of ciphertexts (each packing
up to ringDim/2 values) and the computations can be readily extended to deal with this.
Remark F.2.2. Note that one can use the inverse and forward Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT
and FFT) to multiply a Hankel matrix by a vector using IFFT(FFT(vec(H)) ◦ FFT(v)),
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and reassembling the resulting vector afterwards, where vec refers to vectorizing the Hankel
matrix. Since the CKKS decoding and encoding use IFFT and FFT, we can avoid some
plaintext encoding and decoding operations. However, we need to encode the ciphertext of
the result to be able to further operate on it, which ends up canceling the advantage of the
above observation. For other specific applications, where the resulting ciphertext is the final
output, using the above observation to perform the multiplication would be preferable.
F.3 Proof of Lemma 7.2.6
The following identities can be found in [32, Ch. 1,3]:
lim
δ→0+




(a) Using (F.3.1), we obtain:
lim
λg→0+

















is orthogonal onto the range of P1/2H. From the



















= 1 + hᵀP1/2(HᵀP1/2)†(P1/2H)†P1/2h,
where we used the pseudoinverse limit definition (F.3.1).
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(d) The proof is laborious so, for conciseness, we do not present the complete derivations.






values, which we show by proving lim
λg→0+
g(λg) ≥ 0 and ∂g(λg)∂λg ≥ 0. To this end, we used again
the pseudoinverse limit definitions and that (P1/2H)(P1/2H)† is an orthogonal projection
onto the range of (P1/2H) and hence, its eigenvalues are in {0, 1}.
Let us investigate (b) further. Let h = Hη for some vector η, that in slowly-varying





= 1 + ηᵀ(P1/2H)†(P1/2H)η.
(P1/2H)†(P1/2H) is an orthogonal projection operator, i.e., its eigenvalues are in {0, 1},
meaning that the quantity ηᵀ(P1/2H)†(P1/2H)η has a small magnitude. Then, the second
term in (b) is small.
F.4 Privacy of the encrypted algorithms
Our goal is to satisfy client privacy with respect to the semi-honest behavior of the server,
captured in Definition 2.2.8. Recall that xC denotes the input of the client, xS denotes
the input of the server. The functionality f in Definition 2.2.8 represents in this case the
data-driven algorithm, and fS(xC , xS) represents the output of the server after evaluating
the functionality of the given inputs.
Fix a number of time steps T . We want to prove a secure evaluation of the data-driven
control functionality for T steps, after which we assume the protocol ends. In reality, because
the security of the encryption scheme used is based on computational problems, after a long
time (years), it is recommended that the secret key is changed; so that represents a natural
stopping point T and is not restrictive.
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Under the aforementioned condition, the output of the protocol at the server, fS(xC , xS),
is actually the empty set. Furthermore, all the intermediate messages in the view of the
server will be ciphertext encrypted with the client’s public key using the CKKS scheme.
Finally, the ring dimension of the CKKS scheme is selected such that, for the multiplicative
budget of the desired functionality, an adversary cannot brute force the encryption. These
are the main observations that will be used in proving the subsequent theorems.
There is an preprocessing protocol, where the server gets and computes the encrypted
information it will have to use for the online control of the system, i.e., the encrypted
data trajectories, costs and parameters. This preprocessing protocol is proven secure under
the same Definition 2.2.8, hence, there is an ideal functionality Fpre, which is essentially
indistinguishable from the real-world functionality of the preprocessing protocol. We work
in a Fpre-hybrid model, which means that we can securely compose this functionality with
the functionality of the online protocols (see [152] for more details about simulation proofs
in the hybrid model and composition theorems).
Proof of Theorem 7.2.3. At time t ≤ T , the client’s input is HU, HY, u0:t−1, y0:t−1, r0:t−1
and pk, where pk is the public key of the leveled homomorphic scheme used. We assume
that, after the preprocessing protocol, the server has input Q, R, λg, λu, λy, pk and receives
as messages Ev0(diagiAr), Ev0(diagiAy), Ev0(diagiAu). At time t, the server receives from
the client either Evv(ūt),Evv(ȳt),Evv(rt) or Evv(ȳt),Evv(rt). After applying the functionality
as described in Section 7.2.3, the server obtains Ev0(ut) or Ev∗(ut) and sends it to the client.
The proof immediately follows from the fact that the server only receives fresh cipher-
texts from the client. Since the homomorphic encryption scheme is semantically secure,
these ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable from random encryptions, so we can
construct a simulator for the server that replaces the true messages from the client by ran-
dom encryptions of the same size. The input-output distribution of such a simulator will be
indistinguishable from the input-output distribution of the true protocol.
Proof of Theorem 7.2.7. The input of the client is the same as in the proof of Theorem 7.2.3.
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The input of the server is Q,R, λg, λu, λy,pk and after the preprocessing protocol, it has
the corresponding ciphertexts for HU0, HY0,M−10 ,U
f
0 . At time t < T̄ , while collecting
new samples, the server has ciphertexts corresponding to HUt−1, HYt−1,M−1t−1, ūt−1, ȳt−1,
receives from the client Evr0(ut),Evr0(yt),Evr0(rt), then computes Evr∗(st) and receives from
the client Evr0(1/st). The analysis in Section 7.2.4.3 does not reveal private information:
although the cloud server knows λg, it never gets st in cleartext. Finally, after applying the
functionality described in Section 7.2.4 and Section F.2, the server obtains the corresponding
ciphertexts of HUt, HYt,M−1t ,U
f
t , ūt, ȳt and Ev∗(υt), and sends the latter to the client,
which decrypts it and computes ut. During the times designated for refreshing M−1t , the
server packs it into a single ciphertext, sends it to the client and receives Ev0(M−1t ), which
uses new uncorrelated randomness. After the collection of the new samples ends, i.e., T̄ ≤
t ≤ T , the server only updates the ciphertexts corresponding to the quantities ūt and ȳt,
but otherwise computes the same output.
Since the server only receives fresh encryptions of the private data, we can construct a
simulator for the server that replaces the true messages from the client by random encryption
of corresponding size and apply the server’s functionality. Privacy follows because of the
semantic security of the underlying CKKS scheme.
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